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THROUGH A SCANNER DARKLY:
FUNCTIONAL NEUROIMAGING AS
EVIDENCE OF A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT’S
PAST MENTAL STATES†
Teneille Brown* & Emily Murphy**
As with phrenology and the polygraph, society is again confronted with a
device that the media claims is capable of reading our minds. Functional
magnetic resonance imaging (“fMRI”), along with other types of functional brain
imaging technologies, is currently being introduced at various stages of a
criminal trial as evidence of a defendant’s past mental state. This Article
demonstrates that functional brain images should not currently be admitted as
evidence into courts for this purpose. Using the analytical framework provided
by Federal Rule of Evidence 403 as a threshold to a Daubert/Frye analysis, we
demonstrate that, when fMRI methodology is properly understood, brain images
are only minimally probative of a defendant’s past mental states and are almost
certainly more unfairly prejudicial than probative on balance. Careful and
detailed explanation of the underlying science separates this Article from others,
which have tended to paint fMRI with a gloss of credibility and certainty for all
courtroom-relevant applications. Instead, we argue that this technology may
present a particularly strong form of unfair prejudice in addition to its potential
to mislead jurors and waste the court’s resources. Finally, since fMRI
methodology may one day improve such that its probative value is no longer
eclipsed by its extreme potential for unfair prejudice, we offer a nonexhaustive
checklist that judges and counsel can use to authenticate functional brain images
and assess the weight these images are to be accorded by fact finders.

† This Article is dedicated to our incredible friend and mentor Hank Greely.
* Teneille R. Brown, J.D., is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Utah,
S.J. Quinney College of Law. While writing this Article she was a fellow with the Stanford
Center for Biomedical Ethics, a fellow at the Stanford Law School Center for Law and the
Biosciences, and a research fellow with the MacArthur Foundation Law and Neuroscience
Project.
** Emily R. Murphy, Ph.D., is a J.D. candidate (2012) at Stanford Law School. While
writing this Article she was a fellow in the Stanford Law School Center for Law and
Biosciences and a research fellow on the MacArthur Foundation Law and Neuroscience
Project. Thanks to the MacArthur-funded Law and Neuroscience Project, Jeff Cooper, David
Faigman, Jaime King, Michael Saks, Hank Greely, Stephen Morse, Kathryn Abrams, Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong, Ryan Calo, R. Duncan Luce, William Uttal, and Sean Mackey for their
thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Special thanks to Nita Farahany and
Adina Roskies for their in-depth feedback and guidance.
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INTRODUCTION
Intent is basically a subjective element, that is, the operation of a person’s
mind. However, since we cannot x-ray a person’s mind to determine what he is
thinking, you may infer a person’s intent by his acts or words or both. 1

The model jury instruction above tantalizes those who hope to use
technology to improve upon current methods of determining what is in
someone’s mind. We now know that x-raying a person’s brain does not provide
direct access to her mind, but that was not always the case. 2 As with
phrenology 3 and the polygraph 4 before, courts are again confronted with a
technology that the media claims is capable of mind reading: functional
neuroimaging. A recent criminal case in California provides an example of the
attempted use of functional neuroimaging to address what was—or was not—
going on in a defendant’s mind at the time of the crime.
In Monterey County, defendant Francisco Saviñon was charged with
attempted murder. 5 After the dissolution of his long-term relationship and the
loss of his job, Saviñon became increasingly despondent and decided to commit
suicide. He testified that while sitting in his car inhaling carbon monoxide
fumes from the exhaust pipe, he “remembered” that a “recurring theme” in
conversations with his ex-girlfriend (Jane Doe) was that “if they could be
alone, free of kids and former spouses and the daily stresses of life—they

1. CHARGES TO THE JURY AND REQUESTS TO CHARGE IN A CRIMINAL CASE IN NEW YORK
§ 4:18 (2009) (emphasis added).
2. Attempts to use photographs to draw inferences about someone’s mental state have
been made for hundreds of years. In the nineteenth century, parties relied upon pictures of
the testator to indicate that he either was or was not “of sound mind” at the time of execution
of his will. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Forbes, 53 N.E. 146, 146 (Mass. 1899) (upholding a judge’s
refusal to consider photographs of the deceased as evidence of dementia); Varner v. Varner,
9 Ohio Cir. Dec. 273, 273 (Cir. Ct. 1898) (reversing and remanding where a photograph had
been introduced to establish a testator’s competence, because even “[t]he most devout
believer in the efficacy of the X rays has never urged them as a means of discovering the
mind . . . .”).
3. “Although the claims of the phrenologists were never taken seriously by the
mainstream scientific community, they did capture the popular imagination of the time. In
fact, a textbook on phrenology published in 1827 sold over 100,000 copies.” MARK F. BEAR
ET AL., NEUROSCIENCE: EXPLORING THE BRAIN 9 (1996).
4. See James R. Wygant, Uses, Techniques, and Reliability of Polygraph Testing, 42
AM. JURISPRUDENCE, TRIALS 313, 330 (2008) (“The importance we place upon the ability to
discern the truth is reflected in how we characterize other people. If we say that a person is
‘naive’ or ‘gullible,’ we usually mean that he or she can be fooled easily. To some extent we
relate ‘wisdom’ to insight . . . . The desire to be wise, to know the truth, has led naturally to
the development of aids to observation, including the polygraph.”).
5. Press Release, Monterey County Dist. Attorney, Firefighter Sentenced to Thirty
Years, Eight Months for Attempted Murder (Feb. 27, 2009) (on file with authors)
[hereinafter Saviñon Press Release].
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would be happy.” 6 Saviñon claimed that in his altered state of consciousness,
due to alcohol intoxication and carbon monoxide exposure, he decided “this
[recurring theme] meant she wanted to die with him and they would both be
happy if they went to heaven together.” 7
Saviñon got into a second car, drove to Jane Doe’s condo, and waited for
her to emerge. When Jane Doe left her building, Saviñon attacked her and took
her at knifepoint in her own car to his apartment. When she gained awareness
of her surroundings and struggled against him, he stabbed her at least twice
before forcing her into his car. He duct-taped her to the passenger seat and
attempted to poison them both with the exhaust fumes. Jane Doe managed to
convince him not to kill them both. Saviñon released her on the condition that
she promised not to tell anyone who attacked her. Saviñon then bandaged her
wounds and took her back to her apartment, where he brought her a cordless
8
phone so she could call 911.
Saviñon entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity,
based on a claim that due to his psychiatric diagnosis of major depressive
disorder and his acute carbon monoxide exposure, he was cognitively impaired
and thus could not have formed the required mens rea for attempted murder. 9
The defendant’s claims were to be supported by family testimony, psychiatric
clinical testimony, and by images from a functional neuroimaging device
known as single proton emission computerized tomography (SPECT)
machine. 10 Dr. William Klindt of San Jose Brain Clinic obtained the SPECT
images about five months after the incident. 11
Functional neuroimaging devices like SPECT are not generally accepted in

6. Defendant’s Offer of Proof and Points and Authorities Re SPECT Evidence at 2,
People v. Saviñon, No. SS070622A (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 12, 2009) (on file with authors)
[hereinafter Saviñon Defendant’s Offer of Proof].
7. Id. This admission in and of itself may acknowledge that the defendant intended to
kill his ex-girlfriend, but defense experts planned to testify that the defendant’s beliefs were
the product of disordered reasoning, and “that defendant was legally insane at the time of the
offense.” Id. at 3-4. This would tend to negate an inference that the defendant had the
requisite mens rea to kill.
8. Id. at 3.
9. Id.
10. Id. SPECT scanning uses a radionuclide tracer to image blood flow and brain
metabolism, and is similar to fMRI in the reliance on blood flow assessment to make
inferences about neural function. SPECT scanning, like fMRI, is not presently useful for
making psychiatric diagnoses. We will discuss each device in greater detail infra in Part II.
11. Id. at 4. The defense counsel in Saviñon acknowledged that the brain images could
not prove whether the defendant was legally insane or possessed the specific intent to kill.
The defense argued instead that Dr. Klindt would testify that “the functioning of the brain, as
demonstrated by the SPECT imaging, is consistent with the diagnoses [of] . . . ‘major
depression’ . . . [and] consistent with toxic exposure . . . .” Id. at 6-7.
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the medical or scientific community for the purpose of validating depression. 12
Even so, Dr. Klindt was prepared to assert that SPECT’s appropriate
neurological uses transferred validity to other as-yet unproven forensic
psychiatric uses. 13 It is improper for advocates to blur together the multiple
uses of a technology such as functional neuroimaging. 14
In addition to highlighting the way functional neuroimaging may be coopted by parties to a case, the Saviñon case also illustrates the important and
practical impact of resources in the adversarial system. Despite the
prosecution’s having a written affidavit by a respected SPECT expert 15
refuting the validity of SPECT for forensic psychiatric purposes, the district
attorney’s office did not have the funds to pay for this expert to travel to the
Bay Area for both the pretrial evidentiary hearing and, if admitted, the actual
trial itself. Understandably, the prosecutor facing the pretrial hearing was
worried that the paper testimony from her expert would not be as persuasive as
the defense expert’s oral testimony and accompanying colorful brain images. 16
At the time of this writing, data are being gathered to assess the frequency
12. Declaration of Alan D. Waxman, M.D. at 2 (Dec. 4, 2008) (unsubmitted
prosecution motion in People v. Saviñon, No. SS070622A (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 12, 2009))
(on file with authors).
13. In a pre-trial defense motion, the defense argued that because SPECT is used
clinically to track Alzheimer’s disease, strokes, and trauma, it should also be accepted for the
very different purpose of diagnosing psychiatric conditions such as depression. Saviñon
Defendant’s Offer of Proof, supra note 6, at 7-8 (relying on a secondary source to describe
medical diagnostic use of SPECT imaging).
14. In California, expert scientific evidence is reviewed under the Kelly test, which
states that for a novel technology to be admitted, it “must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs.” People v. Kelly, 549
P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976) (quoting Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir.
1923)). To see how the Kelly test ought to be applied with regard to neuroimaging offered to
prove past mental states, see People v. Ford, No. B171801, 2005 WL 236487, at *7 (Cal. Ct.
App. Jan. 25, 2005) (“Dr. Woods intended to testify that a SPECT scan performed on
appellant’s brain confirmed or was consistent with his clinical findings of cognitive
impairments and of impairment to the frontal and temporal lobes of appellant’s brain. The
trial court excluded any reference to the SPECT scan results, finding that the technology was
not generally accepted in the medical community for diagnostic purposes in a forensic
setting and therefore did not meet the Kelly standard for admissibility.”). See infra Part III
for a discussion of the various tests that govern the admissibility of scientific evidence, and
how those tests should apply to neuroimages offered to prove mental state.
15. Declaration of Waxman, supra note 12.
16. We provided the prosecutor with the arguments laid out in the rest of this paper,
but before the admissibility of the SPECT scan and Dr. Klindt’s accompanying testimony
could be determined in a pretrial evidentiary hearing, the defendant pled to thirty years in
prison. See Saviñon Press Release, supra note 5. The resource issue may cut both ways:
indigent defendants reliant on public resources may have less access to brain imaging, while
private defense firms may spare no expense and steamroll the prosecution. Conversely, while
at present the defense proffers most examples of brain imaging as evidence, so too could the
state inappropriately rely on neuroimaging to bolster arguments of dangerousness and civil
commitment. Prosecutory use in individual cases is, of course, limited by the compliance of
the defendant to submit to a brain scan.
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of neuroimaging-based evidence offered or accepted in court. 17 Anecdotal
reports such as the Saviñon case lead us to hypothesize that functional brain
images are showing up with increasing frequency in state trial courts with
advocates attempting to rely on brain images to bolster otherwise weak mensrea-type claims.
In this Article, we argue that functional brain images should not currently
be admitted into evidence to prove or rebut criminal mens rea charges. 18 We do
this within a framework built on Federal Rule of Evidence 403: assessing
probative and prejudicial value of functional brain imaging for mens rea claims.
We conclude that functional brain images are minimally probative when
introduced to prove a defendant’s mens rea, and almost certainly more unfairly
prejudicial than probative on balance. Furthermore, we argue that Rule 403,
19
rather than the Daubert (or similar) rules governing scientific evidence,
provides both (a) the necessary individualized assessment of claims and (b)
room to allow the technology, as well as the public understanding of the
technology, to improve and adapt, rather than being defined by Daubert (or
similar) rulings that may be categorically and too broadly applied. 20
Part I of this Article establishes the background motivation for this
17. The MacArthur Law and Neuroscience Project is currently gathering data on how
often neuroimaging evidence is being introduced in California trial courts, by whom, and for
what purpose. This project is led by Hank Greely of Stanford Law School and involves
contacting district attorneys and public defenders in each California county to assess the
relative frequency of reliance upon neuroimaging evidence in lower courts. For details on
this
project,
see
The
Law
&
Neuroscience
Project,
http://www.lawandneuroscienceproject.org (last visited Nov. 17, 2009). The most systematic
way to research case frequency is by going to the reported appellate cases, but these cases
will not include those where the defendant used neuroimaging successfully and was
acquitted. Capital cases where the fMRI successfully resulted in a life sentence rather than
the death penalty are unlikely to be appealed, and the evidentiary issues are often not dealt
with in great detail. Often it is not even possible to determine whether the discussed evidence
was admitted or who the expert witness was. As such, the appellate record only tells a sliver
of the story of admissibility, and we need to scour trial court records for a more
representative view. An excellent review of the use of neuroscience in juvenile cases from
Terry Maroney demonstrates the legal and scientific limitations of such attempts. Terry A.
Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 89 (2010).
18. While we focus here on criminal mental states such as specific intent or purpose to
kill, the bulk of our arguments could also apply to the use of functional brain images to
prove mental states such as pain, bias, or experiential knowledge. It is important to reiterate
that in narrowing our focus to functional brain images addressed to past mental states, we are
not evaluating structural brain images such as those that result from X-ray, CT, or regular
MRI scans. Structural scans do not render data or images of brain activity; rather, they
render images of brain structures such as tumors or tissue damage.
19. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
20. For example, once a Daubert hearing is conducted on a category of scientific
evidence (think Bendectin and birth defects), it may be thought of as a legal rule rather than
a factual assessment that depends greatly on the specifics of the case. This does not have to
be the case, but one of our chief concerns is that judges and lawyers may blur together many
different uses of a technology such as functional neuroimaging.
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argument and lays out the terrain of why and how functional neuroimaging is
being used in courts to negate mens rea. Part II explains each step of the
imaging methodology—specifically, functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI)—in plain terms, critically examining the complex and non-obvious
steps required to produce the colorful images. These steps have direct relevance
to admissibility and probative value determinations. 21 While previous articles
have addressed the admissibility of neuroimages generally, 22 our purposes are
(a) to provide sufficient detail that would be useful to a judge or attorney who
is actually confronted with an evidentiary hearing and (b) to establish the
scientific baseline to which admissibility decisions in the future may be
analogized.
Part III applies the rules of evidence to the scientific details from Part II.
Part III argues that the unfairly prejudicial effects will likely substantially
outweigh any probative value of functional brain imaging for mens rea claims,
even if other admissibility hurdles are cleared. In the Appendix we offer
guidelines for authenticating images as well as properly assessing the weight to
accord to such evidence in the event that functional brain imaging technology
advances such that it is truly probative for certain purposes and its prejudicial
value can be sufficiently mitigated.
I. FUNCTIONAL NEUROIMAGING FOR MENS REA CLAIMS
The arguments advanced in this Article are narrowly aimed at functional
brain imaging evidence, both images and expert testimony, addressed to mens
rea claims. Some arguments may generalize to other courtroom uses of

21. As the reader will discover, one of the chief problems with functional
neuroimaging is the “epistemic mismatch,” that is, the difference between the steps a viewer
thinks are required to produce an image, and the actual number of steps required. See Adina
L. Roskies, Neuroimaging and Inferential Distance, 1 NEUROETHICS 19, 20-21 (2008). This
problem can be addressed by proper authentication of the evidence, something that has not
been addressed by any other article.
22. For a thoughtful review of how courts have analyzed the admissibility of PET and
SPECT methodology, see Neal Feigenson, Brain Imaging and Courtroom Evidence: On the
Admissibility and Persuasiveness of fMRI, 2 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 233 (2006). Feigenson’s
article sets forth guidelines for how courts may interpret fMRI in a very accessible way, but
as it does not apply the rules of evidence to a particular use, it ends up being too charitable in
its abstract assessment of probative value. For another interesting article on the admissibility
of neuroimaging, see Jane Moriarty, Flickering Admissibility: Neuroimaging Evidence in the
U.S. Courts, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 29 (2008), which covers many types of brain imaging
evidence for many uses. Because there are important differences between structural and
functional imaging devices, and critical differences between use of a scan to show brain
damage versus use for inferences of mental states such as deception, these two important
articles are much broader in their scope than our Article. Furthermore, Mark Pettit addressed
the admissibility of fMRI in a 2007 article. However, his piece can be viewed as more of an
early issue-spotting article as it does not interpret the rules of evidence by looking directly at
the current state of the science. See Mark Pettit, Jr., FMRI and BF Meet FRE: Brain Imaging
and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 319, 319 (2007).
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functional brain imaging; certainly, we expect the scientific background to be
useful in many cases that use functional neuroimaging to make claims about
complex mental processes such as lying and recalling memories. 23
The motivating factors behind this Article are twofold. First, we anticipate
an expansion of the use of functional brain imaging as forensic evidence, based
on existing case precedent, advancing technology, and increasing availability. 24
For those reasons, this Article attempts to provide a substantial practical
grounding for judges and legal practitioners to assess such evidence’s utility
and potential for unfair prejudice. Second, the emerging field of neuroscience
and law has seen some speculation about the scope of the impact of
neuroscience on the law, particularly at the level of legal philosophy and
justification for punishment. If such impacts are anticipated to take root in the
courtroom, 25 a solid grounding in evidentiary analysis is a primary concern.
A. What Is Functional Neuroimaging?
Functional neuroimaging (or functional brain imaging) refers to a class of
nonsurgical devices and methodologies that allow measurement of living brain
activity. This category is distinct from structural imaging, such as a CT scan or
MRI. Structural imaging provides images of gross anatomical features, but not
of underlying neuronal or metabolic activity.
There are a few different types of functional neuroimaging devices. fMRI
is the most popular functional brain imaging device in cognitive neuroscience
research, as discussed in Part II. Tremendous excitement abounds regarding the
research and clinical applications of fMRI. It is used preoperatively by
23. By “mens rea” claims we refer to the legal term of art in criminal law referring to a
determination of culpability that attaches to a specific act, such as purpose, knowledge, or
recklessness—or the lack thereof—at the time of the crime. We distinguish this use from
other “mental state” uses, such as after-the-fact tests attempting to establish truth-telling or
presence or absence of crime-related memories. Advocates have offered, and continue to
offer, neuroimaging evidence for these other “mental state” uses. The technical and legal
conclusions of this Article will largely apply to both types of uses.
24. See generally Purvak Patel et al., The Role of Imaging in United States
Courtrooms, 17 NEUROIMAGING CLINICS N. AM. 557 (2007) (highlighting recent courtroom
uses of imaging technology). We might also see courtroom uses swell as more commercial
providers of fMRI services enter the market. According to No Lie MRI’s website, “[s]ince
the discrediting of the polygraph a large market for accurate truth verification and lie
detection has been largely untapped. The current estimation of this market, conservatively
based on the peak market demand for polygraph testing in the mid-1980s, is $3.6 billion.
However it is likely the technology used by No Lie MRI, Inc. will be able to expand the
market well beyond this level.” No Lie MRI, Investors Overview, http://www.noliemri.com/
investors/Overview.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2009).
25. An evidentiary analysis seems to be a natural starting point for the introduction of
neuroscience to the law. However, recent scholarship has demonstrated that the effect of
neuroscience may be minimal, and perhaps efforts to effect change in the legal system
should be attempted through legislative and policy channels rather than in individualized
cases. See Maroney, supra note 17, at 169.
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neurosurgeons to attempt to localize areas of critical perceptive, motor, and
cognitive functions so that these abilities are less likely to be destroyed during
tumor or tissue resection. It is also used to assess stroke damage and to follow
the progression of Alzheimer’s and epilepsy. Notwithstanding these important
medical uses, much imaging with fMRI is done exclusively in the research
context. Even within the research context, however, “fundamental questions
concerning the interpretation of fMRI data abound, as the conclusions drawn
often ignore the actual limitations of the methodology.” 26 These fundamental
questions are critical to an assessment of fMRI’s evidentiary value. The
conclusions drawn in the research context may often not be as far afield as
those being asserted in the courtroom.
B. Mens Rea Claims
Criminal acts typically must be accompanied by a particular mental state to
be punishable. 27 The separate requirements for the voluntary act (actus reus)
and the guilty mind (mens rea) endorse a separation between mental state and
bodily act that remains the dominant view in American criminal law. 28 The
mens rea requirement stems from the common law notion of reserving
punishment for those behaving wickedly. 29 However, the doctrine has evolved
to have less to do today with the character of the individual and more to do with
the coupling of a particular state of mind (or level of deliberation) with the
criminal act. 30

26. Nikos K. Logothetis, What We Can Do and What We Cannot Do with fMRI, 453
NATURE 869, 869 (2008).
27. Strict liability crimes such as speeding, drunk driving, and statutory rape are the
exceptions to the rule, but the large majority of criminal acts require some showing of intent
or knowledge. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.01, at 117 (5th
ed. 2009).
28. As Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen have pointed out, the idea that the brain and
body are somehow different from the mind (i.e., dualism) runs deep not just in the law, but
also in our folk intuitions of justice. Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law,
Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y
LONDON 1775, 1781 (2004) (“As long as the mind remains a black box, there will always be
a donkey on which to pin dualist and libertarian intuitions. . . . Arguments are nice, but
physical demonstrations are far more compelling. What neuroscience does, and will continue
to do at an accelerated pace, is elucidate the ‘when’, ‘where’ and ‘how’ of the mechanical
processes that cause behaviour.”).
29. Nita A. Farahany & James E. Coleman, Jr., Genetics, Neuroscience, and Criminal
Responsibility, in THE IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW 218, 219 (Nita
A. Farahany ed., 2009).
30. DRESSLER, supra note 27, § 10.02[B]-[C], at 118-19. Often intent is the state of
mind that is contested, though under the Model Penal Code, it is purposeful action or
knowledge. States that have adopted the Model Penal Code define specific intent crimes
such as murder as requiring the mental state of “knowingly” or “purposely.” MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02(2)(c)-(d) (2008). The mental state required for criminal manslaughter is
recklessness (involving actual awareness of the danger of death), and that for criminally
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This Article specifically addresses the use of functional neuroimaging to
support what we are calling “mens rea claims,” referring simultaneously to
defenses that attempt to inject doubt into the prosecution’s case of proving a
requisite mental state, and to affirmative defenses such as insanity. As
illustrated by the defense arguments in Saviñon, the doctrinal curtain that exists
between negating mens rea and waging an insanity defense is really more like a
veil. 31 The principal distinction between the two is quite straightforward, but in
practice the boundaries are blurred. Recall that the defense in Saviñon used an
argument about Saviñon’s lack of mens rea to bolster a legal insanity defense.
How one argues an insanity defense depends upon the jurisdiction. In most but
not all cases, the states retaining an insanity defense require that the defendant
bear the initial burden of raising the defense. In many jurisdictions, once the
defendant has done this, the burden of persuasion shifts to the prosecution to
prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
As “mens rea” translates literally to “guilty mind,” some group the two
concepts together and think of mens rea as both the absence of an affirmative
insanity defense and the presence of the mental state that must be coupled with
the criminal act. 32 In this way, “mens rea defenses” could include negating
mens rea as well as affirmative claims of insanity and diminished capacity.
Technically, our thesis could apply to all such mens rea defenses. While the
two are distinct (a defendant could in theory be legally insane and still have
intended to kill someone, or someone could be legally sane and not have so
intended), in practice evidence of a mental disease or defect will often be used
to establish either. 33
The distinction between criminal mind and criminal act informs theories of
punishment, but it also performs another function: it establishes a legal
negligent homicide is gross negligence. Id. §§ 210.3-.4.
31. See Christopher Slobogin, The Supreme Court’s Recent Criminal Mental Health
Cases, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2007, at 8, 12 (“[I]nsanity and mens rea are distinct concepts, even
though they may overlap to some extent.”).
32. Stephen J. Morse & Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente Between Legal
Insanity and Mens Rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1071,
1075 (2007).
33. Mens rea is a matter of what actually occurred: did the defendant intend to do the
crime at the time of the act? Legal insanity is a question of capacity or control: was the
defendant capable of understanding the nature of what he was doing and knowing that what
he was doing was wrong, or could he not have done otherwise? Because of this distinction,
which is really more of a layering of factors, neuroscience evidence may perhaps be more
relevant for claims of legal insanity than it is for claims negating mental state to the extent
that the former can rely on present-time assessments, whereas the latter must look back to
the time of the act itself. In most jurisdictions, legal insanity is a question of capacity and not
actual control. In these jurisdictions, therefore, the prosecution need not show that the
defendant actually appreciated the nature and wrongfulness of his actions, only that he was
capable of doing so. For a useful review of the history of the insanity defense and the
distinction between the “control” or “capacity” tests of legal insanity, see Richard E.
Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and Legal Insanity in the TwentyFirst Century, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51, 80-85 (2006).
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requirement that cannot be concretely measured. The task of identifying the
subjective criminal mind has always and continues to elude us. 34 The
promotion of technological flops such as phrenology and the polygraph may be
understood, in part, as attempts to impose greater scientific certainty on the
assessment of mens rea and criminal responsibility. 35 Because we cannot
presently read someone’s mind to determine her mens rea at the time of the
crime, the jury is often told it can rely on the objective circumstances
surrounding the criminal’s conduct to draw inferences about her state of
mind. 36 For example, the purpose to kill may be inferred from evidence
showing that a defendant used a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim’s
body. 37 Intent can also be supported by evidence of flight, motive, or other
behaviors consistent with intentional behavior. 38 But all of these measures are
indirect, and they rely on observable behaviors to analogize from one’s own
experienced contingencies between mental states and behavior to inferences of
purpose. As Christopher Slobogin and other scholars have pointed out, isolating
the criminal state of mind from the act typically relies on a reconstructed
narrative that fuses together our beliefs, intentions, and actions. 39
34. While the precise genesis of the mens rea requirement is disputed, the tying of a
criminal act with a criminal state of mind can be traced back to “Jewish law, Christian
theology, Codex Justinianus, and even tribal English law.” Keren Shapira-Ettinger, The
Conundrum of Mental States: Substantive Rules and Evidence Combined, 28 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2577, 2579 (2007); see also United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 48992 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (providing an incredibly thorough history of the mens rea requirement
through ancient, Medieval, and modern law).
35. When the polygraph was first introduced, it was touted for its objectivity over
medieval attempts to establish the truth. “The interrogation of criminal suspects may not be
easier today than formerly, but it is at least on a more objective basis.” Paul V. Trovillo, A
History of Lie Detection, 29 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 848, 848 (1939). In the same
article, Trovillo invokes an Ayur-Veda text dated at 900 BC to frame his argument for
greater objectivity: “A person who gives poison may be recognized. He does not answer
questions . . . he speaks nonsense, rubs the great toe along the ground, and shivers; his face is
discolored . . . .” Id. at 849.
36. Bruce Ledewitz, Mr. Carroll’s Mental State or What Is Meant by Intent, 38 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 71, 72 (2001); see also Franklin v. Anderson, 267 F. Supp. 2d 768, 791 (S.D.
Ohio 2003) (“[T]he purpose with which a person does an act or brings about a result is
determined from the manner in which it was done, the means or weapon used and all of the
other facts and circumstances in evidence.”).
37. See, e.g., Curry v. State, 657 S.E.2d 218, 220 (Ga. 2008) (“[Defendant] contends
that the trial court erred in charging the jury that it could infer the intent to kill from the use
of a deadly weapon. . . . [G]iven the overwhelming evidence that [defendant] repeatedly shot
the victim without provocation from the victim, the charge constitutes harmless error.”
(footnotes omitted)); Commonwealth v. Jones, 912 A.2d 268, 279 (Pa. 2006).
38. See, e.g., State v. Aviles, 944 A.2d 994, 1000 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008) (holding that
there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendant had intent to kill his
girlfriend based on his behavior, which included arguing with his girlfriend, retrieving a gun,
and shooting her after she slammed a door); see also People v. MacCullough, 274 N.W. 693,
698 (Mich. 1937) (“Evidence of flight is not substantive evidence of guilt, though it may
bear upon the purpose and intent of the party.” (citation omitted)).
39. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE: THE ROLE OF LAW,
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Determining the mens rea of an accused person is to attempt mind reading
(and, indeed, time travel). As noted above, this task is presently accomplished
by inferences drawn from observable behavior. Functional brain imaging seems
to offer a more direct method of “mind-reading” by offering quantification of
some processes going on inside our skulls. It is not our purpose here to delve
deeply into the philosophical problems of “knowing” other minds. It is worth
noting, however, that it is precisely the question of inferring a mental state from
a quantified brain state that makes functional brain imaging as evidence of
mental states different in kind from other forms of scientific evidence to which
it is sometimes analogized. The obvious comparison is to forensic genetics.
While DNA testing can reliably identify suspects and place people at crime
scenes, the results of a genome-wide association study or a point mutation
analysis cannot yet be used to make inferences about complex mental states.
Even so, genetics has successfully overhauled the criminal justice system due
to the fixed nature of our genes and the validity of our genetic tests. But unlike
our genes, our brains and mental states change.
Any ability to “read our minds” depends on several working assumptions,
including: the strength of the contingency between brain states and mental
states, the completeness of our knowledge of cognitive neuroscience, and the
accuracy of behavioral assessments and self-reporting that comprise the library
of existing knowledge about both normal and pathological mental states. 40
These assumptions are not addressed de facto by improving technology or
analytical methods. 41 Rather, the specificity and relevance of the behavioral
SCIENCE, AND SPECULATION IN ADJUDICATING CULPABILITY AND DANGEROUSNESS 44 (2007)
(“[A]lthough ascertaining objective truth might be possible with respect to acts, narrative
thinking dominates attempts to reconstruct mental state. . . . Science cannot tell us the truth
about past mental states because science is meant to identify objective reality, not
interpretations of reality. . . . Even if, in theory, particular past mental states can be said to
‘exist’ in some objective sense, as a practical matter science will not be up to the task of
measuring them.”); see also Deborah W. Denno, Criminal Law in a Post-Freudian World,
2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 601, 605 (“[W]hat people intend, think, and believe are paramount to
assessing guilt; in some cases, they can mean the difference between life and death. How
odd for a legal system to base so much on something about which it seems to know so
little.”).
40. See Martha Farah, Neuroethics and the Problem of Other Minds: Implications of
Neuroscience for the Moral Status of Brain-Damaged Patients and Nonhuman Animals, 1
NEUROETHICS 9, 16-17 (2008).
41. Edward Cheng claims that “[i]t’s not clear whether or not a somewhat reliable but
foolproof fMRI machine is any worse than having a jury look at a witness. . . . If you want
the status quo, fine, but in this case, the status quo might not be all that good.” Alexis
Madrigal, MRI Lie Detection to Get First Day in Court, WIRED SCI., Mar. 16, 2009,
http://blog.wired.com/wiredscience/2009/03/noliemri.html. In fact, it is clear. fMRI has not
been demonstrated to be better than the status quo. While we acknowledge that the current
method of assessing a defendant’s mental state is not ideal, functional brain imaging does
not save us from the problem of human discretion, malingering, and distortion. What it does
is present findings in a way that appear incredibly objective, infallible, and robust, without
actually being any of these things. For our discussion of the unfairly prejudicial effects of
neuroimages, see infra Part III.G.
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tasks used to generate fMRI data must be improved upon before they should be
considered for forensic use—a challenge that is acutely psychological and,
perhaps when dealing with specific issues of malicious intent, at least
somewhat normative in nature. 42
Furthermore, the appropriate translation of functional neuroimaging to a
forensic context demands that proponents answer the question of what
additional explanatory power such data lends to a particular argument about
mens rea. Answering this question is particularly crucial when fMRI is derived
from a behavioral task and, at present, the mere absence of activation cannot be
taken as proof of any deficit, inability, or incapacity. These are all important
points that limit the probative value of functional brain imaging for mens rea
purposes, and each will be addressed in greater detail below.
C. Present and Anticipated Future Use of Functional Brain Imaging in Courts
Brain imaging has been offered as courtroom evidence for a variety of
reasons, albeit not always successfully. These purposes include everything
from competence to waive Miranda rights, 43 subjective experience of pain in
tort cases, 44 custody determinations, 45 mens rea defenses for fraud, 46
kidnapping, burglary, 47 and even murder. 48 A recent article by Terry Maroney
catalogs the attempts to use brain imaging in juvenile cases. 49 Functional
neuroimaging has already been admitted and relied upon as evidence of an
individual’s past mental state. 50
42. Emily Bell and Eric Racine provide a succinct reminder of the challenges created
by the task dependency of fMRI: “Careful consideration of fMRI task dependency casts
doubts on the ease of translation of fMRI to yield robust and substantial real-world uses.”
Emily Bell & Eric Racine, Enthusiasm for Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI)
Often Overlooks Its Dependence on Task Selection and Performance, 9 AM. J. BIOETHICS–
NEUROSCIENCE 23, 23-24 (2009).
43. See In re Roberto H., No. B192678, 2007 WL 4533141, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec.
27, 2007).
44. See Response to Motion of Defendant to Preclude Testimony of Dr. Joy Hirsch,
Ph.D. or in the Alternative for a Frye Hearing at 3, Koch v. W. Emulsions, Inc., No. C20061227 (Super. Ct. Ariz. Sept. 5, 2008).
45. See In re Jasmine M., No. B192729, 2007 WL 1139980, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr.
18, 2007).
46. See United States v. Mezvinsky, 206 F. Supp. 2d 661, 663 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
47. See People v. Herrera, No. B163516, 2003 WL 22962809, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
Dec. 17, 2003).
48. See Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170, 177-82 (Mo. 2009).
49. See Maroney, supra note 17.
50. fMRI was recently admitted at the sentencing stage of a the criminal trial of Brian
Dugan of Illinois. See Greg Miller, fMRI Evidence Used in Murder Sentencing, SCI. INSIDER,
Nov. 23, 2009, http://blogs.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2009/11/fmri-evidence-u.html;
see also People v. Ward, No. B193719, 2008 WL 3906423, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 26,
2008) (“Ward’s primary defense was that a significant preexisting brain injury, combined
with alcohol, negated the mental state required to convict him of second degree murder.
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One expert, Daniel Martell, has received so many requests from counsel
that he began a business called “Forensic Neuroscience Consultants.” 51
According to an interview with Martell reported in The New York Times
Magazine, he has been hired by defense teams and prosecutors alike and has
testified in several hundred cases over the last fifteen years. 52 While his
experience may not generalize, he believes that death penalty litigation will be
the site of neuroscience evidence’s most dramatic impact, as “[s]ome sort of
53
organic brain defense has become de rigueur in any sort of capital defense.”
If Martell and other experts such as neurologist Helen Mayberg are correct, the
tide is rising on this type of argument in criminal cases, particularly capital
cases. 54
While prosecutors may one day introduce fMRI as evidence of future
dangerousness, presently defense teams appear to be the dominant users of
neuroimaging in the courtroom. One practical reason for this is that it would be
physically difficult for the state to compel a brain scan of an unwilling person.
Neuroimaging has seen the courtroom in the sentencing phase of capital cases,

Ward . . . presented the expert testimony of Dr. Joseph Chong-Sang Wu, . . . [who] testified a
positron emission tomography (PET) scan of Ward’s brain function revealed ‘a profound
abnormality in the frontal lobe,’ which is the part of the brain involved with judgment,
awareness of the consequences of one’s actions and the ability to regulate improper
impulses.”); People v. Ford, No. B171801, 2005 WL 236487, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 25,
2005); Commonwealth v. Yancy, 797 N.E.2d 371, 374-75 (Mass. 2003). For examples of
EEG-based neuroimaging evidence that was introduced but not admitted, see
Commonwealth v. Henry, 569 A.2d 929, 936 (Pa. 1990); State v. Idellfonso-Diaz, No.
M2006-00203-CCA-R9-CD, 2006 WL 3093207 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 8, 2006). For
examples in which the defense attempted to obtain neuroimaging evidence but funds were
denied, see People v. Guerra, 129 P.3d 321, 339 (Cal. 2006); Mangum v. State, 765 So. 2d
192, 193-94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
51. The Forensic Neuroscience Consultants website lists “Neuropsychological Issues
in Diminished Capacities/Diminished Actualities and related Mens Rea defenses” as an area
of expertise. Forensic Neuroscience Consultants, Inc., http://forensicneuroscience.com (last
visited Nov. 29, 2009).
52. Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2007, § 6 (Magazine),
at 48, 50.
53. Id. at 50. Similarly, Art Barnum & Ted Gregory, Dugan’s Brain the Subject of
Sentencing Hearing, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 6, 2009, at 14, describe the testimony of neuroscientist
Kent Kiehl in the sentencing phase of convicted child rapist and murderer Brian Dugan:
Kiehl testified for four hours that Dugan’s fMRI brain scans help show that Dugan is a
psychopath with an abnormally functioning brain. Dugan’s lawyers asked jurors to consider
this abnormality as evidence of Dugan’s incapacity to make moral decisions, and thus not
put him to death. Id. Nevertheless, Dugan was sentenced to death. Id.
54. Helen S. Mayberg is a neurologist at Emory University and has testified in many
trials. She spoke about the burgeoning courtroom use of imaging studies at a presentation to
MacArthur Foundation on Law and Neuroscience members at its annual meeting in Santa
Barbara, California on May 29, 2008. See also Patel, supra note 24. As mentioned supra
note 17, the MacArthur-funded Law and Neuroscience Project is currently building a
database of lower court cases in which neuroimaging was introduced or attempted to be
introduced.
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where evidentiary hurdles are much lower and a capital defendant may have a
constitutional entitlement to a psychiatric evaluation. 55 One might further
argue that criminal defendants have a right under the Sixth Amendment to
present exculpatory evidence such as fMRI images, though recent Supreme
Court precedent places practical limitations on this right. 56
D. The Impact of Neuroscience on the Law: Grounding in Evidence
The final motivation for this Article is to be useful to the nascent and
expanding field of neuroscience and law. This field has received vigorous
attention due to speculation or hope that neuroscience will be better able than
psychology or philosophy to shed light on the mechanisms of the criminal mind
and justifications for criminal responsibility. 57 In turn, some scholars argue that
55. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (“[W]hen a defendant demonstrates
to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial,
the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who
will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and
presentation of the defense. This is not to say, of course, that the indigent defendant has a
constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to hire
his own. . . . [W]e leave to the States the decision on how to implement this right.”).
56. As the defendant’s right to compulsory process “would be defeated if judgments
were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts,” the Sixth
Amendment does not provide a right to present unreliable, confusing, or cumulative
evidence. Donald Dripps, Relevant but Prejudicial Exculpatory Evidence: Rationality Versus
Jury Trial and the Right to Put on a Defense, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1389, 1405 (1996) (quoting
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410-12 (1988)); see also EDWARD IMWINKELRIED &
NORMAN GARLAND, EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE 19-35 (3d ed. 2004); Peter Westen, The
Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 96-100 (1974) (chronicling the history of
the inclusion of the Compulsory Process Clause in the Sixth Amendment).
In United States v. Scheffer, the Court held that a per se rule against admission of
polygraph evidence in court martial proceedings did not violate the Sixth Amendment rights
of the accused to present a defense. 523 U.S. 303, 309 (1998). The state advanced legitimate
interests that included “ensuring that only reliable evidence is introduced at trial, preserving
the court members’ role in determining credibility, and avoiding litigation that is collateral to
the primary purpose of the trial.” Id. For a survey of various cases that further define the
right to present exculpatory evidence, see Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 331
(2006); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691 (1986); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S.
479, 488-89 (1984); United States v. Sparkman, 500 F.3d 678, 682 (8th Cir. 2007); Harris v.
United States, 834 A.2d 106, 124 (D.C. 2003); Commonwealth v. Durning, 548 N.E.2d
1242, 1248 (Mass. 1990); King v. State, 962 So. 2d. 124, 127 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
57. Joshua Greene and Robert Sapolsky, among others, make the case that
neuroscience will lead us to see humans in more deterministic ways, where defendants with
defective brain functioning should be thought of as broken machines, not moral monsters.
See Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and
Everything, in LAW AND THE BRAIN 207, 207 (Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006);
Robert Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal Justice System, 359 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON 1787 (2004); see also Rosen, supra note 52, at 52
(“‘You can have a horrendously damaged brain where someone knows the difference
between right and wrong but nonetheless can’t control their behavior,’ says Robert Sapolsky,
a neurobiologist at Stanford. ‘At that point, you’re dealing with a broken machine, and
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a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying brain dysfunction ought
to lead us to treat defendants for their illness rather than punish them for moral
wrongs. While in theory this type of individualized justice may be something to
aspire to, its implementation is complicated in a system that has largely
abandoned rehabilitation as a theory of punishment. Further, as Carter Snead
and Nita Farahany point out, the same evidence offered by defendants as
mitigating factors could also be used by the prosecution to demonstrate future
dangerousness—an aggravating factor that can increase punishment following
the punishment theory of incapacitation rather than retribution or
rehabilitation. 58
Will neuroscience have a direct impact on legal and societal conceptions of
responsibility? The first step toward answering this question is gaining a
complete understanding of what neuroscience can and cannot tell us when used
as evidence in a courtroom. This question is best explored through the laws of
evidence.
Regardless of what one thinks about the ultimate utility of neuroscience as
courtroom evidence, neuroscience research has resulted in a better
understanding of the neural basis of psychiatric disorders, addiction, and
cognitive and emotional processing across individuals. This improved
understanding will likely inform the law first through the development of
programs and policy rather than through the adjudication of specific cases
relying on individualized facts. 59 For example, one practical application may
be to craft better treatment options for use by drug courts and parole boards.
Depending on its particular use, neuroscience will have varying degrees of
utility for legal scholars and practitioners.

concepts like punishment and evil and sin become utterly irrelevant. Does that mean the
person should be dumped back on the street? Absolutely not. You have a car with the brakes
not working, and it shouldn’t be allowed to be near anyone it can hurt.’”).
58. O. Carter Snead accurately points out that neuroscience evidence could be used for
aggravating as well as mitigating factors. He incorrectly assumes, however, that mitigation is
on the agenda for most of those engaged in law and neuroscience research:
In the short term, these scientists seek to play a role in the process of capital sentencing by
serving as mitigation experts for defendants, invoking neuroimaging research on the roots of
criminal violence to support their arguments. Over the long term, these same experts (and
their like-minded colleagues) hope to appeal to the recent findings of their discipline to
embarrass, discredit, and ultimately overthrow retributive justice as a principle of
punishment. Taken as a whole, these short- and long-term efforts are ultimately meant to
usher in a more compassionate and humane regime for capital defendants.

In fact, most academic research in neuroscience and law is conducted without specific
litigation agendas. O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital
Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 1265 (2007); see also Nita A. Farahany & James E.
Coleman, Jr., Genetics and Responsibility: To Know the Criminal from the Crime, 69 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 115, 130 (2006).
59. See Maroney, supra note 17, at 117, for a clear explanation of the level of the legal
system at which neuroscience is most likely to have a lasting impact: the legislature.
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II. SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND: IMAGING BRAIN ACTIVITY AND MENTAL
STATES
A. The Science of Functional Neuroimaging
1. Overview of older methods
Several functional neuroimaging techniques predate fMRI in development
and in the courtroom, and we briefly review them here. 60 Positron Emission
Tomography (PET) and Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography
(SPECT) rely on the injection of a radioactive tracer into the subject’s
bloodstream. The tracer emits pairs of gamma rays, which are detected and
interpreted by a computer, and eventually result in a 3-D image of the brain.61
PET’s temporal resolution is on the order of seconds or minutes. 62 PET and
SPECT have been quite useful clinically to diagnose many types of cancers,
heart disease, and brain abnormalities. PET and SPECT share some
commonalities with fMRI, including some of the basic methodologies for
constructing the image from the data. 63
Electroencephalography (EEG) measures electrical activity produced by
the brain as recorded from electrodes placed on the scalp. Relative to PET or
60. For a great overview of the characteristics of and trade-offs among major
functional neuroimaging technologies, see Judy Illes and Eric Racine, Imaging or
Imagining? A Neuroethics Challenge Informed by Genetics, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 5, 8 (2005).
61. PET is based on the “fact that changes in the cellular activity of the brain of
normal, awake humans . . . are invariably accompanied by changes in local blood flow. This
robust, empirical relationship has fascinated scientists for well over a hundred years, but its
cellular basis remains largely unexplained . . . .” Marcus E. Raichle, Behind the Scenes of
Functional Brain Imaging: A Historical and Physiological Perspective, 95 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. 765, 765 (1998). SPECT works on similar principles, providing an image of
blood flow in the brain thought to be closely coupled with neural metabolism. However, two
recent studies that directly measured blood flow, blood oxygenation, and neural activity in
animals suggest that the coupling of energy metabolism, blood flow and neuronal activity
needs to be reexamined. See Anna Devor et al., Stimulus-induced Changes in Blood Flow
and 2-Deoxyglucose Uptake Dissociate in Ipsilateral Somatosensory Cortex, 28 J.
NEUROSCIENCE 14347 (2008); Yevgeniy B. Sirotin & Aniruddha Das, Anticipatory
Haemodynamic Signals in Sensory Cortex Not Predicted by Local Neuronal Activity, 457
NATURE 475 (2009).
62. “Spatial” and “temporal” are two terms used frequently in functional
neuroimaging. “Spatial” refers to the measurement of some data point in space, while
“temporal” refers to the measurement of some data point in time.
63. fMRI has quite a few things in common with PET. Specifically, both require a
careful experimental design that defines the criteria for subject inclusion and behavioral
measure. They also obtain time-sequenced data sets that must be algorithmically
reconstructed into a 3-D map of activity based on assumptions about the brain’s physiology.
The 3-D brain data sets must then be warped onto a brain structure, and they are
subsequently averaged and subtracted against a control state. Just as with fMRI, “colors are
used to substitute for the numbers in the [data set],” and the visible image is born. JOSEPH
DUMIT, PICTURING PERSONHOOD 59 (2004).
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SPECT, EEG has poor spatial resolution and is limited to assessing neural
activity close to the scalp, but its temporal resolution is much better—on the
order of milliseconds. Beyond its clinical uses, various forms of EEG-based
investigation or interrogation techniques have received considerable media
attention. One methodology was recently relied upon by an Indian court to
convict a woman based on her “experiential knowledge” of the murder. 64
Another method dubbed “brain fingerprinting” is hailed by its developers as the
next generation of biologically-based deception detection,65 despite strong
academic criticism and official rejection. 66 The lack of peer-reviewed data on
the various methodologies of both forensic EEG-based technologies makes us
similarly skeptical of the scientific validity of their use. Many of our critiques
about functional neuroimaging as applied to mens rea claims apply also to
functional neuroimaging attempts in the lie detection context, though we do not
focus here specifically on that intended use. 67
Most of the reported court cases that cite to neuroimaging refer to PET or
SPECT. However, these methodologies are largely being replaced by fMRI in
research and in practice. Unlike PET or SPECT, fMRI does not require the
64. See Anand Giridharadas, India’s Novel Use of Brain Scans in Courts Is Debated,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A10. Court opinion on file with the authors.
65. See Brain Fingerprinting, http://www.brainwavescience.com (last visited Dec. 10,
2009) (the website of the technology’s inventor). Brain fingerprinting relies on the P300
wave—a positive event-related potential occurring 300 milliseconds after the particular
stimulus that evoked it. “Brain Fingerprinting testing can prove that the suspect’s brain does
not have the salient details of the crime stored in it, that is, when the suspect does not
remember or recognize the salient details of the crime.” Brain Fingerprinting, Memory
Issues, http://www.brainwavescience.com/MemoryIssues.php (last visited Feb. 5, 2010). For
the only peer-reviewed paper on this method, see Lawrence A. Farwell & Emanuel Donchin,
The Truth Will Out: Interrogative Polygraphy (“Lie Detection”) with Event-Related Brain
Potentials, 28 PSCYHOPHYSIOLOGY 531 (1991). The P300/EEG evidence was admitted in the
Iowa case of Harrington v. State, though it was not heard by a jury and was not the basis for
the postconviction relief by the judge. Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 516 n.6 (Iowa
2003) (“According to Dr. [Lawrence] Farwell, his testing of Harrington established that
Harrington’s brain did not contain information about Schweer’s murder. On the other hand,
Dr. Farwell testified, testing did confirm that Harrington’s brain contained information
consistent with his alibi.”); see also John G. New, If You Could Read My Mind: Implications
of Neurological Evidence for Twenty-First Century Criminal Jurisprudence, 29 J. LEGAL
MED. 179, 185-87 (2008).
66. A 2001 General Accounting Office report concluded that “[o]fficials representing
CIA, DOD, Secret Service, and FBI do not foresee using the Brain Fingerprinting technique
for their operations because of its limited application.” U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES: FEDERAL AGENCY VIEWS ON THE POTENTIAL APPLICATION OF
“BRAIN FINGERPRINTING,” GAO-02-22 (2001), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/
othergov/polygraph/brainfinger.pdf. Specifically, “[t]he FBI conducted a thorough review of
Dr. Farwell’s research and on two occasions provided him an opportunity to present his
findings. In this instance, Dr. Farwell did not conduct research that met the FBI’s standards
for research, nor did his research demonstrate the usefulness of this technique.” Id. at 23.
67. For a thorough and recently published assessment of the state-of-the-art in
neuroimaging for lie detection, see Hank T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie
Detection: The Urgent Need for Regulation, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 377 (2007).
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injection of a radioactive tracer. fMRI’s temporal and spatial resolution are also
superior to PET’s. The temporal resolution and signal-to-noise ratio of fMRI is
not as good as that of EEG. Though it is too early in the technology’s history
for many appellate opinions to have discussed fMRI, experts agree that it will
dominate older methods as courtroom evidence. This is due in part to the
increased availability of fMRI devices and the reduction in their cost. 68 Much
of our analysis in this Article applies to functional neuroimaging generally.
However, in anticipation of an expanding use of fMRI, our inquiry focuses on
the assessment of mental states using fMRI.
2. Principles of fMRI
fMRI is a relatively safe and noninvasive technique that indirectly
measures the brain’s activity. 69 The fact that fMRI is an indirect measurement
cannot be stressed enough. fMRI does not directly measure neuronal activity or
firing. 70 What follows is the rationale for nonetheless using fMRI to measure
brain activity in studies of cognition and behavior.
Perceiving, thinking, acting, feeling, and even resting have associated
neuronal firing. A growing body of evidence suggests that mental states—such
as thoughts and emotions—are represented by patterns of neuronal activation in
specific regions or networks of the brain. For many such cognitive or emotional
tasks, an increase in neural firing in a particular region or network is interpreted
as the brain doing “more” of that particular cognitive or emotional task.
Because neurons do not have internal reserves of energy, when they fire in
response to some activity, oxygen-carrying blood must be transported to the
neurons. This is called the “hemodynamic response.”
Blood that is carrying oxygen behaves differently in magnetic fields than
deoxygenated blood does. The difference in the magnetic properties of
oxygenated blood allows fMRI to detect changes in blood flow related to
71
activity. This is called the Blood Oxygen Level Dependent (BOLD) response.

68. Eric Racine, Ofek Bar-Ilan, & Judy Illes, fMRI in the Public Eye, 6 NATURE REVS.
NEUROSCIENCE 159, 159 (2005).
69. Joseph Mandeville & Bruce Rosen, Functional MRI, in BRAIN MAPPING 315, 315
(Arthur Toga & John Mazziotta eds., 2d ed. 2002). While fMRI is typically quite safe, it is
not without risks. Contraindications include any metal in the body, pacemakers, and other
devices. Even nonobvious metal, such as tiny fragments embedded in the eyes of
metalworkers that otherwise may go undetected, could lead to serious burning. Also, the
donut-shaped core of the machine is quite a small space. Individuals who are claustrophobic
or who have a particularly large body frame may not be able to participate in fMRI research.
70. See Raichle, supra note 61, at 767-68.
71. Seiji Ogawa and colleagues labeled this enhancement the “BOLD contrast.” See
Seiji Ogawa et al., Brain Magnetic Resonance Imaging with Contrast Dependent on Blood
Oxygenation, 87 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 9868 (1990); see also Marcus E. Raichle &
Mark A. Mintun, Brain Work and Brain Imaging, 29 ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 449, 455
(2006).
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In simple terms, when a region of the brain is “activated” in response to a
perception or to enable a behavior, that region receives more oxygenated blood.
Because oxygenated blood behaves differently in a magnetic field, the large
magnet in the fMRI device can measure this influx. If the local oxygen use is
more than adequately supplied by the influx of blood, then a positive BOLD
response will result. If the local demand for oxygen exceeds that provided by
the regional blood flow, then a negative BOLD response will result. Because
the change in the blood oxygenation level in a spatial volume (called a voxel,
like a three-dimensional pixel) does not directly capture the activity of neurons,
fMRI does not yet provide detailed physiological information about the neural
mechanisms underlying the mental state.
The actual experience of undergoing an fMRI is similar to that of
undergoing a scan for medical purposes, which some readers may be familiar
with. To begin, individuals are asked to lie on their backs on a thin bed, which
slides into the center of a donut-shaped magnet core. While in this core, the
individual is told to lie as still as possible; this state is sometimes facilitated by
the doctor’s fixing the individual’s head in a frame. Depending on the research
question, the subject is given some task to perform, which can include listening
to stimuli or viewing visual stimuli projected into the scanner via a mirror. In
tasks requiring a response, the subject may have their hands on a special
controller to input their response without moving their head. During this time,
the magnetic coils in the scanner receive different amounts of electric current.
The exchange of current in the scanner produces a loud knocking sound.
Subjects wear headphones to help drown out this noise and to receive any audio
instructions or stimuli. While the subject is performing the task, software
loaded on the device collects and stores data about the individual’s oxygenated
blood flow. The data must be heavily processed, aligned, smoothed, and
filtered before it can be mapped onto a template of a human brain.
Employing a very strong magnet and the BOLD response, fMRI can aid in
determining which regions of the brain are recruited in particular cognitive or
perceptual tasks. 72
3. Knowns and unknowns about the BOLD response
Perceiving, thinking, feeling, and acting correlate with changes in oxygen
consumption and regional blood flow in the brain. 73 By comparing the BOLD
response signal in the experimental or activation state with the control state,
72. Blood that is oxygenated is not attracted to a magnetic field, while blood that is
deoxygenated is paramagnetic (attracted to a magnetic field). The presence of paramagnetic
deoxygenated blood causes the signal-producing proton spins to dephase more rapidly. An
increase in blood flow to active brain regions results in higher concentration of oxygenated
blood and therefore results in an increased fMRI signal in that active region. See GORDON
SARTY, COMPUTING BRAIN ACTIVITY MAPS FROM FMRI TIME-SERIES IMAGES 3 (2007).
73. See Ogawa, supra note 71.

BROWNMURPHY - 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

1140

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

4/13/2010 11:40 AM

[Vol. 62:1119

small changes in signal intensity (on the order of four percent) are detectable. 74
This slight change in BOLD signal is what makes fMRI capable of facilitating
inferences about brain activity. There are other less common methods for
producing an fMRI image, but the BOLD response is by far the most
widespread method. 75
While the BOLD response is correlated with brain activity, researchers are
currently hard at work to understand the relationship between the BOLD
response and neuronal firing (including phenomena such as the depolarization,
spiking of neurons, 76 and neurotransmitter release). 77 Nikos Logothetis
suggests that the BOLD response may reflect the neural activity related to the
synaptic input 78 and processing in a given region rather than the output
(spiking activity). 79 The mechanism for this three-part process needs to be
further confirmed in humans, as most of the experimental work has been done
on anesthetized monkeys. Blood flow, oxygen availability, and glucose
metabolism are undoubtedly linked, but the precise relationship between these
factors is still unknown. 80 Further complicating the picture, a 2008 study found
74. See R. Todd Constable, Challenges in fMRI and Its Limitations, in FUNCTIONAL
MRI: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND CLINICAL APPLICATIONS 75, 76 (Scott H. Faro & Feroze B.
Mohamed eds., 2006).
75. Some question the strength of the BOLD response because the neural signals on
which it is based are relative and not individually quantitative. Other methods, such as the
Oxygen Extraction Fraction (OEF), have attempted to measure neural activity directly, but
the signal-to-noise ratio is extremely low and statistical methods used to extract quantitative
data have been largely unsuccessful thus far.
76. “Spiking” is a term in neurophysiology that refers to the generation of action
potentials (discrete electrical events that are the basis of neuronal signaling).
77. See Constable, supra note 74, at 86. Still, there are recent developments that link
neurotransmitter release to the BOLD response. See Brian Knutson & Sasha E. B. Gibbs,
Linking
Nucleus
Accumbens
Dopamine
and
Blood
Oxygenation,
191
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 813, 813 (2007) (“Dopamine release in the NAcc appears to
increase local BOLD signal via agonism of postsynaptic D1 receptors. Such a physiological
mechanism implies that FMRI may be used to track symptoms related to NAcc
dopaminergic dysregulation in psychiatric disorders including schizophrenia and attention
deficit/hyperactivity disorder.”).
78. A synapse is the gap between two neurons. Generally speaking, neurons
communicate via the release of chemical neurotransmitters into this gap, where they are
detected by receptors and re-interpreted into electrical or intracellular signals.
79. See Nikos K. Logothetis et al., Neurophysiological Investigation of the Basis of the
fMRI Signal, 412 NATURE 150, 154 (2001); Nikos K. Logothetis, The Underpinnings of the
BOLD Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Signal, 23 J. NEUROSCIENCE 3963, 3969
(2003) (“Simultaneous fMRI and electrophysiological recordings suggest that the BOLD
contrast mechanism directly reflects the neural responses elicited by a stimulus. . . .
[A]ctivation in an area is often likely to reflect the incoming input and the local processing in
a given area rather than the spiking activity. Although it is reasonable to expect that output
activity will usually correlate with neurotransmitter release and presynaptic and postsynaptic
currents, when input into a particular area plays what is primarily a modulatory role, fMRI
experiments may reveal activation in areas in which physiological experiments find no
single-unit activity.”).
80. See Raichle & Mintun, supra note 71, at 452 (“Despite the centrality of blood-flow
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that astrocytes, a non-neuronal cell type in the brain that provides physical
scaffolding and support functions for neurons, may also be involved in the
BOLD response. 81 Even more recently, another study reported increases in
local blood flow in anticipation of, but without actual, neuronal firing, throwing
into question how tight the relationship really is. 82 Each new finding about the
BOLD response suggests that our understanding of its neurological basis and
correlation to brain activity is just scratching the surface. Understanding this
phenomenon at the level of the neuron is critical to understanding if it is
capturing little, some, or most of the brain’s actual neuronal activity in response
to an event. In turn, this knowledge is necessary to bridge the gap between a
particular cognition or behavior and the neural mechanism underlying it.
4. The semantics of “activation”
Most researchers, including the authors, use the word “activation” to refer
to a change in the BOLD signal. This shorthand, however, may be
misinterpreted. A change in the BOLD signal might be correlated to greater or
lesser neuronal firing, and “activation” when referring to the BOLD response
does not necessarily mean “on” or “excitation” in the neuronal sense. Indeed,
the brain is always “on” and the neuronal networks therein are constantly in
some state of activity, unless they are dead due to trauma. Our brains use a
significant amount of energy even when we are in a resting state with our eyes
closed. 83 “Activation,” taken out of context, may inaccurately imply that unless
changes to the imaging signals we observe with PET and fMRI, the complexity of the
relationship of blood flow and metabolism to the underlying cellular events has only recently
become more fully appreciated.”).
81. See James Schummers, Hongbo Yu & Mriganka Sur, Tuned Responses of
Astrocytes and Their Influence on Hemodynamic Signals in the Visual Cortex, 320 SCIENCE
1638, 1638 (2008) (“Though astrocytes are the major class of nonneuronal cell in the brain,
their role in brain function is unresolved. . . . [A]strocytes do respond to neural activity in
vivo, but fundamental questions about the relationship between neuronal networks,
astrocytes, and hemodynamic responses remain unsolved.”).
82. See Sirotin & Das, supra note 61. In two awake monkeys, blood flow increased in
the visual cortex in anticipation of a visual stimulus that the monkeys had been trained to
expect to appear. This increase in blood flow, not coupled with neuronal activity, appears to
be mediated by an unknown preparatory mechanism. Id. at 475. A review published
alongside the study observed why this hitherto unexpected response may be problematic for
the interpretation of fMRI studies:
For one thing, most fMRI experiments involve the periodic presentation of sensory stimuli,
and then rely on the temporal structure of the haemodynamic response for deducing local
neural activity. The present study clearly demonstrates that some of the assumptions
underlying such analysis—namely, that cyclical variations in blood flow reflect local,
stimulus-driven events—may sometimes be incorrect.

David A. Leopold, Pre-Emptive Blood Flow, 457 NATURE 387, 388 (2009).
83. Because the BOLD response refers to a contrast between two states, when only the
default networks are engaged (i.e., no specific task is being completed), there is no contrast
against which the BOLD response can be measured. Marcus E. Raichle et al., A Default
Mode of Brain Function, 98 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 676, 682 (2001) (“[W]hen an
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a BOLD response is observed, the brain is “off.” Another confusion arising
from labeling the BOLD response “activation” is that it is not clear whether the
BOLD response captures excitatory and inhibitory firings or whether it
confuses the two. 84 And although inhibition is still a neuronal “action,” the
limitations of language imply that activation somehow means a positive, rather
than negative, feedback loop. 85
B. The “Function” of Functional Imaging: Task-Dependency and Behavior
In cognitive neuroscience research, the construction of an fMRI image
typically begins with a question about cognition, emotion, or perception. An
experimental task is designed to attempt isolation of the relevant psychological
process that is being assessed. 86 The performance of this task constitutes the
individual is awake and alert and yet not actively engaged in an attention-demanding task, a
default state of brain activity exists . . . . [A]n appreciation of the important activities that
may underlie the baseline state of the human brain will certainly enrich our understanding of
its function.”).
84. György Buzsáki et al., Inhibition and Brain Work, 56 NEURON 771, 772 (2007)
(“These data were interpreted to raise doubts about the possibility that GABA-mediated
inhibition will be reflected in changes in the fMRI BOLD signal.”).
85. See Robert F. Ackermann et al., Increased Glucose Metabolism During LongDuration Recurrent Inhibition of Hippocampal Pyramidal Cells, 4 J. NEUROSCIENCE 251,
251, 261 (1984) (“[S]everal fundamental issues remain unclear, among them the role that
neuronal inhibition plays in regional energy demand.”); id. (“[F]uture research utilizing
techniques having greater resolution, together with concomitant and independent measures
of physiological function, is needed to allow confident attribution of alterations in glucose
metabolism to specific synaptic mechanisms.” (citation omitted)). One research team has
posited that this scientific discrepancy may be explained by inhibition and questions
whether, with an observable increase in inhibitory firings, we might observe glucose
metabolism, increases in blood, and oxygen consumption moving in parallel. See Buzsáki et
al., supra note 84, at 773 (“To date, the lack of rigorous experiments prevents one from
answering this question.”).
86. The fMRI device is gathering data on the subject’s brain while the subject is
performing the task. There are many possibilities for behavioral tasks. Cognitive
neuroscience researchers often rely on widely-used cognitive tasks such as the Stroop Task,
the Go/No-Go task, and the Stop Task to allow for points of comparison between labs. Using
the same battery of behavioral tasks is useful for this comparative purpose. However, legal
paradigms may require the development of new tasks that better model the specific behavior
of interest. Major contributions to neuropsychological research are often made by those who
question assumptions inherent in commonly used tasks.
The widely used Go/No-Go task measures inhibitory control. Subjects have to press
either the left or right response button according to the direction of arrows that are presented
on a screen in front of them. Infrequently, arrows pointing upward (“no-go” signals) appear.
In these trials, subjects have to inhibit their motor response. See Brian A. Nosek & Mahzarin
R. Banaji, The Go/No-Go Association Task, 19 SOC. COGNITION 625, 627 (2001); Katya
Rubia et al., Tryptophan Depletion Reduces Right Inferior Prefrontal Activation During
Response Inhibition in Fast, Event-Related fMRI, 179 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 791, 793-94
(2005). The stop task was designed to assess inhibition, and it is often used in diagnosing
clinical disorders such as ADHD and schizophrenia. See James D. Carter et al., Assessing
Inhibitory Control: A Revised Approach to the Stop Signal Task, 6 J. ATTENTION DISORDERS
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subject’s behavior; the resulting captured data and constructed images are
interpreted as the neural correlates of that behavior. fMRI experiments
conducted with the intention of introducing them as evidence of mental states
are likely to be similar to such studies.
As in the research context, the utility of the fMRI data in a forensic context
is highly task-dependent. Emily Bell and Eric Racine recently reiterated this
dependency: “Since fMRI operates under the premise that measured brain
activity is a reflection of areas of the brain engaged in or involved in carrying
out a task, conventional fMRI and the resulting brain images are bound to the
context of the task.” 87
Task design is influenced both by theories and previous studies as well as
by practical constraints: the task has to be something that can be reasonably
done within the scanner. 88 Thus, limitations on interpretation and
generalization to real-life behavior are at least two-fold: the physical constraints
imposed by the scanner environment and the constraints inherent in tasks
focused on a discrete behavioral or psychological process. A major critique of
using fMRI for forensic purposes is that the behavior being solicited in
response to the task is usually so isolated that the results are difficult to
generalize to other real-world functions. We will discuss this problem of
ecological validity under our legal analysis of probative value below.
A third limitation in interpretation is added if the fMRI data are being
offered as evidence of mens rea. Such use would require a close relationship
between the chosen behavioral task and the specific legal question of interest.
Validity problems arise here in trying to operationalize legal terms of art such
as “intent” or “capacity” to be assessed in discrete behavioral tasks, including
appropriate control conditions. For example, there could be a healthy debate
surrounding the selection of the appropriate behavioral task for assessing
capacity to form the specific intent to kill. Even well-validated behavioral
tasks, such as those used to assess executive function, 89 do not directly map on

153, 153 (2003).
87. See Bell & Racine, supra note 42, at 23.
88. fMRI does not presently work with uncooperative subjects. While not all fMRI
tasks require an instrumental behavior (such as the press of a button in response to a
stimulus), they all require active participation in the minimal sense of the subject’s paying
attention and keeping still. The subject could very easily deviate from the control group or
make the scan unusable just by keeping his eyes closed, moving slightly, or letting himself
fall asleep (which frequently happens to a healthy control during long scanning sessions).
See John A. Detre, Clinical Applicability of Functional MRI, 23 J. MAGNETIC RESONANCE
IMAGING 808, 811 (2006).
89. See B.J. Casey et al., A Developmental Functional MRI Study of Prefrontal
Activation During Performance of a Go-No-Go Task, 9 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 835,
836 (1997); Akira Miyake et al., The Unity and Diversity of Executive Functions and Their
Contributions to Complex “Frontal Lobe” Tasks: A Latent Variable Analysis, 41 COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 49, 92 (2000); Jennifer A. Richeson et al., An fMRI Investigation of the Impact of
Interracial Contact on Executive Function, 6 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1323, 1323 (2003).
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to Model Penal Code constructs such as purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or
negligence. At best, deficiencies in task performance and correlated
abnormalities in brain activity are several inferential steps away from a legal
lack of intent or lack of capacity. The task-dependency of fMRI may be
obscure to the fact finder, especially when confronted with images of a
defendant’s brain, leading this critical component of data interpretation to be
left unexamined. Bell and Racine summarize these concerns as a warning: “The
selection of the appropriate task for drawing out relevant information about
brain activity in fMRI investigations should not be neglected in haste to explain
behaviors and pathological differences by functional neuroimaging data.” 90
C. Variables in Data Collection, Processing, and Analysis
Creating a brain activation map from the raw data requires expertise from
the fields of magnetic resonance physics, neurophysiology, cognitive
neuroscience, and statistics. The complex method of constructing the fMRI
image is critical to the evidentiary analysis.
1. Hardware and software: the scanner
Magnetic resonance imaging scanners are very large and expensive pieces
of equipment. When installed, the massive magnet must be appropriately
shielded for the protection of the device as well as for the surrounding
electromagnetic environment. Scanners are also rather finicky machines—they
must be carefully calibrated by expert technicians on a regular basis. Even so,
scanners have their own idiosyncrasies, and no two scanners can be expected to
produce exactly the same set of functional imaging data, even under identical
parameters.
The quality and resolution of the fMRI images will vary depending on the
strength of the magnet. 91 While the subject is performing the behavioral task,
the raw data are acquired through a program that runs on the fMRI’s
computer. 92 This “pulse sequence program” directs the switching of current in
the magnet through gradient coils, the transmission of radio frequency, and the
ultimate collection of data with microsecond accuracy. 93 The program captures
the signal that is generated at points in space and represented as a time-series of

90. See Bell & Racine, supra note 42, at 24.
91. See, e.g., Press Release, Univ. of Mich., A Powerful Picture: Two New 3 Tesla

MRI Scanners at U-M Health System Will Take Metabolic Imaging, Research to the Next
Level (Apr. 22, 2004), http://www.med.umich.edu/opm/newspage/2004/mri.htm; News
Release, Univ. of Pa., Penn Researchers to Get 7 Tesla Whole-Body MRI System (Aug. 28,
2006), http://www.uphs.upenn.edu/news/News_Releases/aug06/7TMRI.htm.
92. See SARTY, supra note 72, at 2.
93. See id.
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cubed units called voxels. 94 These voxels hold information across multiple
slices of the brain. The volume of each voxel is correlated to the data’s
precision. The greater the voxel volume, the lower the spatial resolution. 95
Spatial resolution is inversely proportionate to temporal resolution and
sensitivity. Researchers often do not look for effects across the entire brain, but
instead select a region of interest (“ROI”) very carefully to focus on brain
regions where they have some reason, based on psychological constructs, to
believe that the area may be implicated in the activity being measured.
Computer programs take the spatial data and reconstruct it into an image using
multiple regression statistical techniques and mathematical modeling. 96 This
process is often invisible even to the researcher, as it is done by software
installed on the fMRI machine.
2. Processing the raw data
At this point, the time-series of images is ready for “preprocessing” to
clean up the images and remove random effects. Because the fMRI machine is
so sensitive and the physiological signal so tiny, the raw data include quite a bit
of background noise (signals thought to be unrelated to the experimental BOLD
response). The ratio of background noise to activation signal is described by the
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR). 97 To amplify this ratio as much as possible, some
noise is removed through preprocessing. 98

94. A voxel is a three-dimensional unit of space, similar to a pixel in two dimensions.
The voxel volume and the statistical threshold at which the analysis is set will alter the
resulting image immensely. See Jerzy Bodurka et al., Mapping the MRI Voxel Volume in
Which Thermal Noise Matches Physiological Noise—Implications for fMRI, 34
NEUROIMAGE 542, 542 (2007).
95. See F. DuBois Bowman et al., Statistical Approaches to Functional Neuroimaging
Data, 17 NEUROIMAGING CLINICS N. AM. 441, 442 (2007). The amount of imaging time
required increases in inverse proportion to the sixth power of a voxel dimension. For
example, in order to reduce the voxel size from 3.5 mm to 1 mm on each side, the
acquisition time must be increased by ten minutes for each excitation measurement
(controlling for the signal-to-noise ratio and scanner used). Joseph B. Mandeville & Bruce R.
Rosen, Functional MRI, in BRAIN MAPPING, supra note 69, at 315, 321.
96. See Nick F. Ramsey et al., Functional MRI Experiments: Acquisition, Analysis, and
Interpretation of Data, 12 EUR. NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 517, 521 (2002).
97. See Kevin Murphy et al., How Long to Scan? The Relationship Between fMRI
Temporal Signal to Noise Ratio and Necessary Scan Duration, 34 NEUROIMAGE 565, 565-66
(2007).
98. One example of this is the production of “ghost artifacts,” which occur when the
image is blurred at the top or bottom. Ghost artifacts such as this one arise when the signal
being received from a voxel has an alternating amplitude or phase. Examples of: (a) nonoverlapping and (b) overlapping ghost artifacts are below. Images are from Stuart Clare,
Functional MRI: Methods and Applications 80 (Oct. 1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Nottingham), available at http://users.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/~stuart/thesis (used with
author’s permission).
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Noise can be created from variations in the scanner’s magnetic field and
power, in the cognitive strategies of the subject, and in the head motion,
swallowing, heartbeat, time in the scanner, and brain architecture of subjects.
Studies are designed to increase the SNR and therefore reduce the temporal and
spatial noise. One mechanical way to decrease the noise is to use a scanner with
a stronger magnet. Another strategy to decrease noise is to average a subject’s
results over several trials to reduce the effects of random noise, on the theory
that a “real” signal will be robust across most or all of the trials and thus
survive the averaging. Training the subject to attend to focused stimuli and to
remain still may also reduce background noise. However, in order to produce a
usable image of the activation and region of interest, the noise often needs to be
further smoothed out using complex statistical models. 99
Once the slices of time-series data sets are transformed into spatial images
and the images are correctly oriented in time and space, the individual brain
data is then “warped” or normalized to map on to a 3-D template brain
structure. A significant point here is that individual brain anatomy varies
significantly, particularly in cortical (outermost) areas. 100 It can be very
difficult to determine, based on anatomical landmarks, which parts of the brain
in one person correspond to the standardized anatomical regions on the
“average” structural brain image. With some stretching and realignment, the
conformation of structural and functional assessments allows for comparisons
between studies and for the pooling of data from different subjects. 101

(a)

(b)
99. See Michal Mikl et al., Effects of Spatial Smoothing on fMRI Group Inferences, 26

MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 490, 490 (2008); Patrick L. Purdon & Robert M. Weisskoff,
Effect of Temporal Autocorrelation Due to Physiological Noise and Stimulus Paradigm on
Voxel-Level False-Positive Rates in fMRI, 6 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 239, 239 (1998); Amy
Scouten et al., Spatial Resolution, Signal-to-Noise Ratio, and Smoothing in Multi-Subject
Functional MRI Studies, 30 NEUROIMAGE 787, 787 (2006); Christina Triantafyllou et al.,
Effect of Spatial Smoothing on Physiological Noise in High-Resolution fMRI, 32
NEUROIMAGE 551, 551 (2006); see also Chloe Hutton et al., Image Distortion Correction in
fMRI: A Quantitative Evaluation, 16 NEUROIMAGE 217, 217 (2002).
100. See, e.g., Gabriele Lohmann & D. Yves von Cramon, Automatic Labeling of the
Human Cortical Surface Using Sulcal Basins, 4 MED. IMAGE ANALYSIS 179, 179 (2000)
(explaining that one of the most “intriguing problems in [the field of human brain mapping]
is the high interpersonal variability of human neuroanatomy which makes studies across
many subjects difficult”). In the field of brain mapping, work is being conducted to create
useful brain atlases that can be used across individuals with less stretching and distortion
than has been the norm. See, e.g., David W. Shattuck et al., Construction of a 3D
Probabilistic Atlas of Human Cortical Structures, 39 NEUROIMAGE 1064, 1064 (2008)
(“[S]ingle subject atlases cannot describe the variability in brain structure that is inherent
across the human population. To capture this information, larger numbers of subjects must
be examined.”).
101. Warping is discussed infra Part III.D.2 as a possible problem for the admissibility

BROWNMURPHY - 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

April 2010]

4/13/2010 11:40 AM

FMRI AS EVIDENCE OF PAST MENTAL STATES

1147

Often, spatial smoothing is performed to mitigate the effects of the
substantial differences in brain anatomy between subjects. Spatial smoothing
refers to the methods employed to blur sharp spikes from the BOLD frequency
signals. Some researchers discourage this step because it may inflate the
correlations between neighboring voxels and reduce the strength of highly
localized effects. 102 Below is an example of the effects of spatial smoothing on
a constructed brain image, where the same fMRI data set is subjected to three
different spatial smoothing filters. Brain regions that correlate well to the task
appear in white, with the same statistical threshold, or p-value, used for all
three maps. In the first image on the left, no filtering was applied, in the
second, moderate filtering, and, in the third, even more filtering. 103 It is easy to
see how the activation appears greater with greater filtering.
Figure 1

(a)

(b)

(c)

In addition to spatial smoothing, images can be temporally smoothed. 104
This sometimes needs to be done to make sure the functional data accurately
tracks the underlying physiological changes over time. 105 Many researchers
employ high-pass filtering to remove low frequencies of signal that were
identified as likely being the product of random noise or signal drift. Signal
drift is often caused by the natural and constant flow of cerebral spinal fluid
of functional neuroimaging data. See Bowman et al., supra note 95, at 443.
102. See RICHARD B. BUXTON, INTRODUCTION TO FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE
IMAGING: PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES 280-82 (2002); Jiongjiong Wang et al., To Smooth or
Not to Smooth? ROC Analysis of Perfusion fMRI Data, 23 MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING
75, 80 (2005).
103. Image (b) used 7 mm full width at half maximum (“FWHM”) filtering, and image
(c) employed 15 mm FWHM filtering. In image (a), no filtering was applied. Clare, supra
note 98, at 115.
104. There is a delay of the peak BOLD response by five to eight seconds due to the
gap in time between the neural activity and the brain’s blood flow response. There is also a
transient increase of blood flow within the first 1000 milliseconds of neuronal activity. See
Bowman et al., supra note 95, at 444.
105. See Karl J. Friston, Statistics I: Experimental Design and Statistical Parametric
Mapping, in BRAIN MAPPING, supra note 69, at 605, 619-29; Arthur W. Toga & Paul
Thompson, An Introduction to Brain Warping, in BRAIN WARPING 1, 3-5 (Arthur W. Toga
ed., 1999); see also John Ashburner & Karl J. Friston, Spatial Normalization, in BRAIN
WARPING, supra, at 27, 30.
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through the hollow cavities deep in the brain.
Despite the well-developed methods for removing such artifacts, there are
some means of noise production in the fMRI machine that cannot be
completely removed. 106 While the above corrections are typically thought of as
removing image distortion, the lack of consensus on proper methodology
provides an opportunity for manipulation. 107 One expert expressed concern
that correction tools can be thought of as “‘black boxes’ to be trusted implicitly
and utilized without attention to their underlying assumptions and inherent
limitations.” 108 This concern over the lack of standardized methods will be
revisited when we analyze the admissibility of fMRI as evidence in Part
III.D.5.
Once the raw data are scrubbed up, the activation map must be created. 109
While there is a vigorous ongoing discussion on the topic, currently no single
set of best methods for fMRI data analysis exists for a given research question,
and therefore no single standard software package to use. 110 Despite the
ubiquity of functional neuroimaging, only a small fraction of such research is
devoted to standardizing functional neuroimaging methods. 111 Researchers
may employ any one of a handful of statistical modeling tools and software
packages to create the activation maps, depending in part upon their research
question, their familiarity with different options, and what is available to them

106. See Chloe Hutton et al., Effect of Head Motion and Non-Linear Distortions on
fMRI Time Series, 11 NEUROIMAGE S495, S495 (2000) (“This effect can be corrected by
characterising the inhomogeneities with a field map and converting this into a map of pixel
shifts. . . . Correction of the resulting time-varying distortions may require the generation of
a distortion map at each time point, which involves phase unwrapping and image processing
techniques that can be laborious and introduce additional noise.”); João M. Sanches et al.,
Medical Image Noise Reduction Using the Sylvester–Lyapunov Equation, 17 IEEE
TRANSACTIONS ON IMAGE PROCESSING 1522, 1522 (2008) (“Noise reduction in medical
images is a difficult task in which linear filtering algorithms usually fail . . . . This paper
presents a Bayesian denoising algorithm . . . .”).
107. See R. Todd Constable, Challenges in fMRI and Its Limitations, in FUNCTIONAL
MRI: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND CLINICAL APPLICATIONS 75, 77 (Scott H. Faro & Feroze B.
Mohamed eds., 2006).
108. See Preface to BRAIN WARPING, supra note 105, at xi.
109. Bowman et al., supra note 95, at 443-44.
110. See R. Todd Constable et al., Quantifying and Comparing Region-of-Interest
Activation Patterns in Functional Brain MR Imaging: Methodology Considerations, 16
MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 289, 289 (1998); Robert W. Cox & James S. Hyde,
Software Tools for Analysis and Visualization of fMRI Data, 10 NMR IN BIOMEDICINE 171,
175-77 (1997); Wang et al., supra note 102, at 75. Through personal communication with
Adina Roskies, we have learned that this is something that is being discussed in the fields of
neuroscience and bioinformatics.
111. See Richard Baumgartner et al., Are Global Methods Appropriate for fMRI Data
Analysis? An In Vivo fMRI Study of the Spatio-temporal Heterogeneity of fMRI Data, 2002
PROC. OF THE 2002 IEEE CANADIAN CONF. ON ELEC. AND COMPUTER ENG’G 894, 894;
Bowman et al., supra note 95, at 441.
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in their facility. 112
3. Individual differences and reliance on the group data
a. Something with which to compare: defining “normal”
While most fMRI research relies on group data sets, the law cares a great
deal about the individual and her unique function. In order to make
comparative claims about whether an individual has abnormal neurological
functioning, a testifying expert must have a basis for comparison—preferably a
measurement of what would be considered normal function. To achieve this,
data from many subjects and many conditions must be collected. Activation
maps from a control group are often added together and then averaged. The
normal group map is then compared to the activation map of the individual or
group of individuals being tested (which itself is often the result of repeated
trials that are averaged). 113 Differences between the individual’s averaged data
and the group’s averaged data is then used to make a claim that the individual
is either normal or a certain degree outside of normal with respect to this
task. 114
This discretionary creation of the control map and the subjective definition
of normal may cause quite a bit of trouble with respect to the interpretation of
the averaged data. Although it may be possible to test how many subjects are
needed to be included in this control group to present an accurate and reliable
brain activation map of the normal population, this sampling frame is not often
112. Typically the statistical inferences target the voxel level, or a particular region of
interest in the brain. This is based upon some assumptions about where the researcher
expects to see the activation. However, nonparametric methods may also be employed, as
they do not require knowledge or assumptions about the underlying probability distributions
for activation in the brain. For a discussion of statistical methodologies and their benefits and
weaknesses, see Christian F. Beckmann et al., General Multilevel Linear Modeling for
Group Analysis in fMRI, 20 NEUROIMAGE 1052, 1052 (2003); Bowman et al., supra note 95,
at 454.
113. See SARTY, supra note 72, at 69.
114. Positron Emission Tomography (“PET”), an older form of functional
neuroimaging, uses the subtraction method to compare the baseline state with the
experimental state, either across subjects or within a subject. This method is still widely used
with fMRI today. The subtraction method measures the BOLD response of an individual in a
given state and then subtracts the BOLD response present in a control map. The difference is
presented in the ultimate image. This technique may assume that the experimental condition
of interest merely adds mental processing (and thus brain processing) that is not present
during the control state. It also implies that there are no interactions among various mental
components of a task. This assumption may be inaccurate or false, but it does not render the
data useless in the research context. See Interview, Marcus E. Raichle, 8 J. COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE 189, 191 (1996). Subtraction as a technique produces information that can be
“very useful” for comparisons between discrete tasks and between carefully defined groups.
Edson Amaro Jr. & Gareth J. Barker, Study Design in fMRI: Basic Principles, 60 BRAIN &
COGNITION 220, 223 (2006).
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done. 115 The number of subjects in the control group is often selected based on
practical concerns such as how much money and scanning time has been
allocated to the project, or on experimental bases such as the size and known
function of the region of interest. In addition to the problem of control group
size, another significant issue involves which, or whose, brains are classified as
normal. In theory, someone could be included in the control group of normals
because he has never performed poorly on psychiatric evaluations, and yet that
person could have abnormal brain activity due to his reliance on different
cognitive strategies. 116 Because all of the results are dumped into the mix and
averaged, after-the-fact review may not be adequate and may not catch the fact
that a member of the control group lies significantly outside the normal mean
of the rest of the group and thus may skew the results. We will say more about
this problem in Part III.F.1.
b. Individual differences are important but are often ignored
Individuals, in addition to having differences in their brain anatomy, often
exhibit significant differences in the way they respond to a given stimulus.
However, because group data for both the control map and the experimental
map typically focus on shared neural activations, differences between subjects
may be regarded as statistical noise and eliminated. 117 This is deliberate in the
research setting, as the mission of cognitive neuroscience is to discover the
elements of normal brain function that are common to most people and
disrupted in specific patient populations. However, this may be highly
problematic in a forensic and individualized legal context.
There are major interpretive problems when individual differences are

115. The number of subjects included in the control group may affect the results. For a
particular task, a group of researchers found that about fifteen to twenty subjects were
required in order to reliably detect all of the activated regions in the left hemisphere. About
thirty to thirty-five subjects were needed to reveal the weaker and more variable activation in
right hemisphere regions. See Mohamed L. Seghier et al., Group Analysis and the Subject
Factor in Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging: Analysis of Fifty Right-Handed Healthy
Subjects in a Semantic Language Task, 29 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 461, 472 (2008) (“A
greater N-sub is required (>30 subjects) when one’s objective is also to investigate patients
with atypical language representation and where activations are found in areas that are not
dominantly involved in healthy controls.”).
116. Indeed, a recent report demonstrated that, in the context of gender differences,
similar behavioral performance can correspond to significantly different patterns of brain
activation; the reverse was also demonstrated, however, as similar patterns of activation
could be observed despite variance in behavioral performance. See Emily C. Bell et al.,
Males and Females Differ in Brain Activation During Cognitive Tasks, 30 NEUROIMAGE 529,
529 (2006) (“[D]espite these fMRI changes, there were no significant differences between
males and females on cognitive performance of the task. . . . In contrast, in the spatial
attention task, men performed better . . . than women, but there were no significant
functional differences between the two groups.”).
117. See Seghier et al., supra note 115, at 462.
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ignored in tasks that involve emotional processing, as variance between
individuals in activation patterns may be the rule rather than the exception. 118
Two researchers reviewing the literature on individual differences found that
“[r]egional brain activity associated with emotion processing can be influenced
by a range of individual differences, including differences in personality,
dispositional affect, biological sex, and genotype.” 119 Even cutting-edge
science still has a crude idea of what “normal” means as captured by group
data. So far, researchers have found evidence that state-dependent factors such
as sleep deprivation and caffeine intake affect the BOLD response, but the
universe of relevant factors is still being populated. 120 Without knowing more
about what modulates the BOLD response, comparisons based on averaged
group data are not very useful for individual determinations. Michael Miller
and his research team have argued that the exclusive reliance on statistical
analyses of groups of subjects “may be to the detriment of understanding the
true underlying cognitive nature of brain activations.” 121 In their study, Miller
and co-workers found that information that emerges from the group pattern
does not reflect the reliable but non-overlapping patterns from individuals. 122
The reliance of fMRI methods on averaging activation across individual
subjects presents a problem for their utility in criminal law and individualized
justice. The figure below makes this point nicely. Each pinhead circle
represents the area with the most significant BOLD response for a particular
task. The nine individual scans are to the left of the resulting group-averaged
map. Interestingly, the group map reveals the most significant activation in a
location in the brain where none of the individual brains were most active,
though a few were close. 123

118. See generally Stephan Hamann & Turhan Canli, Individual Differences in
Emotion Processing, 14 CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROBIOLOGY 233 (2004).
119. Id. at 236.
120. See Paul J. Laurienti et al., Dietary Caffeine Consumption Modulates fMRI
Measures, 17 NEUROIMAGE 751, 751 (2002) (showing that BOLD response “in visual cortex
was significantly greater” in high caffeine users relative to low caffeine users); Robert
Joseph Thomas & Kenneth Kwong, Modafinil Activates Cortical and Subcortical Sites in the
Sleep-Deprived State, 29 SLEEP 1471, 1475 (2006) (finding that “[s]leep deprivation results
in an overall reduction in activation, especially in frontal and prefrontal areas”).
121. Michael B. Miller et al., Extensive Individual Differences in Brain Activations
Associated with Episodic Retrieval Are Reliable Over Time, 14 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
1200, 1200 (2002).
122. See id. at 1209.
123. Id. at 1203.
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Figure 2

To reinforce the problematic nature of averaging, a recent study attempted
to pin down exactly how much signal variance was due to individual
differences in a semantic language task. 124 To visualize the variability between
subjects, the percentage of overlap of each activated voxel was measured across
subjects. In order to account for anatomical variation, the method looked to
some of the neighboring voxels as well. The researchers found that the
activated brain regions varied considerably across subjects in size, localization,
and the levels of activation. 125 Of even greater interest, this research team
discovered that the results for the same task varied greatly depending on three
important and experimenter-controlled variables: (1) the statistical threshold
used; (2) the software package employed; and (3) the size of the control
population. The potential for manipulating each will be discussed in turn.
4. Variance: the statistical threshold can be manipulated to affect the
results
Which of the brain images below shows the greatest level of activation? 126

124. Subjects were asked to identify whether two nouns belonged in the same semantic

family.
125. See Seghier et al., supra note 115, at 466-67.
126. Images of statistical threshold differences are used here with the permission of

Scott Grafton of the University of California, Santa Barbara. From left to right: P < 0.05
(1682 voxels), P < 0.01 (364 voxels), P < 0.001 (32 voxels).
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Figure 3

The truth is, these images represent the same group of brains performing
the same task. Each could be argued to be “statistically significant,” in the
sense that the likelihood that the result happened due to chance is less than 0.05
in each. The only difference is that the statistical threshold is tighter, and thus
the voxel volume is lower, as you move from left to right. Without some
background information about the chosen statistical threshold, an individual
could infer very different things about how abnormal an activation pattern
is. 127 If you were to zoom out enough, only the most significant activation
could be seen, while if you zoom in closely, everything may appear to be
active. Statistical thresholds can therefore be manipulated to do what
neurologist Helen Mayberg has called “dial a defect.” 128 If a party does not
like the results that are shown at a certain level of zoom, simply altering the
statistical precision may provide a more compelling image for one’s legal
argument.
5. Variance: the statistical analysis employed can affect the results
Just as the statistical threshold can affect the resulting activation map, so
too can the statistical analysis or test employed. In the figure below, you can
see that the map at the top using one method, RFX, is the most restrictive and
produces the least activation for this semantic task, while the same data

127. While a more lenient statistical threshold may be desirable when conducting more
exploratory research, the use of a lenient standard in clinical or forensic diagnosis is much
more suspect. See Michael B. Miller & John Darrel Van Horn, Individual Variability in
Brain Activations Associated with Episodic Retrieval: A Role for Large-Scale Databases, 63
INT’L J. PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 205, 213 (2007).
128. Helen S. Mayberg spoke about the manipulation of imaging studies at a
presentation to the MacArthur Foundation on Law & Neuroscience members at its annual
meeting in Santa Barbara, California on May 29, 2008. Of course, the same was said of PET,
as Joseph Dumit noted in his book, PICTURING PERSONHOOD, the quantitative data set itself is
dynamic and always imperfectly represented visually. The layers of construction making up
the image can literally “make it up.” DUMIT, supra note 63, at 69. David Faigman aptly
points out that the problem by which statistical analysis is selected by an expert plagues all
applied science: “Applied science is almost invariably probabilistic and so cannot be used
adequately without knowledge of probabilities and statistics; [j]udges regularly rely on
applied science as an integral part of lawmaking; therefore, it is incumbent on judges to
understand probabilities and statistics.” David L. Faigman, Judges as ‘Amateur Scientists,’
86 B.U. L. REV. 1207, 1207 (2006).
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analyzed by a different statistical procedure produce a brain that appears more
active in the left hemisphere. 129 A good lab will retest its data using different
statistical tests, but selecting the analysis provides another opportunity for
manipulation.
Figure 4

None of this is to say that skilled researchers deliberately employ such
methods to manipulate the interpretation of the data or to dupe peer reviewers.
In fact, depending on the purpose of the study, a less restrictive analysis and
statistical threshold may be desirable. However, what troubles us is the ability
of forensic labs or paid experts to take advantage of these effects to “dial a
defect” in the courtroom. Unless standardized and transparent criteria are
followed to process the data and construct the activation map, the procedures
employed could be subject to distortion. Furthermore, none of these concerns
are at all mitigated by the oft-employed claim that data analysis is
“computerized”—a virtually meaningless assertion meant to soothe fact finders
that such analysis could not possibly be incorrect, as it was not subject to
human error. In fact, as we have shown, there are a number of subjective
decisions that must be made during image acquisition, preprocessing, and
analysis, and the use of a computer does not immunize the process from
distortion. Computerized analysis, in this context, should be interpreted by fact
finders with skepticism, as it may be a panacea meant to discourage critical
questioning about the choices made that underlie the final production of the
neuroimages.
Now that we have discussed at length the gathering, processing, and
production of group neuroimages, we will walk through the evidentiary steps

129. For our purposes it is not important to understand the specific differences in the
methodology. However, it is important to note that researchers are likely not deliberately
manipulating the data so much as they are employing various methods for various research
purposes. While the RFX analysis may be “suitable for detecting true positive activations
with [a] high degree of confidence,” the less restrictive analyses may be “particularly useful
for appreciating all activated regions of interest during normative database formation.”
Seghier et al., supra note 115, at 472.
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required for admissibility, relying on the scientific framework that we have just
presented. At various points in the evidentiary analysis it might be useful to
refer back to specific methods and concepts. Where possible we will include
the section headings to facilitate easy reference.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Admissibility Is Specific to the Evidentiary Purpose
Admissibility cannot be decided in a vacuum; the first inquiry must be how
the party introducing the evidence proposes that it be used. The same evidence
may be extremely probative for one purpose and not even relevant for
another. 130 As discussed above, this Article focuses on functional neuroimages
that are introduced to provide evidence of an individual’s mens rea. As such,
much of the analysis of the evidentiary requirements could be applied to other
applications of fMRI such as in lie detection or assessment of subjective pain.
However, this analysis sets aside structural brain images—such as those used to
prove harm in a tort action, or those used to validate a relevant medical
diagnosis when imaging is a component of the medical standard of care.
In order to be admissible, functional brain images: must be relevant,
authenticated, and more probative than unfairly prejudicial; cannot be
impermissible hearsay; 131 and, if introduced by an expert, must satisfy the tests
for expert scientific testimony in that jurisdiction. In short, there are many
hurdles to admissibility. We focus here on the requirements that the evidence
be relevant, authenticated, and that the probative value be greater than the
potential for unfair prejudice. Even though states have different rules of
evidence, each state has some equivalent to Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and
403, which speak, respectively, to relevance and excluding relevant evidence
that is unfairly prejudicial. 132 In this Article, we will take advantage of the
130. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993) (“The study of
the phases of the moon, for example, may provide valid scientific ‘knowledge’ about
whether a certain night was dark, and if darkness is a fact in issue, the knowledge will assist
the trier of fact. However (absent creditable grounds supporting such a link), evidence that
the moon was full on a certain night will not assist the trier of fact in determining whether an
individual was unusually likely to have behaved irrationally on that night.”).
131. The hearsay rule applies to “computer-generated evidence which repeats or
contains human declarations. Evidence to which this hearsay rule may apply includes
accounting records, invoices, summaries or any other types of computer output which
reiterate human declarations which have been inputted into the computer.” 57 AM. JUR. 3D
Proof of Facts § 7 (2009).
132. FRE 401 states, “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 401. FRE
403 states, “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
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broad overlap between states on these two rules, and will generally reference
the standards for admissibility as codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence
(FRE).
B. Classifying Functional Brain Images
Evidence can be either direct or circumstantial, and it may come in the
form of either demonstrative (real) evidence or witness testimony. Under many
evidentiary rules, the classification of evidence does not do much work. But as
fMRI challenges the traditional boundaries between categories of evidence, it is
worth discussing how the resulting images might be classified. 133 As used in
this Article, fMRI images are tangible objects that are often used to illustrate
testimony, and are not as yet themselves direct proof of the defendant’s
capacity to form intent or otherwise hold a particular criminal mental state.
They are therefore not direct evidence, and for now they are not likely to
constitute testimonial evidence. 134 However, if the behavioral task involves the
subject testifying to some guilty knowledge or participation in a criminal act,
one wonders whether the images might one day be thought of as testimonial. If
the methods for producing the images involve the subject declaring or
testifying to something as part of the experimental stimuli, the resulting image
may very well be categorized as a declaration or statement. 135 If this occurs,
presentation of cumulative evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 403.
133. Many thanks to David Faigman for emphasizing the importance of these
classifications and the distinctions.
134. Erich Taylor, Note, A New Wave of Police Interrogation? ‘Brain Fingerprinting,’
The Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, and Hearsay Jurisprudence, 2006
U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 287, 303 (“The Court has repeatedly considered four factors
when determining whether a practice is testimonial in nature: (1) whether the practice
‘enlists the mind’ of the subject; (2) how the practice ‘compares to paradigms of real and
testimonial evidence;’ (3) how the practice adheres to the values and principles behind the
Fifth Amendment; and (4) what implications banning the practice will have on law
enforcement practices and procedures.”); see also Sarah E. Stoller & Paul Root Wolpe,
Emerging Neurotechnologies for Lie Detection and the Fifth Amendment, 33 AM. J.L. &
MED. 359, 366 (2007). Nita Farahany has presented on the potential for brain-derived data to
be considered testimonial evidence. See Audio recording: Nita Farahany, Incriminating
Thoughts, Stanford Law School Junior Scholars in Law and Neuroscience Conference (Apr.
7,
2008),
available
at
http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/
events_media/20080405_CLB_FarahanKolber.qtl.
135. Though this technique will undoubtedly be further refined, at present it has been
successful in predicting mental states in highly constrained conditions related to visual
perception (e.g., asking the subject to recall an image of a hammer or an igloo), and simple
intention formation, such as whether the subject decided to add or subtract two numbers. See
Kendrick N. Kay et al., Identifying Natural Images from Human Brain Activity, 452 NATURE
352 (2008); Yoichi Miyawaki et al., Visual Image Reconstruction from Human Brain
Activity Using a Combination of Multiscale Local Image Decoders, 60 NEURON 915 (2008);
Svetlana V. Shinkareva et al., Using fMRI Brain Activation to Identify Cognitive States
Associated with Perception of Tools and Dwellings, 3 PLOS ONE e1394 (2008); see also
John-Dylan Haynes et al., Reading Hidden Intentions in the Human Brain, 17 CURRENT
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the images generated by testimonial statements will also implicate the hearsay
doctrine and the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. 136 For
now, however, as the functional images cannot decode thoughts and cannot be
used to coerce testimony or reliably reveal someone’s “true thoughts,” it will be
classified for our purpose as circumstantial, demonstrative evidence. 137
It is analytically important to differentiate between the methodology that
the expert relies upon and the interpretation of that methodology. This is true
even though the Supreme Court has stated that there must be some nexus
between the scientific expert’s interpretation and the data and methodology on

BIOLOGY 323 (2007); Chun Siong Soon et al., Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions
in the Human Brain, 11 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 543 (2008). The latter study focused on
“free” decisions about pressing a right or left button, and found that the outcome of the
binary decision was predictable from brain activity well before the decision was reported to
have entered conscious awareness. The neuroscientific basis of “free will” is a topic for
another manuscript. Furthermore, the construction of such pattern classifiers requires many
repeated trials, and the pattern may be idiosyncratic to a particular individual, such that one
classifier would not be useful as a general forensic tool unless there is a universal signal in
response to the stimuli that is incredibly robust and specific. However, given that visual
memory for faces produces a very robust and specific signal in the brain, with sufficient
knowledge of the facts of the crime (e.g., exact murder weapon, details about a unique
location), it is conceivable that pattern classifiers may be able to predict whether the
defendant has ever seen the evidence put before him in the fMRI scanner. See John-Dylan
Haynes & Geraint Rees, Decoding Mental States from Brain Activity in Humans, 7 NATURE
REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 523, 528 (2006).
One important caveat is that the pattern classifier at present cannot differentiate
between sources of encoding the memory. What this means is that it will not work if the
object being tested for recognition triggers a response because it resembles an unrelated
object the subject has seen before (such as a similar model of gun or a crime scene that the
subject has seen before in a different context). Query whether merely recognizing something
indicates anything about whether the defendant committed the crime. To date, pattern
classifiers cannot differentiate between knowing something because one has heard it or read
it, versus knowing something because one actually experienced it. This severely limits the
forensic application of pattern classifiers.
136. If the behavioral measure used to trigger the BOLD response requires making a
statement, and that statement is made by someone who cannot testify in court, one wonders
whether fMRI might also implicate hearsay rules. See Taylor, supra note 134, at 306
(questioning whether “hearsay considerations would become an issue with BF [brainfingerprinting] testing . . . if the test results of one suspect were used in an attempt to
prosecute another suspect, possibly a co-conspirator. In such an instance, would the BF test
results of the first suspect be admissible as against the second suspect? If BF test results are
found to be testimonial statements, they would only be admissible in such an instance if the
individual making the statements was ‘unavailable’ to testify and had previously been
subject to cross examination on the test results. Alternatively, the test results could be
admitted under any of the recognized exceptions to the general rule of hearsay
inadmissibility.” (citation omitted)).
137. Demonstrative evidence appeals to the jurors’ senses: it is something they can
touch, smell, taste, or hear. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that requires the jury to draw
an inference, and which on its own cannot be dispositive of the prima facie elements of a
case. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES
50 (2008).
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which it rests. 138 In this Article, we are primarily concerned with the
presentation of the images themselves, regardless of whether the problems we
address would likewise challenge the reliability and analytical validity of the
expert’s testimony interpreting the images. Practically speaking, functional
neuroimages would almost never be introduced without being interpreted by a
testifying expert. However, as the images could be thought of as generating
independent substance rather than merely illustrating preexisting testimony or
data, the presumption that they are demonstrative evidence may not be robust.
We will elaborate on this point when discussing the authentication of the
images infra in Part III.D.
C. Relevance
The point of departure for analyzing admissibility of any type of evidence
is relevance. Federal Rule of Evidence 402 simply states that only relevant
evidence is admissible, and irrelevant evidence is not admissible. 139 Relevance
has two parts: materiality and probative value.
The word materiality is often used to describe the first prong of relevance,
which is the fit between the evidence and the case. 140 The materiality
component of relevance reflects the idea that there is no such thing as relevance
in the abstract. 141 If brain images were introduced to suggest that the defendant
suffered from an irresistible impulse, this would be immaterial in a state such as
California that does not recognize the irresistible impulse test for legal insanity.
However, so long as the functional brain images are introduced to bolster or
challenge some fact that is of consequence under the criminal statute of that
state, they will satisfy the materiality requirement.
The second prong of logical relevance is probative value. Quite simply,
probative value refers to the tendency of evidence to establish the proposition
for which it is offered. Probativeness can also be referred to by another name,
138. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the Supreme Court stated that the
“focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that
they generate.” 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993). But see Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,
146 (1997) (“[C]onclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another.
Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data. But nothing in either Daubert or
the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is
connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that
there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.”).
139. FED. R. EVID. 402.
140. This can be confusing, as unlike some states, the federal rules do not require that
evidence be introduced to prove a fact that is in dispute or material to the outcome.
Materiality is used here to refer to the requirement that there be a nexus between the
proffered evidence and the substantive law.
141. See GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 18 (2d ed. 2008). Therefore if knowledge is not an
element of a criminal statute, then a defense based on lack of knowledge (for example, that a
previous conviction was punishable by more than one year, and thus the defendant should
not have been carrying a firearm) is immaterial.
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logical relevance, as it “exists as a relation between an item of evidence and a
proposition sought to be proved.” 142 In order for a piece of evidence to carry
any probative value, there must be a sound reason for relying on it and a
probabilistic connection between the evidence and the proposition it seeks to
prove. The Federal Rules of Evidence only require that the proffered evidence
have any tendency to make the existence of any fact of consequence more or
less probable. 143 Under the FRE, the evidence could be relevant if it merely
helped the jury put some other critical element in context. 144
Recent legal scholarship has proposed new models for calculating
probative value. Some of these call for mathematical representations of the
proposition sought to be proved and the probability of proving that
proposition. 145 While mathematical models of probative value provide
conceptual clarity, they are not very practical: 146 even if judges employ
probabilistic models for evaluating evidence, they tend to do so without
conscious access to this process. 147

142. George F. James, Relevancy, Probability, and the Law, 29 CAL. L. REV. 689, 690

(1941).
143. FED. R. EVID. 401.
144. As we saw in the Saviñon case discussed infra Part I, functional neuroimages

would likely be introduced to bolster other psychological evidence—i.e., psychological
testing, behavioral data, and eyewitness testimony. In that particular case, the defense
counsel conceded that the image could not prove anything about the criminal’s mental state
at the time of the crime. Instead, the expert would only use the image as supporting evidence
for the psychological theory that the defendant was depressed. See Defendant’s Offer of
Proof and Points and Authorities Re: SPECT Evidence, supra note 5, at 5. While evidence
may be deemed relevant if it puts something else in context, it still needs to clear other
evidentiary hurdles to be admitted.
145. See Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of Mathematical
Models of Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 108 (2007).
146. There are a few conceptual models for measuring whether an item has probative
value. One model asks whether the probability of the hypothesis (H) is affected by some
piece of evidence, (E)—i.e., P(H|E). A second model reverses this inquiry and asks whether
the existence of the evidence is affected by an assumed hypothesis P(E|H). To put this into
our terms, the first formulation asks whether the probability that an individual was unable to
form the requisite intent is more or less likely given the existence of data in the functional
brain image. The second formulation asks whether the interpretation of the fMRI data is
more or less likely if the individual lacked the ability to inform intent. However, if we
already have some reason to believe that the defendant lacked the ability to form intent, then
our job in the scanner is a bit easier. The probability that the image reflects some reduced
functioning is greater if we think there is a functional impairment a priori, and can build
upon existing knowledge of cognitive and behavioral networks to model the experimental
task. Because the fMRI image is only as good as the experimental task, having a behavioral
task that is tailored to the individual’s unique deficit will be easier than throwing darts at the
entire frontal lobe and hoping to see a BOLD response that may have nothing to do with the
ability to form intent. This is important, as the legal requirement of intent to kill is not a
unique phenomenon; there may be many physiological events leading to reduced ability to
form a particular type of intent. So the probability of E, given H, is greater than the
probability of H, given E. See A.W.F. EDWARDS, LIKELIHOOD 44-51 (expanded ed. 1992).
147. A judge typically relies on her “personal experience, general knowledge, and
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1. Logical inference and relationships between brain data and mental
states
The probative value of functional neuroimaging varies depending on the
exclusiveness of the relationship between the brain data and the mental state of
interest. With respect to complex mental states and cognitive functions, there is
virtually no one-to-one mapping of a particular function to a particular brain
region. If one sees reduced activity in the frontal lobe (and a corresponding
difference in the BOLD response compared to a group of normals) this does not
conclusively mean that this individual lacked the ability to form a specific
intent. Such a finding certainly could implicate mens rea, but the probative
value is weak given the many other possible explanations for the result.
Without knowing anything about an individual’s ability to form the relevant
mens rea, or about the precise networks recruited for a particular mental state, a
variant BOLD response could mean any number of things, including
nothing. 148
To date, most research investigating the neurological correlates of
cognitive processes has relied on “forward inference.” With the forward
inference approach, researchers ask subjects to perform two experimental tasks
understanding of human conduct and motivation.” MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 736 (Kenneth
S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006); see also D.H. Kaye, Comment, Quantifying Probative Value, 66
B.U. L. REV. 761, 766 (1986) (“The search for an interpretation of PV [probative value]
should be guided by the uses to which such an expression will be put. Without a quantitative
measure of prejudicial effect and the other counterweights of Rule 403, I do not see how a
mathematical expression of PV could find direct forensic application. The only purpose that
I can see is heuristic. A suitable formulation for PV may clarify our thinking about what it
means to say that evidence is very probative, slightly probative, and so on. These rough
quantifications are useful in performing the balancing required under Rule 403.”). One day,
perhaps neuroscience will shed light on this issue as well. See Jeffrey M. Beck et al.,
Probabilistic Population Codes for Bayesian Decision Making, 60 NEURON 1142, 1142
(2008) (the paper presents a “neural model of decision making that can perform both
evidence accumulation and action selection optimally”).
148. As top neuroimaging researcher Steven Petersen explains, “The problem right
now with imaging is that doing experiments right is really, really hard, but getting pictures
out is really, really easy.” Greg Miller, Growing Pains for fMRI, 320 SCIENCE 1412, 1412
(2008). Elizabeth Phelps, a cognitive neuroscientist at New York University, adds that
although anxiety engages the amygdala, so do intense smells, sexually arousing images, and
many other things. Id.
This critical point has been elaborated on by Roskies, supra note 21, at 24, who states
that “[w]hen considering the steps that allow us to draw conclusions about neural activity
from imaging data, it becomes evident that a large number of neural states could conceivably
give rise to the same signal, and furthermore, we currently lack means of ruling out many of
those possibilities as improbable.” While this was discussed above, it bears repeating here.
Possible alternative explanations include: (1) the behavioral task used in the fMRI is not well
correlated with the individual’s specific ability to form intent; (2) the differences within the
group may be too great, so that the averaged activation pattern does not reflect data that
correspond to any one individual; (3) the BOLD response is not capturing reduced
functioning, or put differently, the reduced “activation” in the defendant might be the result
of efficient processing, increased inhibitory firings, or novel cognitive strategies.
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that are thought to differ only in their engagement of a particular mental
process. As a crude example, in one condition the subject may be asked to read
aloud words aloud that are presented on a screen, and in a second condition he
is instructed to silently read the same words on the same screen. If the two tasks
differ in their relative BOLD response, it may be inferred that the nonoverlapping BOLD activation corresponds with brain regions that are necessary
for orally producing, rather than merely visually processing, words. There are
problems with the forward inference, as there are many examples of scenarios
where regions that are activated during one task are not necessary and
sufficient for completing that task.
Also, if the task has become highly automatic or if it has been repeated
upon many trials, efficient processing may lead to relatively little BOLD
activity, even though that region is involved in the task. 149 In this case the
inference might be that the individual is deficient in her functioning, when in
fact she is either on autopilot or has developed expertise. The opposite may also
be true, where subjects may recruit additional brain regions if the task is
difficult—brain regions that assist in, but that are not normally required for,
completion of the task. 150 It is therefore presently impossible to assign
anatomical specificity or functional necessity to a region or network in the
brain through fMRI alone. In order to make a claim that a brain region is not
only specifically recruited for a task, but also functionally required, researchers
will need to rely on other techniques that can measure the functional impact of
manipulating healthy brain anatomy. 151
While there are interpretive problems with the forward inference approach,
reverse inference reasoning is more troubling. The reverse inference from
activation to mental state reflects the logical fallacy of affirming the
consequent. In a series of influential articles, cognitive scientist Russell
Poldrack lays out this common, but flawed, reasoning. 152 It typically proceeds

149. See John Darrell Van Horn & Russell A. Poldrack, Functional MRI at the
Crossroads, 73 INT’L. J. OF PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 3, 4 (2009). “Repetition suppression” is a
known phenomenon wherein repeated processing of the same stimulus results in decreasing
neural and associated hemodynamic activity. For a review, see R.N.A. Henson & M.D.
Rugg, Neural Response Suppression, Haemodynamic Repetition Effects, and Behavioural
Priming, 41 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 263 (2003).
150. See Roberto Cabeza et al., Task-Independent and Task-Specific Age Effects on
Brain Activity During Working Memory, Visual Attention and Episodic Retrival, 14
CEREBRAL CORTEX 364, 373 (2004) (“[T]ask-specific age effects included age-related
contralateral recruitments in left PFC during WM and in right PFC during VA. This result
suggests that older adults may compensate for deficits in production processes by recruiting
monitoring processes, and vice versa.”).
151. See Van Horn & Poldrack, supra note 149, at 4.
152. See Russell A. Poldrack, The Role of fMRI in Cognitive Neuroscience: Where Do
We Stand?, 18 CURRENT OPINION NEUROBIOLOGY 223, 223-24 (2008) [hereinafter Poldrack,
Role]; see also Russell A. Poldrack, Can Cognitive Processes Be Inferred from
Neuroimaging Data?, 10 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 59, 63 (2006) [hereinafter Poldrack,
Cognitive Processes].
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as follows:
In the present study, when task comparison A was presented, brain area Z was
active. (If A, then Z; or, when chocolate shown, the brain region called the
nucleus accumbens is active).
In other studies, when cognitive process X was putatively engaged, then brain
area Z was active. (If X, then Z; or, when reward processing is thought to be
engaged, the nucleus accumbens is active).
Thus, the activity of area Z in the present study demonstrates the engagement
of cognitive process X. (Thus, if Z, when A, then X; or, because the nucleus
accumbens is active when chocolate is shown, reward processing must be
engaged).

The logical failure is fairly obvious, as the brain region called the nucleus
accumbens may be involved in numerous other mental processes that are not
specific to signaling reward. Typical reverse inference claims are deductively
true only if the specific mental process activates the region of interest, but
“brain regions observed with fMRI are rarely activated by only one mental
process.” 153 Reverse inference is relatively common in cognitive neuroscience
research articles, where the inference is understood as explaining unexpected
findings or developing novel hypotheses to be tested in subsequent
experiments. 154 However, reverse inferences may be abused in the courtroom,
where the faulty logic is not exposed, and where findings are not being used to
bolster future research but rather to make factual or legal claims. 155
Areas of the brain that are likely to show up in mens-rea-related claims,
specifically components of the prefrontal cortex, parietal association cortex,
and subcortical components such as the amygdala and hippocampus, are among
the best studied yet most complex areas of the human brain. These areas are
responsive to a huge variety of stimuli and are engaged in nearly the full
spectrum of human behavior. As discussed above, it is well understood with
respect to complex perceptual and behavioral functions that the relationships
within the human brain between structure and function are not one-to-one.
While practicing neuroscientists tend to strongly believe that every mental state
must be encoded as a brain state, we are at present a considerable distance

153. Poldrack, Role, supra note 152, at 223-24 (“It has become increasingly common to
use neuroimaging data to infer the presence of specific mental processes . . . . This approach
has been particularly common in newer literatures such as neuroeconomics and social
cognitive neuroscience, where the fundamental processes underlying task performance are
often unknown . . . . However, given that the goal of cognitive neuroscientists is to build
explanations rather than deductive laws, reverse inferences may provide some useful and
important information even if they are not deductively valid.”).
154. Poldrack, Cognitive Processes, supra note 152, at 63.
155. Id. at 60 (“If a [brain] region is activated by a large number of cognitive
processes, then activation in that region provides relatively weak evidence of the
engagement of the cognitive process; conversely, if the region is activated relatively
selectively by the specific process of interest, then one can infer with substantial confidence
that the process is engaged given activation in the region.”).
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away from the precise mapping of complex mental states onto unique brain
activation patterns. Knowing that structure and function do not map onto each
other in a one-to-one relationship, and given the problems with the forward and
reverse inferences in the forensic context, why would anyone ever think that an
fMRI directly proves anything about an individual’s mental state? At least two
alternative avenues exist: First, the images may lend credibility to other
psychological theories of the defendant’s behavior. Second, the image might be
thought of as superior to the status quo of relying on eyewitness or direct
testimony.
Given what is known about the unreliability of eyewitness testimony and
what may be suspected about the truthfulness of direct testimony, it may be
tempting to call upon the more reductionist and seemingly objective brain
images to draw inferences about a defendant’s mental state. 156 Although brain
images may appear more scientific and less capable of distortion, as
demonstrated in Part II, it is this appearance, and not the validity of the
science, that parties expect to do the persuading. When used to make inferences
of mens rea, fMRI images have even less probative value than the status quo of
psychological testing and testimony as to criminal behavior. But given that the
construction of the functional brain image requires the researcher to take
multiple discretionary steps—steps that are not obvious in the resulting
image—the results appear more reliable than they are. This was referred to
157
In order to expose the discretionary
previously as the “epistemic mismatch.”
steps, counsel proffering functional neuroimages should carefully authenticate
the images and lay a foundation for their introduction. Over time the
authentication process becomes more automated, but particularly with a new
technology, the process needs to be meticulously articulated in order make
transparent the process behind the compelling images.

156. See Bethany Shelton, Turning a Blind Eye to Justice: Kansas Courts Must
Integrate Scientific Research Regarding Eyewitness Testimony into the Courtrooms, 56 U.
KAN. L. REV. 949, 954-55 (2008) (“Reid Hastie, a well-known researcher in the 1980s,
studied juries and their perspective of eyewitness identifications. Hastie’s work indicates that
jurors misunderstand many factors that affect eyewitness accuracy. He concluded that juror
misconceptions about eyewitness accuracy, combined with potentially inaccurate
identifications, pose a serious threat to justice. Today, Dr. Elizabeth Loftus is the most
recognized expert on eyewitness testimony. She has participated in many criminal trials
where eyewitness identification played a major role in the case against the defendant.
Research has led Dr. Loftus to conclude that, depending on the circumstances, eyewitness
identification can be highly unreliable and riddled with error. . . . Following in the footsteps
of Dr. Loftus and Hastie, researchers continue to discover that juries overestimate the
accuracy of eyewitness identification.” (citations omitted)); see also Cindy O’Hagan, When
Seeing Is Not Believing: The Case for Eyewitness Expert Testimony, 81 GEO. L.J. 741, 74849 (1993); Brooke Whisonant Patterson, The “Tyranny of the Eyewitness,” 28 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 195, 202 (2004).
157. See supra note 21.
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D. Authentication
Before demonstrative evidence can be admitted into the record, the
proponent must first offer sufficient proof that it is what she claims it to be.
This is done to make sure the evidence has not been adulterated and that it is
the product of sound scientific principles. 158 Nothing should be presumed to be
authentic, and the proponent bears the burden of establishing authenticity. 159
This standard is embedded in FRE 901(a) 160 and resembles the conditional
relevance standard from FRE 104(b). 161 Like conditional relevance,
authentication allows for the admission of evidence based upon the fulfillment
of some condition of fact (here, authenticity). 162 To satisfy authentication
requirements, the proponent must offer enough proof that the jury could
reasonably find by a preponderance of the evidence that the exhibit is what the
proponent claims it is. 163 In jury trials, the judge will conduct the offer of proof
outside of the hearing of the jury and will ask about the underlying
methodology for producing the image. Only after an initial offer of proof is
satisfied will the judge allow the jury to see the evidence. The jury will then
make the ultimate decision as to the item’s authenticity.
There is, at present, no standard for authenticating functional brain images.
For the moment, analogies to the authentication requirements for more familiar
types of evidence may be helpful. As fMRI represents statistical probabilities
and requires inferences from a group to an individual, the authentication
requirements for social science survey data may be instructive. In this case, the
proponent must authenticate the survey data by demonstrating both that the
general methodology produces an accurate result and that proper survey
methodology was followed in the particular case. 164
As the ultimate image looks like a still photograph, the authentication
requirements for X-rays may be instructive. 165 However, as fMRI relies on
158. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED & DANIEL D. BLINKA, CRIMINAL EVIDENTIARY
FOUNDATIONS 113-15 (1997).
159. By way of example, before a crime scene photograph may be admitted, the
proponent must offer sufficient proof to enable a jury to find that the photograph accurately
depicts the crime scene in question. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK,
EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES 977 (1st ed. 1988).
160. See FED. R. EVID. 901(a) (“The requirement of authentication or identification as a
condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”).
161. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b) (“When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the
fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction
of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.”).
162. FISHER, supra note 141, at 805-06.
163. See id. at 806 (citing Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 688 (1988)).
164. See Kevin H. Smith, External Validity: Representativeness and Projectability in
the Probative Value of Sample Surveys, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1433, 1445-46 (1993).
165. Christopher J. Buccafusco, Gaining/Losing Perspective on the Law, or Keeping
Visual Evidence in Perspective, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 609, 627 (2004) (“Although the
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computer programming and statistical models to produce the brain image,
which is similar to the modeling of computer-generated animation videos,
comparing the way computer-animated videos have been authenticated may be
useful. Some aspects of fMRI will render the social science, X-ray, and
computer animation examples inapposite, but this only illustrates the point that
authentication requirements are not one-size-fits-all. 166
1. The pictorial and silent witness theory of admissibility may
accommodate the authentication of fMRI images
In most situations, a photograph needs to demonstrate “pictorial
testimony,” meaning that a witness needs to testify according to personal
knowledge that the photograph accurately reflects the scene in question. The
witness need not have taken the picture, nor does she need to know anything
about the conditions at the time the picture was taken. She only needs personal
familiarity with how the scene normally looks.
There is an alternative to this approach. The “silent witness theory” was
developed to accommodate the situation that arises when no one can personally
witness the object being photographed. 167 One such example is X-ray, as no
one can testify from personal knowledge as to how bones or tissue normally
appear. Instead of speaking to the accuracy of the content, the witness need
only lay a sufficient foundation that the process that produced the image is
reliable and capable of capturing whatever it is that the proponent claims it to
be. 168 Thus in certain cases we are willing to assume authenticity of content if

acceptance of a new form of visual evidence provided a novel question for the jurists of the
day, they were quickly able to develop coherent rules for the admission of photographic
evidence by analogizing this new medium to more traditional types of evidence that had a
long history of admission.”).
166. Specifically, the empirical data from computer-generated videos runs the other
way: it may be less prejudicial insofar as the images are produced according to an accurate
program that does not distort the data—a big assumption. In an empirical study of the impact
of computer-generated videos, subjects who viewed testimony with computer animation
“recalled information more accurately and in more detail than participants who did not view
animation . . . . Providing the animation with verbal narration reduces the processing
demands on listeners’ short-term memory and maximizes the likelihood of their successful
and accurate encoding into long-term memory.” Linda C. Morell, New Technology:
Experimental Research on the Influence of Computer-Animated Display on Jurors, 28 SW.
U. L. REV. 411, 414-15 (1999).
167. Not all states subscribe to the “silent witness” theory of authentication, though
most do. See, e.g., Dolan v. State, 743 So. 2d 544, 545 (Fla. 1999); State v. Arafat, No.
85847, 2006 WL 871720, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006); see also In the Matter of the Welfare
of S.A.M., 570 N.W.2d 162, 165 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). While many states have adopted
this theory, and some have codified it into their rules of evidence, states like Georgia have
not. See MINN. R. EVID. 901(b)(9); Ross v. State, 585 S.E.2d 666, 670 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003);
CHARLES C. SCOTT, PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE § 800, at 727-29 (1942).
168. Wagner v. State, 707 So. 2d 827, 830 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (“Under the
‘silent witness’ theory, photographic evidence may be admitted upon proof of the reliability
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the process is sound. 169
For efficiency, we will fold the various components for authenticating
evidence under the silent witness theory 170 into the following list, and apply it
to fMRI: (1) the image must accurately capture the individual’s brain under the
same conditions that existed at the time of the crime; (2) the procedure for
creating the image should be described in detail to remove any possibility of
tampering, error, or distortion (this should include testimony as to the
competence of the staff and the reliability of the equipment); and (3) the
underlying statistical computer programs must demonstrate reliance on
irrefutable scientific principles. Each component will be discussed below with
reference to fMRI.
of the process which produced the photograph or videotape.”); Dep’t. of Pub. Safety & Corr.
Servs. v. Cole, 672 A.2d 1115, 1119 (Md. 1996); Washington v. State, 943 A.2d 704, 711,
714 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (finding that the theory is justified “because [the pictures]
accurately represent what they purport to show” and “the photograph speaks with its own
probative effect.”). Today the silent witness theory for authentication provides another
means of introducing visual and photographic evidence in virtually all jurisdictions.
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL § 401:7 (2010).
169. See Straughn v. State, 876 So. 2d 492, 502 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003). Indiana takes
the theory a step further than most, and holds that once admitted under the silent witness
theory, pictorial evidence may be considered substantive evidence, rather than merely
demonstrative. See Shepherd v. State, 690 N.E.2d 318, 323 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). The
substantive and demonstrative divide is in many ways a distinction without a difference,
however, as there are minimal practical consequences stemming from a designation of
substantive as opposed to demonstrative. See Robert D. Brain & Daniel J. Broderick, The
Derivative Relevance of Demonstrative Evidence: Charting Its Proper Evidentiary Status, 25
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 957, 965-66 (1992) (“Some courts treat demonstrative exhibits exactly
like they do substantive exhibits, by formally admitting them into evidence and allowing the
jury to view the exhibits during deliberations. Other courts admit demonstrative exhibits into
a twilight zone reserved for ‘demonstrative purposes only,’ apparently indicating that such
exhibits can be identified for the record but must be precluded from use by the jury during
deliberations.”).
Even so, because the photograph itself cannot be cross-examined, most courts hold that
there should be a strong showing of authenticity and reliability of the process. Specifically in
the case of photographs, this may require “evidence as to how and when the camera was
loaded, how frequently the camera was activated, when the photographs were taken, and the
processing and chain of custody of the film after its removal from the camera.” Edwards v.
State, 762 N.E.2d 128, 136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
170. This seven-prong test has been dubbed the “Voudrie standard” following Voudrie
v. State, 387 So. 2d 248, 256 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980). It requires: (1) a showing that the
device that produced the item being offered as evidence was capable of recording what a
witness would have seen or heard; (2) a showing that the operator of the device was
competent; (3) establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the resulting recording,
photograph, videotape, etc.; (4) a showing that no distortions, additions, or deletions have
been made; (5) a showing of the manner in which the recording, photograph, videotape, etc.,
was preserved, (6) identification of the speakers, or persons pictured; and (7) for criminal
cases only, a showing that any statement made in the recording, tape, etc., was voluntarily
made without any kind of coercion or improper inducement. See also Bryant v. State, 810
So. 2d 532, 536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). For our purposes we have simplified the
substance into a three-part test as described in the text.
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2. Images must accurately capture the individual’s brain under the same
conditions that existed at the time of the crime
The proponent must show that an X-ray film portrays the part of the body
of the person whose condition is at issue in the case. 171 While this threshold
element is usually fairly easy to meet, in the case of fMRI, the resulting brain
image is not just a picture of the individual’s brain at a single point in time. The
proponent here just needs to reiterate that the image is not the activity of one
individual’s brain on its own at one time, and in fact it relies on comparison,
data manipulation, and warping to templates.
The second common requirement is proof that “the physical condition of
the subject at the time of being photographed [is] the same as at the time in
issue in the case.” 172 Here the proponent needs to testify that the subject
sustained no injuries after the event in question and before the image is
constructed. If a great deal of time has passed, this factor would typically go to
weight rather than admissibility. 173 For our purposes, the proponent of fMRI
images may satisfy this requirement by stating outright that the fMRI-produced
image is not a picture of the brain at the time of the crime, but rather a current
assessment of the subject under different circumstances that may be correlated
with the past mental state. This distinction is critical and ought to dramatically
affect the weight that the fact finder gives to the evidence. The jury could not
review a picture of the subject’s brain at the time of the crime, and there is no
way to recreate the emotional reaction and cognitive processes at the time of
the crime to assess contemporaneous mens rea.
3. The procedure for creating the image should be described in detail to
remove any possibility of tampering, error, or distortion
Next, the proponent must show that the apparatus used in making the
picture was of a type known to produce dependable results and was in “good
working condition.” 174 So long as the magnet and the computer equipment
were working well and were sufficiently powerful to render accurate data, the
proponent could easily clear this requirement. It must also be shown that the
person operating the fMRI device was qualified through training and
experience to use it, 175 that she followed proper procedures, and that the chain
of custody of the resulting image was maintained.
The next authentication prong requires that the manner of creating the

171. See Call v. City of Burley, 62 P.2d 101, 107 (Idaho 1936).
172. SCOTT, supra note 167, § 799, at 724 (emphasis added); see also Dennison v.

State, 66 So. 2d 552, 554 (Ala. 1953); Wilburn v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 60 P.2d 188 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1936).
173. SCOTT, supra note 167, § 799, at 724.
174. See Stevens v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 137 N.E. 859, 862 (Ill. 1923).
175. See id.
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image be described in detail. Specifically, any enhancements or distortions of
the image must be disclosed. 176 Here the analogy to X-rays breaks down, as the
production of X-ray images involves some, but not much, methodological
discretion. 177 Conversely, pursuant to the discussion infra Part II, the final
product of fMRI is greatly affected by idiosyncratic lab practices. 178 Even
though these practices are routinely employed to clean up the data rather than
distort it, the degree of methodological freedom invites manipulation. 179 Five
of the greatest opportunities for manipulation are: (a) attempts to remove
background noise in the data, (b) the selection of the experimental task, (c) the
creation of the “control” group and the exclusion of control subjects whose data
does not support a certain theory, (d) the chosen threshold of statistical
significance, and (e) the statistical software package the lab employs.
The way to resolve the problem of what was earlier dubbed “dialing a
defect” is to require a detailed explanation by the proponent of not only what
was done to the raw data to produce the image, but also why each step was
taken. This should be explained in the simplest way possible so that the fact
finder can understand. While X-ray images provide helpful guidance as to how
fMRI images should be authenticated, the minimal degree of discretion in the
production of X-ray images requires reliance on another example. As there is a
great deal of literature challenging the authentication of computer-generated
videos, this type of evidence may direct the authentication process for fMRI
176. In the case of X-rays, courts required information about the distance from the Xray to the subject, the separation between the film and the subject, the angle from which the
X-rays were directed, and the length of exposure. Courts have also required testimony as to
whether the film was artificially changed to bring into relief certain features. See, e.g.,
Bartlesville Zinc Co. v. Fisher, 159 P. 476, 477 (Okla. 1916); see also Cooney v. Hughes, 34
N.E.2d 566, 569 (Ill. App. Ct. 1941); West v. Wilson, 4 P.2d 469, 471 (Mont. 1931); State v.
Veatch, 740 N.W.2d 817, 826 (Neb. Ct. App. 2007) (“It must also be shown to the
satisfaction of the trial court that no substantial change has taken place in the exhibit so as to
render it misleading.”); SCOTT, supra note 167, § 800, at 727.
177. To take an X-ray of the bones, short X-ray pulses are shot through a radiographic
film, with the relevant body part in front of the film. The bones then absorb many photons as
they are quite electron-dense. The X-rays that do not get absorbed turn the film from white
to black, leaving a white silhouette of bone matter. Creating an image of the cardiovascular
system requires a few extra steps, as an initial image is taken of the system of interest first. A
second image is then taken of the same system after an iodine contrast material has been
injected into the blood. The two images are digitally registered rendering one image that
contrasts the blood vessels with the background physiology. The registration process does
not involve the smoothing or statistical modeling that is required in fMRI.
178. This is true for PET images as well. “If [such] a [large] difference . . . can be
obtained on the same subjects with the same injection using different tomographs, then
apparent differences in metabolic rates reported by different groups should be interpreted
with caution.” Cheryl L. Grady, Quantitative Comparison of Measurements of Cerebral
Glucose Metabolic Rate Made with Two Positron Cameras, 11 J. CEREBRAL BLOOD FLOW &
METABOLISM A57, A63 (1991).
179. See Jill Witkowski, Can Juries Really Believe What They See? New Foundational
Requirements for the Authentication of Digital Images, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 267, 269
n.53 (2002).
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that also relies on complex statistical software.
4. Underlying statistical computer programs must demonstrate reliance
on irrefutable scientific principles
The phrase “garbage in, garbage out” describes a key concern when
dealing with computer-generated images. Unfortunately, juries may, in their
fascination with a computer’s ability to produce seemingly objective data,
disregard this concern. 180 One legal scholar noted that even with increased
visibility of computer technology, “there remains an air of mystery about the
computer. Computerization is seen as a magic world, ruled by the wizards who
operate the machines.” 181 Of course, “computers do not think for themselves;
they act on the commands of the programmer.” 182 As was illustrated with the
various fMRI processing and analytical tests, computers can produce very
different functional images, depending on the data put into the computer and
the programming commands supplied. As previously mentioned,
“computerized analysis” should not be allowed to be a veneer of rigor and
reliability, and instead should be questioned as critically as any other piece of
evidence.
5. Authentication should be specific to fMRI and distinct from other image
types
None of the authentication obstacles should be impossible for fMRI to
overcome. But just as “an X-ray picture cannot be authenticated in the same
manner as an ordinary photograph . . . [as] it requires a higher degree of
authentication,” 183 the same is true for fMRI as compared to X-ray. Each new

180. Two examples of being over-awed by computers come from a Pennsylvania case
and a recent law review article. See Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170, 1176 n.3 (Pa.
2006) (“Because a [computer generated animation] is a graphic illustration of an expert’s
reconstruction rather than a simulation based upon scientific principles and computerized
calculations, it is not subject to the Frye test governing the admissibility of scientific
evidence in Pennsylvania.”); Leo Kittay, Admissibility of fMRI Lie Detection: The Cultural
Bias Against “Mind Reading” Devices, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1351, 1355 (2007) (“[T]he fMRI
appears less subject to examiner bias because the exam questions are presented visually on a
screen and the analysis is performed using computer software.”).
181. Mario Borelli, The Computer as Advocate: An Approach to Computer-Generated
Displays in the Courtroom, 71 IND. L.J. 439, 439 (1996).
182. Carolyn Smart, The Computer Must Be Right: Computer Generated Animations,
Unfair Prejudice, and Commonwealth v. Serge, 26 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 387,
387 (2007).
183. The departure from the strict foundational requirements for video evidence is a
product of “the judicial system’s growing familiarity with video evidence, and the
widespread social, cultural, and technological acceptance of the medium.” JORDAN S.
GRUBER, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE § 8:9, at 386 (1995), quoted in Jill Witkowski, Note, Can
Juries Really Believe What They See? New Foundational Requirements for the
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generation of imaging device will require more sophisticated methods for
authentication as the steps involved to create the image are obscured by the
previous technology. As society becomes savvier as to the production methods
for each new type of image or recording, the authentication requirements may
become less strict, and judges may start to take judicial notice of the process.
Such was the case with video recording and photography, which used to require
much more thorough scrutiny for authentication than is typically required
today. 184
Turning from the past to the present, a final analogy comparing fMRI to
computer-generated animation may help predict how functional images will be
evaluated in the future. By way of background, parties often introduce
computer-generated images in car accident cases in order to draw conclusions
about how the accident likely occurred. 185 Recognizing the authoritative power
of computer-generated images, many jurisdictions require that the underlying
software and input data be tested for their ability to authentically model or
predict the simulated events. 186 Computer-generated images have been
classified as either “simulations” or “animation.” 187 Animation evidence
merely summarizes the expert’s preexisting opinion in graphical form, and the

Authentication of Digital Images, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 267, 280 n.53 (2002).
184. “As time passed, the courts relaxed the requirements for admissibility of video
evidence. . . . As long as recordings meet these four requirements, there is generally no need
to adhere to the strict seven-part test. . . . In fact, strict foundational requirements for video
recordings ‘are now almost universally rejected as unnecessary.’” Witkowski, supra note
183, at 279, 280 & n.53 (quoting GRUBER, supra note 183, § 8:22, at 408).
185. In Livingston v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd., a car accident case, the Montana Federal
District Court admitted computer simulation evidence under FRE 702, but only after the
plaintiff’s expert testified at length to the foundation of the technology. Specifically, he
explained the development and use of the simulation program, including how the physics
equations were created, how the road conditions were modeled, etc. Livingston v. Isuzu
Motors, Ltd., 910 F. Supp. 1473, 1495 (D. Mont. 1995); see also 57 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of
Facts § 3 (2000).
186. See State v. Foreman, 954 A.2d 135, 158 n.24 (Conn. 2008); see also Schaeffer v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 360 N.E.2d 1062, 1067 (Mass. 1977) (“Our concern is not with the
precision of electronic calculations, but with the accuracy and completeness of the initial
data and equations which are used as ingredients of the computer program.”); IMWINKELRIED
& BLINKA, supra note 158, at 104-06; Fred Galves, Where the Not-So-Wild Things Are:
Computers in the Courtroom, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Need for Institutional
Reform and More Judicial Acceptance, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 161, 185 (2000).
187. Simulations require an expert to enter “mathematical formulae or other scientific
principles into the computer so that the computer can generate a model—based on the data
and scientific assumptions—that the expert will use to form an opinion as to what must have
or could have actually happened.” Galves, supra note 186, at 185 (emphasis added); see also
Robert B. Bennett et al., Seeing Is Believing; or Is It? An Empirical Study of Computer
Simulations as Evidence, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 257, 260 (1999); Borelli, supra note 181,
at 450-52.
In contrast, animations “are simply computer-generated drawings assembled frame by
frame which, when viewed sequentially, produce the image of motion.” Galves, supra note
186, at 180 (2000).
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data that is put into the animation is based on this subjective opinion.
Simulation evidence does more than animate testimony, and in fact provides
independent, illustrative content. Because simulation evidence is thought to be
more authoritative and objective, it often must meet a higher threshold for
authentication. 188
fMRI may be thought of as a hybrid between animation and simulation
evidence, with the scales tipping slightly toward simulation evidence. fMRI
provides the basis of the expert’s opinion by applying neuropsychological
models, laws of physics, and statistical principles in order to draw probabilistic
conclusions about an individual’s brain activity. In this way it resembles
simulation evidence. However, as discussed in detail infra Part II, the image
can be thought of as animating preexisting psychological theories of behavior
and cognition. This is because the interpretation of the BOLD response will
vary depending on the assumptions that are built into the computer software
package and the theories behind the mental process being studied. 189 This
makes fMRI a bit like animation evidence. Even though fMRI may be a hybrid
form of evidence, it should require authentication of the scientific principles on
which the image construction rests. It should also include an analysis of the
reliability of that process under an FRE 702 analysis or its state counterpart. As
standards develop in the field of neuroimaging, judges will begin to take
judicial notice of the methodology for constructing the brain image, and the
authentication process will become much more streamlined.
Before standardization occurs, the authentication of the expert evidence
must involve some discussion of the methodology’s reliability in order to
satisfy the foundational requirement that the evidence is the product of sound
scientific principles. While the reliability of the process may be unpacked a bit
during the authentication phase, the scientific validity of the methodology and
the interpretations that flow from it should be distinct from authentication.
Daubert and its progeny have held that this distinction has little meaning, but it
still serves a purpose in separating authentication from scientific expert
testimony. The film “Willy Wonka and the Chocolate Factory” illustrates this
point. 190 Recall the Wonkavision machine that mesmerized Mike Teevee by

188. See Fred Galves, The Admissibility of 3-D Computer Animations Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence and the California Evidence Code, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 723,
726 (2008); Gregory P. Joseph, A Simplified Approach to Computer-Generated Evidence
and Animations, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 875 (1999); Kurtis A. Kemper, Admissibility of
Computer-Generated Animation, 111 A.L.R.5th 529, § 3 (2003).
189. See Dunkle v. State, 139 P.3d 228, 250-51 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006) (“Although
Dalley’s use of the computer-generated animations suggested that she was adding a
computer-based analysis to the other evidence in the case, a careful review of her testimony
reveals that she was simply restating evidence already introduced and re-summarizing areas
in which various statements by Dunkle were inconsistent with this evidence.”).
190. Wonkavision is a fictional process that is featured in the 1971 film adaptation of
Roald Dahl’s novel CHARLIE AND THE CHOCOLATE FACTORY. See WILLY WONKA & THE
CHOCOLATE FACTORY (Warner Bros. 1971).
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being able to transport a chocolate bar through a television. Authentication
would not ask an expert to opine on whether each piece of chocolate tastes the
same, or whether the Wonkavision system made all of the “right” decisions
according to the chocolatiers of the world. It just asks the proponent to explain
the process used to transmit the candy bars, to make sure that the Wonkavision
mechanisms are grounded in sound scientific principles. Whether Wonkavision
would stand up to peer review and falsifiability would be taken up later in great
detail, when the process undergoes FRE 702 scrutiny. While this example is
fanciful, computer simulation evidence is not, and it therefore provides a nice
comparison for fMRI, where independent content is likewise generated by
algorithms. 191 With computer simulations, jurists have found Daubert and
authentication criteria to overlap, as the authentication process may need to
inquire into the reliability of the methodology of producing the evidence, in
order to make sure the programming assumptions are supported by scientific
principles. 192
Even though authentication may cross the threshold of FRE 702, “[t]he
authentication standard does not demand the intricate, complex ‘pavane’ that
Daubert seemingly entails.” 193 With authentication, the judge must only deem
the evidence sufficient for a jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence
that the neuroimage captures what the proponent claims that it does. 194 Under
the expert scientific evidence analysis, the interpretations that flow from the
brain images would be heavily scrutinized to make sure that the method is
either generally accepted for this purpose or that it is a product of, and
subjected to, the scientific method. Authentication of the underlying scientific
principles will not answer the question of whether the ultimate interpretation of
the evidence is valid. Post-Daubert Supreme Court precedent has revealed that
the nexus between the methods and conclusions should be reviewed under FRE
702. 195

191. For a discussion of how scientific validity and authentication are related, see Dean
A. Morande, A Class of Their Own: Model Procedural Rules and Evidentiary Evaluation of
Computer-Generated “Animations,” 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1069, 1110 (2007) (“Although
authentication does not generally involve a Frye/Daubert analysis, simulations present a
unique set of circumstances: providing the jury with scientific, expert-like substantive
evidence created by a non-human source.”).
192. See State v. Kirsch, 820 A.2d 236, 243 (Conn. 2003); Bray v. Bi-State Dev. Corp.,
949 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
193. Daniel D. Blinka, Expert Testimony and the Relevancy Rule in the Age of Daubert,
90 MARQ. L. REV. 173, 195 (2006).
194. “The judge, then, is not expected to mediate scientific disputes on the merits but
rather to determine only whether the issues may be fairly disputed within the framework of
the adversary trial.” Id.
195. While Daubert drew a sharp line between methodology and conclusions, later
Supreme Court precedent recognized that, under a Daubert or FRE 702 analysis, the
distinction is not clean. See supra note 138. A later Supreme Court case followed up on this
inability to cleave methods from conclusions. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,
153-54 (1999) (“[I]t was the reasonableness of using such an approach, along with [the]
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A real-world application of this theory arose in a murder case involving
computer-enhanced bitemark photographs. The prosecution used Adobe
Photoshop to superimpose the defendant’s teeth on top of photographs of the
victim’s bitten flesh. On appeal, the defense successfully challenged the
authentication of the computer-enhanced photographs, as the prosecution’s
expert had not demonstrated five elements. First, the process for creating the
overlays was not demonstrated to have been accepted by the field of
odontology. Second, there was insufficient evidence that the proper procedures
were followed relating to the processing of data input and output. Third, the
Adobe Photoshop software that was used to construct the image was not
demonstrated to be reliable for this forensic application. Fourth, the equipment
was not demonstrated to have been programmed correctly or administered by a
competent technician. Finally, the court found that the Adobe Photoshop
software might actually allow for the underlying bitemark photographs to be
altered. 196 Note that this analysis is geared more toward reliability than
validity, a critical distinction that the Daubert Court unfortunately bungled. 197
For now, the proponent should not encounter much difficulty
demonstrating the competence of the fMRI device or the process, so long as she
is quite clear at each step of the way that the resulting data is correlative in
nature and many idiosyncratic decisions can dramatically affect the constructed
image. First, it should be made clear that fMRI does not produce a snapshot of
the subject’s brain. 198 Second, judges should know that fMRI also typically
relies on group data to create a comparison to a “normal” standard. Otherwise
the judge may not fully understand how the resulting image relies on data input
particular method of analyzing the data thereby obtained, to draw a conclusion regarding the
particular matter to which the expert testimony was directly relevant.” (emphasis omitted)).
Lastly, a Third Circuit judge stated:
[T]his distinction has only limited practical import. When a judge disagrees with the
conclusions of an expert, it will generally be because he or she thinks that there is a mistake
at some step in the investigative or reasoning process of that expert. If the judge thinks that
the conclusions of some other expert are correct, it will likely be because the judge thinks
that the methodology and reasoning process of the other expert are superior to those of the
first expert.

In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 746 (3d Cir. 1994).
196. See State v. Swinton, 847 A.2d 921, 951 (Conn. 2004). For a similar case on
authenticating computer-generated content, see Commonwealth v. Serge, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th
52, 59 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2001).
197. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993) (“We note
that scientists typically distinguish between ‘validity’ . . . and ‘reliability’ . . . . [O]ur
reference here is to evidentiary reliability—that is, trustworthiness. . . . In a case involving
scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity.” (emphasis
omitted)).
198. Serge, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th at 82-83 (“[I]n order to ensure that the jury does not
confuse art with reality, an appropriate cautionary or limiting instructions [sic] should be
provided . . . . [T]he jury should be reminded that ‘[a]n animation is only as good as the
underlying testimony, physical data, and engineering assumptions that drive its images’ and
that ‘[t]he computer maxim “garbage in, garbage out” applies to computer animations.’”
(quoting Clark v. Cantrell, 529 S.E.2d 528, 536 (S.C. 2000))).
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from other volunteers. Third, in order to remove the possibility of tampering, a
witness will need to testify to the procedures employed in analyzing the data
and creating the image. In cases where the methodology is unique or
particularly opaque, it may be necessary to validate the findings by having an
independent lab conduct the same imaging procedure, or at least validate the
analysis by subjecting the raw data to the same spatial smoothing and filtering
techniques, statistical thresholds, and software package. Finally, once this is
done, the image may be considered sufficiently authenticated. While
authentication of this complex technology may seem incredibly burdensome to
judges with busy schedules and full dockets, we provide a simple checklist in
the Appendix as a starting point to authenticate functional neuroimages. While
not exhaustive, the checklist may be a tool for unpacking the methodological
elements a judge should inquire into before the fMRI data can be considered
free from distortion.
E. Why Daubert, Frye, and FRE 702 Should be Secondary Considerations
After Rule 403
For many legal practitioners and scholars, questions surrounding the
admissibility of expert scientific evidence begin and end with an analysis of
Daubert or Frye. While it would be impossible to discuss a new type of expert
scientific evidence without starting with its relationship to the rules for expert
scientific testimony under FRE 702, the inquiry should not end there. In order
to push the discussion into a broader arena, we have focused the bulk of our
inquiry on whether the images themselves, without any accompanying
testimony, may be too unfairly prejudicial to be admitted to speak to mens rea.
The first reason for this is that fMRI must be considered with respect to a
threshold rule for all evidence, not just scientific evidence: FRE 403. Besides
being legally necessary to the evidentiary analysis, FRE 403 does a better job
of assessing the potential for judicial waste and confusion of the issues. It also
responds better to arguments based upon convergent validity. 199 Moreover,
FRE 403 provides a flexible standard closely tied to the purpose for which the
evidence is being offered, whereas the outcome of a Daubert-type hearing

199. Convergent validity refers to the ability of a measurement scale to converge with
other measures of the same variable. As such, it can capture the idea that there might be a
point after which additional measurements are not cost-justified, and certain types of
evidence might be privileged over others. David L. Faigman et al., How Good Is Good
Enough?: Expert Evidence Under Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 645, 654
(2000) (“[W]e do endorse a better evidence principle in our analyses of certain issues in the
law of expert testimony. That is to say, we believe that there are circumstances in which a
court properly may exclude proffered evidence when other evidence of greater probative
value is or should be available.” (emphasis omitted)). To the extent that fMRI may one day
possess convergent validity with other behavioral measures, or even be simply consistent
with (and still reliant upon) a clinical diagnosis, FRE 403 could better deal with the
prejudicial impact of wasting the court’s time with expensive, convergent data.
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could lead to sharper lines being drawn in the minds of courts and counsel that
a technology is “admissible” or “inadmissible,” even when that technology is
still in flux. Even so, there is more than one way to dispose of fMRI addressed
to past mental states, and many of the same arguments we will make below in
our discussion of probative value could be used to challenge the scientific
validity of fMRI addressed to past mental states. For this reason, we provide a
brief overview of the evidentiary rules that are specific to expert scientific
evidence.
The probative value of functional neuroimages will likely be established
through interpretive expert testimony. In this situation, the judge may admit
evidence subject to its connection with the testimony, or admit it upon proof of
a proper foundation. The underlying expert testimony must meet the
requirements of FRE 702 or its state counterpart. 200 FRE 702 requires the
judge to determine whether the opinion of the expert is based on sufficient facts
or data, whether it is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
whether the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts
of the case. 201 This rule is often referred to simply as the Daubert standard,
following the Supreme Court case that clarified the federal rules. 202 Many
states have adopted the essential elements of Daubert, either outright or
indirectly. Those states that have not adopted Daubert typically follow a
different test—that of Frye v. United States. 203 Under the Frye test, “the thing
200. See Howard L. Nations & Cindy L. Nations, The Rules of Digital Evidence, in
ANNUAL ADVANCED ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY CIVIL PRACTICE AND LITIGATION
TECHNIQUES IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 501, 506 (2007).
201. See 1 DAVID FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1:4-5, at 6-10
(student ed. 2008).
202. Even though the federal rules are thought to be coterminous with the Daubert
standard, there are some states (notably Michigan, Arizona, and Missouri) that use language
similar to FRE 702 in their evidence codes without subscribing to the specific scientific
validity framework espoused by Daubert. See Alice B. Lustre, Post-Daubert Standards for
Admissibility of Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R.5th 453
(2001).
203. In 1923, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia influenced the
way other state courts thought about the admissibility of expert scientific testimony for
seventy years. In a case dealing with the precursor to the polygraph, the court held that the
“test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and
psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced
from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made.” Frye v. United States,
293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Under the Frye test, expert scientific testimony is
admissible when the method underlying the data has “gained general acceptance” by the
relevant community. Id. at 1014 (emphasis added). Jurisdictions that have adopted Daubert
principles include Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas,
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, The
Draining of Daubert and the Recidivism of Junk Science in Federal and State Courts, 35
HOFSTRA L. REV. 217, 267 n.300 (2006). Conversely, Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois,
Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Washington
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from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”204
Fourteen states still employ Frye, and others employ a similar standard.
The Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Dow Chemical partially in
response to the perceived weaknesses of Frye. 205 In Daubert, the Supreme
Court held that under the FRE, expert scientific testimony must be scientifically
valid in order to be admissible. 206 Specifically, the Court provided a
nonexhaustive list of factors that trial courts could use to decide whether
evidence is reliable enough to be admitted.207 This list included asking whether
the evidence was falsifiable, refutable, and testable; whether it was subjected to
peer review and publication; whether there were known or potential error rates;
whether there were standards concerning its operation; and lastly, whether the
theory and technique were generally accepted by the relevant scientific
community. In deciding Daubert, the Court thought it was interpreting the
existing FRE, but after Daubert was decided, the drafters of the FRE revised
the rules to make the endorsement of the Daubert standard explicit. 208 About
half of the states followed suit and revised their evidentiary rules to follow the
new federal standard.
Daubert was a dramatic change from Frye. The Frye standard did not
require judges to know much about a novel scientific method, as they could just
rely on its acceptance by an external, relevant community. Supporters of Frye
have argued that the requirement of general acceptance by the relevant
community “assures that those most qualified to assess the general validity of a
scientific method will have the determinative voice.” 209 Under Daubert,
however, judges are now required to act as amateur scientists to determine
whether the methods are scientifically valid. 210 Depending on its intended use,

have rejected Daubert and instead continue to follow the Frye test of general acceptance. Id.
at 267, n.301.
204. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
205. The Frye test was criticized as both too liberal and too conservative, depending on
the type of evidence that the proponent sought to introduce. It seems to privilege wellorganized trades or professions and disproportionately excludes reliable evidence that is
experimental and not accepted by any particular community. See Daubert v. Dow Chem.,
509 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1993).
206. 1 FAIGMAN, supra note 201, § 1:6-7, at 11-17.
207. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
208. “[T]he Rules of Evidence—especially Rule 702—do assign to the trial judge the
task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant
to the task at hand.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597; see also FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory
committee’s note (“Rule 702 has been amended in response to Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. . . . In Daubert the Court charged trial judges with the responsibility
of acting as gatekeepers to exclude unreliable expert testimony . . . .”).
209. People v. Kelly, 17 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976) (quoting United States v.
Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974)) (emphasis omitted).
210. While Chief Justice Rehnquist derided the new burden the Daubert majority
imposes upon judges, legal scholars have noted that judges must now be amateur scientists.
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expert testimony based on functional neuroimaging may be admissible under
Frye or Daubert. Because fMRI is a valid research tool that has been generally
accepted by cognitive scientists and is subject to peer review, and the precise
research methods can be replicated and rely on theories that can be tested for
error rates, it seems to pass both the relatively permissive Frye test and the
stricter Daubert test when introduced to prove the content of the research
itself. 211 The key issue, however, under either a Frye or Daubert analysis, is
212
An expert’s
the particular purpose for which the brain image is introduced.
testimony is deemed relevant if it fits the facts of a case. Post-Daubert, another
Supreme Court decision made it clear that the data on which the expert relies
must also fit the facts. 213 There must be an appropriate logical nexus between
the data and the ultimate conclusions, and the scientific methods and resulting
214
data must be valid for a particular purpose.
Proponents of the use of novel scientific evidence in courts often gloss over
this significant “fit” requirement. Rather than engage the critical question of
whether or not the methodology is generally accepted or scientifically valid for
this purpose, they cite the thousands of peer-reviewed articles that rely on fMRI
but fail to fully address the purpose for which the findings are relevant. 215
However, the sheer presence of fMRI in peer-reviewed journals is not sufficient
to demonstrate its acceptance for a particular purpose and thus permit its
admission. The Supreme Court has clarified that the gatekeeping function of

See Faigman, supra note 128, at 1209 (“In the twenty-first century–and the sooner the
better–judges have no choice but to become amateur scientists. The job requires it. This is
true well beyond the narrow region of admissibility rules for expert evidence and includes all
contexts in which empirical research is relevant to legal decision making.”).
211. Under the federal rules, a cognitive neuroscientist could testify as to either memory or
deception . . . [W]ith regard to memory, the result of this step of the inquiry would clearly
pass the test of admissibility, at least so long as the test was conducted with due regard to the
individual variation in brain structure activation. This would require matching neuroimages
with stimuli known to be familiar and unfamiliar to that person, before assessing the level of
familiarity the subject has with the item whose familiarity level is unknown and relevant.
With regard to lie detection . . . the evidence would fail [to be admissible], because there are
not currently any reliable “deception signatures” against which the individual’s neuroimaging
result could be matched . . . .

Charles N.W. Keckler, Cross-Examining the Brain: A Legal Analysis of Neural Imaging for
Credibility Impeachment, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 509, 541-42 (2006) (footnote and emphasis
omitted).
212. Under either test for scientific evidence admissibility, the evidence must still be
relevant for something at issue in the case; that is, it must be used to make an argument that
has a nexus to the case at hand. “In the area of scientific evidence, the Daubert Court
explained, relevance foremost is a question of fit. Specifically, whatever the validity of the
science, it must pertain to some disputed issue in the case.” See FAIGMAN, supra note 201, §
1:10, at 21.
213. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
214. Id.
215. Cephos Corp., Lie Detection, http://www.cephoscorp.com/lie-detection/
index.php#admissibility (last visited Nov. 16, 2009) (“There are over 15,000 fMRI
publications so the [Cephos] technique is undoubtedly generally accepted.”).
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judges extends to conclusions, explaining that “nothing in either Daubert or the
Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence
that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.” 216 Even
the Frye test required that technology be generally accepted for a particular
purpose. 217 Thus, determinations of admissibility of scientific evidence cannot
be made in a vacuum and with passing reference to a universe of scholarly
publications.
One of the few areas in which fMRI has demonstrated clinical application
is in pre-surgical planning. Neurosurgeons may rely on fMRI before surgery to
map an individual’s critical language areas to assist in decision-making about
how the surgery will proceed, so as to minimize functional disruption in a
particular patient. 218 fMRI may also be scientifically valid and generally
accepted by neuroscientists when introduced to demonstrate brain damage 219
or stroke. 220 When used to determine retrospective and complex mental states
in an individual subject, however, fMRI is not sufficiently studied. Nor are
there any respected researchers who presently support the use of functional
brain images to assess past mental states in a forensic setting. 221 fMRI is
216. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.
217. People v. Ford, No. B171801, 2005 WL 236487, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 25,

2005) (“The trial court excluded any reference to the SPECT scan results, finding that the
technology was not generally accepted in the medical community for diagnostic purposes in
a forensic setting and therefore did not meet the Kelly standard for admissibility.” (citing
People v. Kelly, 17 Cal.3d 24, 28-30 (1976))).
218. As language centers in the brain are more focused and specific than those for
“forming intent,” pre-surgical surveying of linguistic function can assist the surgeons in
ensuring that they do not obliterate linguistic connections during neurosurgery. See John E.
Desmond & S.H. Annabel Chen, Ethical Issues in the Clinical Application of fMRI: Factors
Affecting the Validity and Interpretation of Activations, 50 BRAIN & COGNITION 482, 485-86
(2002); Paul M. Matthews, Garry D. Honey & Edward T. Bullmore, Applications of fMRI in
Translational Medicine and Clinical Practice, 7 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 732, 733-34
(2006).
219. See Giovanni B. Frisoni et al., Mapping Local Hippocampal Changes in
Alzheimer’s Disease and Normal Ageing with MRI at 3 Tesla, 131 BRAIN 3266 (2008); C.L.
MacDonald et al., Verbal Memory Deficit Following Traumatic Brain Injury: Assessment
Using Advanced MRI Methods, 71 NEUROLOGY 1199, 1201 (2008).
220. See Steven C. Cramer et al., Use of Functional MRI to Guide Decisions in a
Clinical Stroke Trial, 36 STROKE e50, e51-52 (2005).
221. A research team in Germany has demonstrated some success in predicting the
mental state of intention in tightly controlled settings. The research team asked subjects to
covertly form an intention to either subtract or add two numbers. After a variable delay the
subjects performed their chosen activities, and then indicated which tasks they had prepared.
The study demonstrated that during the delay, it was possible to decode from activity in
medial and lateral regions of the prefrontal cortex which of two tasks the subjects had
covertly intended to perform. It is hard to imagine near-term applications of this finding in a
legal setting, and it remains to be replicated in other labs. For further details of the
fascinating study, see John-Dylan Haynes et al., Reading Hidden Intentions in the Human
Brain, 17 CURRENT BIOLOGY 323 (2007). For a discussion of the complexity of
disentangling the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural models, see Ned
Block, Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience,
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therefore neither generally accepted nor scientifically valid for such a purpose
as a mental state diagnosis. When properly applied, FRE 702 and the statespecific rules governing expert scientific evidence should lead to the exclusion
of functional brain images addressed to past mental states.
But what if the images themselves are not introduced, and the expert
merely relies upon them outside of court to form her opinion? Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence 222 and thirty state counterparts, 223 the images need
not be admissible in order for the expert testimony to be admitted, so long as
the images are “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field.” However, this returns us to something resembling a Frye analysis for the
factual basis of expert inference, and we have demonstrated that fMRI is not
the type of evidence that is relied upon by psychiatrists or neuroscientists to
make inferences about past mental states. Moreover, the images should not be
disclosed to the jury unless the court determines that their probative value in
assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect. 224
F. Probative Value
The limited probative value of fMRI addressed to mens rea forms the crux
of our argument. Therefore, much of what we discuss here will apply the
findings of Part II to an analysis of probative value and the potential for unfair
prejudice. Probative value, in this case, is intimately related to the scientific and
methodological limitations of fMRI.
1. fMRI has limited probative value unless the question of proper base
rates is resolved
As noted above in Part II.C, many imaging methods, and particularly those
used in a forensic context, compare an individual subject’s brain against the
average of a group of controls. The control group is meant to represent the
normal population. But “normal” is a statistical creation, and the scientific
community does not yet have anything resembling population data on fMRIassessed brain activity during even the most basic of tasks. There are two

30 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 481 (2007). For a discussion of how we might begin to isolate
specific neural activity in a sea of constant and complex stimuli, see Hugo J. Spiers &
Eleanor A. Maguire, Decoding Human Brain Activity During Real-World Experiences, 11
TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 356 (2007).
222. FED. R. EVID. 703.
223. Several state courts have held that, under state counterparts to FRE 703, an expert
may be allowed to disclose to the trier of fact the facts on which the expert’s opinion are
based. See 89 A.L.R.4th 456, §§ 2, 3 (West 2009).
224. This is the opposite of FRE 403, which will be discussed later, as the presumption
under FRE 703 is exclusion, rather than admissibility.
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problems with our lack of knowledge about what is normal. First, we do not
know the underlying prevalence of the specific functional deficit (i.e., the
population base rate), and second, we do not know whom to include in the
control group (i.e., the reference class).
Without knowing the prevalence of any functional brain abnormality in the
population, we can say very little about the positive predictive value 225 of an
fMRI that seeks to establish this abnormality. If the prevalence of an
abnormality is low, there will be a great risk of false positives. This problem
can be illustrated by considering a population of 10,000 that has a 1% base rate
of a particular functional brain abnormality that predisposes one to impulsively
commit murder. That means that for every 100 people in the population who
have the functional brain abnormality, 9900 do not have it. If an fMRI test for
this functional abnormality is 95% specific, meaning that the test will pick up
true negatives 95% of the time, then it will falsely tag 5% of the 9900
individuals (or 495) as “positive” even though they lack that abnormality. Even
if we assume the fMRI test is 100% sensitive, meaning that it will detect true
positives 100% of the time, a positive test result still has the positive predictive
value of only 100/595, which is below 17%. This hypothetical example renders
495 false positives, a number that appears too high in the face of potential
criminal conviction. Perhaps this number of false positives might not be
problematic for civil uses that require proof only by a preponderance of the
evidence; this is a normative question, however, that is better explored in other
literature. 226
The lack of empirical data on prior probabilities, or base rates, is troubling
for courtroom use of many types of evidence that rely on statistics. 227 This
includes the interpretation of survey data, DNA analysis, and individual
functional brain images. To help cure the problem, experts relying on brain
images and other statistical evidence should speak plainly about the limitations
of the process. A judge should question why the specific base rates were used,
and perhaps require that experts proffer various statistical probabilities based
on unproven but reasonable assumptions.

225. Positive predictive value is a statistical term of art. It refers to a test’s ability to
properly classify people as “positive” who will then develop the disease or dysfunction.
226. We have dealt elsewhere with normative considerations, which in turn can impact
upon the predictive value itself:
This low predictive value of a single positive test for a functional abnormality can be
improved by additional tests, but only if the defense allows (or the court requires) those
additional tests to be conducted. If the defense gets a positive result that they think supports
their claim that the defendant is not fully responsible, then they might be unwilling to subject
the defendant to further testing. That will make it difficult in practice to improve upon the
low predictive value.

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong et al., Brain Images as Legal Evidence, 5 EPISTEME 359, 364
(2008).
227. See FAIGMAN, supra note 201, § 5:23, at 197; see also People v. Collins, 438 P.2d
33, 38 (Cal. 1968).

BROWNMURPHY - 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

April 2010]

FMRI AS EVIDENCE OF PAST MENTAL STATES

4/13/2010 11:40 AM

1181

The next problem is determining the appropriate reference class. Imaging
limitations notwithstanding, the selection of the appropriate reference class may
be a legal decision, depending on whether the law decides to subjectivize the
standard to which a particular defendant is held. 228 Should we measure the
defendant’s brain activity and compare it against other adults in the
community? Other males of the same age and IQ? Other males who take
similar drugs? 229 Asking whether we should use a subjective standard for
defending criminal conduct based on neural, structural, functional, or
behavioral deficits highlights our lack of knowledge regarding the convergent
relationship between these features. For any given brain state, there is no
predetermined reference class for making references to normal brain
functioning. 230 As a result, the probabilistic power of the inference will
fluctuate greatly depending on the group of normals to which we compare the
subject. 231 Without understanding the significance of an appropriate reference
class, juries may give too much weight to the fMRI data and related expert
testimony.
As neuroscientists are still identifying which factors influence the BOLD
response, group comparisons are nearly worthless for the purpose of making
diagnostic predictions at an individual level. 232 While there may be probative

228. See David M. Paciocco, Applying the Law of Self-Defence, 12 CAN. CRIM. L. REV.
25, 44 (2007) (“The practice illustrated by [the] decisions of “subjectivizing” the reasonable
person to account for the frailties of the accused has an attractive human dimension as it is
sympathetic to the uneven capabilities that individuals possess through no fault of their own.
It is, however, problematic as a matter of principle, pragmatics, and legal consistency to
evaluate reasonableness using the kinds of variable standards that this line of authority
produces.”).
229. This issue was raised by Michael Pardo and Ronald Allen when they questioned
the utility of probabilistic evidence that does not have a predetermined reference class. See
Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of Mathematical Models of
Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 113 (2007) (“Instead of being natural facts consigned to
predetermined reference classes with labels attached to designate the proper class, the
evidence and the events on which it is based are members of an infinite number of reference
classes, which lead to various inferences of various strength depending on how the boundary
conditions of those classes are specified.” (citation omitted)).
230. See Edward Cheng, A Practical Solution to the Reference Class Problem, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 2081, 2082-83 (2009); Kevin H. Smith, External Validity:
Representativeness and Projectability in the Probative Value of Sample Surveys, 39 WAYNE
L. REV. 1433, 1461 (1993) (“The proper specification of the universe is arguably the most
critical step in a survey’s design. If the researcher fails to accurately specify the legally
relevant universe, the best that will be achieved is a well-designed and well-executed survey
that yields good data about the wrong group of people.” (citations omitted)).
231. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE METHODS OF ATTACKING SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE § 13-10, at 467-69 (1982).
232. Scientists are still collecting data on what types of environmental and dietary
factors can affect glucose metabolism in the blood and therefore the BOLD response. Some
data suggest that women who are menstruating have different BOLD responses than those
who are not. See Jean Claude Dreher et al., Menstrual Cycle Phase Modulates RewardRelated Neural Function in Women, 104 PNAS 2465, 2466 (2007). Without a better
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value in the weakest of associations, the inference about dysfunction will be
meaningless unless more is known about the neurophysiology and variance in
activation patterns of normal people who are presented with opportunities to
commit crimes. If no rational sampling frame can be composed, the results will
be plagued by sampling error, meaning that the “normal” sample will not
represent the right population. 233 Because of this deficiency, one researcher
stated bluntly that “[a]t the moment, fMRI would be among the most useless
things to do” when attempting to draw inferences about an individual’s
capacity or mental state from group neuroimaging data. 234
2. fMRI has limited probative value as it relies on averaged group data
and ignores individual differences
As discussed supra in Subpart II.C, the current fMRI methodologies rely
heavily on averaged group data to make inferences about whether an
individual, by comparison, is normal. These averages often eliminate important
cognitive, emotional, and perceptual differences between control subjects, as
the data focus on overlapping, or shared, activation.
As noted above, a growing list of external variables can affect the BOLD
response. Because of the present inability to account for irrelevant individual
differences in the control data, if the defendant is compared to the group map,
he may be incorrectly identified as “abnormal” if any shared activation data is
subsumed by averaging with a larger set. The opposite is also true, as two
individuals may perform very similarly on a behavioral task, and yet have very
different brain activity. 235
Until we can better understand the variables that can lead to individual
differences in activation, comparisons between individuals in arbitrarily
selected groups will not yield useful legal results. The criminal law cares about
individual differences more than most scientific research does. Questions about
mens rea do not ask what most reasonable people would think at the time of a
crime, but rather what the defendant in fact thought or was capable of thinking
at the time. 236 Therefore, the reliance on averaged group data of what is
understanding of external variables that can affect this measure, any group-to-individual
inference will have very limited value. See Miller, supra note 121, at 1201.
233. For a discussion of the problems with surveys that do not capture a random
sample of the universe under investigation, see Amstar Corp. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 615
F.2d 252, 264 (5th Cir. 1980); United States ex rel. Free v. Peters, 806 F. Supp. 705, 715-16
(N.D. Ill. 1992); see also FAIGMAN, supra note 201, § 4:17, at 148.
234. Richard Robinson, fMRI Beyond the Clinic: Will It Ever Be Ready for Prime
Time?, 2 PLOS BIOLOGY 0715, 0716 (2004) (quoting John Gabrieli, Associate Professor of
Psychology at Stanford University).
235. See Bell & Racine, supra note 42, at 24.
236. Any reliance on what has been dubbed “social frameworks” theory would be
inappropriate here, if only for the narrow reason that a well-researched comparison group of
which the defendant is clearly a member does not exist. “Social frameworks” is a term
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“normal” is even less relevant for determining a defendant’s guilt in a criminal
trial.
Inferences are drawn from the control group to the specific individual to
help explain a variety of phenomena, such as the reasonableness of a battered
woman’s self-defense or the reasonableness of a child’s delayed response to
abuse. As explained above, however, determinations of an accused criminal’s
mental state cannot be reached based entirely upon what is reasonable; rather,
these determinations are factual elements to be proved. For example, murder
“may be punished less severely when the killer is merely aware of but ignores a
risk of death—‘recklessness’ —than when the killer desires the victim’s
death—‘purposefulness.’ The defendant’s unique thoughts thus govern the
degree of culpability.” 237 Averaged data that compares the individual to a
group therefore has virtually no probative value for assessing mens rea.
3. fMRI will have limited probative value for determining mens rea until
we know more about the BOLD response
The limitations on the BOLD response outlined in Subpart II.A underscore
the problem of prematurely employing research data for individual diagnostic
or courtroom purposes. The BOLD response may provide a helpful, indirect
proxy for neural activity in the lab when precision at the individual level is
unnecessary. But when the decision is whether to convict or acquit an
individual of a serious crime, the lack of information on what the BOLD
response actually captures is exceedingly problematic. Does the BOLD
response vary based on diet? Does it vary based on hormone levels? Does it
capture inhibitory firings? 238 What relationship does it have to underlying
synaptic activity? One lab hypothesized that variations in blood circulation may
lead to frequent “underestimat[ion]” of activation in fMRI experiments. 239
Much evidence introduced at trial is merely correlative. But given how little is
known about the strength of the correlation between the BOLD measure and

coined by Laurens Walker and John Monahan to refer to the use of off-the-shelf research
results to construct a control group for deciding factual issues crucial to the resolution of a
particular case. See Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of
Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 559-60, 570 (1987).
237. Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice Through Psychological
Character Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1, 3 (1993) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
238. See, e.g., Logothetis, supra note 26, at 873 (“A frequent explanation of the fMRI
data simply assumes an increase in the spiking of many task- or stimulus-specific neurons.
This might be correct in some cases, but increases of the BOLD signal may also occur as a
result of balanced proportional increases in the excitatory and inhibitory conductances . . .
.”).
239. Logothetis and his co-workers have found that the BOLD response may reflect the
neural activity related to the input and local processing in a given area rather than the output
(spiking activity). Nikos K. Logothetis et al., Neurophysiological Investigation of the Basis
of the fMRI Signal, 412 NATURE 150, 154 (2001).
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the brain’s physiology, the probative value of fMRI images based on the BOLD
response is severely limited.
4. fMRI will have limited probative value for the purpose of determining
mens rea until we have standardized methods for processing the data
and creating the activation map
As we discussed above in Subpart II.C, the techniques of processing data to
generate fMRI images, the statistical threshold, and the software package
employed can all have a dramatic impact on the resulting activation map. 240
This problem may be mitigated in part by vigorous cross-examination that may
expose variations in the methods and reduce the jury’s confidence in the
images. But cross-examination will not do enough, as the problem remains that
there are no gold standards for rigorous fMRI analysis in the criminal justice
context. Indeed, though it is not our focus here, a Daubert challenge might
conceivably be raised with respect to the lack of adequate standards for
gathering and analyzing the data. In this sense there is currently no objective,
measurable truth that each side could work toward in a criminal trial; at present,
cross-examination could create a competition over arbitrarily selected software
packages. Even if there is no truth at the core of the methodology, the
adversarial process of fact-finding would improve if forensic labs were required
to standardize their methods. The Functional Biomedical Informatics Research
Network (“FBIRN”) has developed a suite of tools and methods to calibrate
and collect data across diverse environments. FBIRN has also suggested
universal methods for storing and managing the data. 241 Without standardized
methodology like that proposed by the FBIRN project, there is too great a risk
of distortion or manipulation. It remains difficult to know what the fMRI image
means and why the particular analysis was employed. 242
240. The Biomedical Informatics Research Network (BIRN) group demonstrated this
by looking at data from the same person, analyzed at four different laboratories with
different fMRI machines and use protocols. The image below, available at Function BIRN,
http://www.birncommunity.org/current-users/function-birn (last visited Nov. 16, 2009),
represents the results.

As Daniel Langleben, Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at the University of
Pennsylvania School of Medicine, explained: “[I]f you want to abuse this technique and
claim that it works, you can create tests that will produce results—I can see how it could be
done. We know enough to rig it.” Robinson, supra note 234, at 0717.
241. Specifically, FBIRN suggests standardized imaging parameters, quality control
measures, and standardized software packages for multi-cite imaging comparisons. All of
these
tools
are
available
for
download
from
BIRN
Home
Page,
http://www.birncommunity.org.
242. However, even with greater standards for developing fMRI, the BIRN project
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5. fMRI will have limited probative value for the purpose of determining
mens rea so long as institutional review boards exist and research
ethics are followed
fMRI is highly constrained by the variety and validity of tasks that can be
performed in the scanner. 243 At present, there are no psychological tasks that
map directly onto a complex, legally-defined mental state such as intent to
harm or kill, or even the capacity to form such intent. This deficiency in the
state of knowledge assaults the ecological validity of the fMRI
244
methodology.
As previously mentioned, labs carefully create behavioral tasks to measure
specific cognitive phenomena such as executive control or impulsivity. Many
of these tasks are quite good at assessing cognitive flexibility, 245 learned and
unlearned conditioned fear responses, 246 inhibitory control, 247 and risk
cannot get rid of fundamental problems with interpretation at the individual level. See
Laurence R. Tancredi & Jonathan D. Brodie, The Brain and Behavior: Limitations in the
Legal Use of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 271, 29394 (2007) (“Even assuming that the BIRN project succeeds . . . , the difficulties of using
fMRI images to draw legal conclusions will continue to remain unresolved. . . . The image
doesn’t explain by itself psychiatric syndromes, complex behavior, nor even something as
discrete as an impulsive reaction. Furthermore, a 99% correlation from a group study
between an fMRI image and violent behavior does not tell us why person ‘X’ committed
murder.”).
243. See Bell & Racine, supra note 42, at 23-24.
244. By weak “ecological validity,” we mean that the cognitive or behavioral task that
the subject is asked to perform will almost never mirror the decision-making process of a
real-life criminal setting.
245. The Probabilistic Reversal Learning Task is one measure of cognitive flexibility.
On each trial, subjects are presented with two abstract visual patterns. Using trial-and-error
feedback, subjects must discover which of the two patterns is correct. Feedback (a green
smiley face or red sad face) is presented as soon as the subject has chosen one of the patterns
by a left or right button press. The ventrolateral prefrontal cortex is the area of the brain that
is often implicated in this task. See Roshan Cools et al., Defining the Neural Mechanisms of
Probabilistic Reversal Learning Using Event-Related Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging, 22 J. NEUROSCIENCE 4563, 4563-64 (2002); Chris M. Dodds et al., Methylphenidate
Has Differential Effects on Blood Oxygenation Level-Dependent Signal Related to Cognitive
Subprocesses of Reversal Learning, 28 J. NEUROSCIENCE 5976, 5976-77 (2008).
246. The Pavlovian Fear Extinction task measures the ability to “unlearn” conditioned
fear stimuli such as responses to snakes or unfamiliar faces. In this task, a simple
discrimination, partial-reinforcement paradigm is used: the conditioned stimuli are colored
squares and the unconditioned stimulus is a mild shock to the wrist. See Elizabeth A. Phelps
et al., Extinction Learning in Humans: Role of the Amygdala and vmPFC, 43 NEURON 897,
898, 904 (2004). The ventromedial prefrontal (or medial orbitofrontal) cortex is an area of
the brain that is often implicated in this task. See Mohammed R. Milad et al., Thickness of
Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex in Humans Is Correlated with Extinction Memory, 102
PNAS 10706, 10709-10 (2005); Phelps, supra, at 897.
247. The Stop-Signal Task gives a sensitive estimate of inhibitory control—the stop
signal reaction time (SSRT)—reflecting the time it takes to internally suppress a response. In
each trial, a left- or right-pointing arrow stimulus is displayed on a computer screen. The
subject responds by pressing the left or right key as quickly as possible (“go” task) unless
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evaluation in decision-making. 248 The important point here is that, even if the
behavioral task is reliable for a particular cognitive measure in the lab, it may
not be well-suited for diagnostic purposes in the courtroom. Specific intent to
kill is not an operationally-defined cognitive state, and in fact it may actually
represent multiple cognitive states. While many experimental tasks may be
relevant to the ability to form specific intent to kill, the tasks often require
extrapolation to a degree that severely limits their relevance in the courtroom.
There are several reasons for this conclusion.
First, the emotional stakes in an experiment are comparatively low. No one
is actually going to be robbed, stabbed, shot, arrested, or sentenced. The
response in a lab will therefore never be as real as the response on the street,
and may reflect a different decision-making process entirely (as the fear of
sentencing may replace the fear of being caught). Second, in the case of using
fMRI to buttress the insanity defense, presenting the defendant with a question
about whether or not he could appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions at the
time of the crime will be skewed by intervening events (e.g., by his current
understanding of the criminal charge, the passage of time, or incentives to
malinger). The same incentive to malinger could exist even in a test of
executive control that assesses the ability to form intent. Third, and still quite
important, is the problem that in some cases, “the very same behavior that
might not be deemed criminal in one social context (say, shooting a gun at a
target at a shooting range) may be deemed criminal in another (such as
shooting a gun in the direction of a crowd of people).” 249 Context obviously
matters. The complex situation that gives rise to the criminal behavior will be
impossible to replicate, or even approximate, in a lab.
Perfect unison between the experimental task and the criminal setting is
impossible to reach. Institutional review boards (“IRBs”) oversee research on
human subjects to ensure that the experiments are not overly risky to the

she hears a beep, in which case she is instructed to withhold a response (“stop” task). The
inferior frontal gyrus is an area of the brain that is often implicated in this task. See Adam R.
Aron et al., Stop-Signal Inhibition Disrupted by Damage to Right Inferior Frontal Gyrus in
Humans, 6 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 115, 115-16 (2003).
248. The Cambridge Gamble Task assesses decision-making under risk, with imperfect
probability information. The subject is presented with an array of ten red and blue boxes and
is instructed that the computer has hidden a token under one of the boxes. After guessing
whether the token is hidden in a red or blue box, the subject is asked to wager a proportion of
her points on that decision. Potential wagers are offered in an ascending or descending
sequence that enables the separation of impulsive response tendencies from genuine risk
preference (risk-preferring subjects must wait to place high wagers in the ascend condition).
Outcome probabilities of winning and losing are provided explicitly by the ratio of red to
blue boxes, and thus the task assesses decision-making under risk rather than ambiguity. The
ventromedial prefrontal cortex is an area of the brain that is often implicated in this task. See
Luke Clark et al., Differential Effects of Insular and Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex Lesions
on Risky Decision-Making, 131 BRAIN 1311, 1312-13 (2008).
249. Dean Mobbs et al., Law, Responsibility, and the Brain, 5 PLOS BIOLOGY 0693,
0695 (2007).
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individual or to society. 250 Because of the regulatory and ethical requirements
that the research minimize the risk of harm to the subject, IRBs are incredibly
unlikely to approve a set of behavioral tasks that mirror true criminal choices
and settings. For this reason, the judge should remind the jury that the
behavioral task is at best only loosely related to the mental state at the time of
the crime. Again, this does not mean that the data are useless, but rather that
their probative value to the legal question of mens rea is severely diminished
based on the low ecological validity of the behavioral task.
6. fMRI has limited probative value for evaluating past mental states as it
measures present reactions to present stimuli
By now, it is clear that using measurements of a behavioral task to attempt
to assess a past mental state using fMRI requires significant inferential leaps.
The most remarkable leap virtually requires time travel when jurors are asked
to view an image from the present to infer capacity or lack of mens rea in the
past. Even if the most ecologically valid behavioral task were created, the
“perfect” group data were collected, the contrast between the defendant’s
activation and the group’s activation were statistically significant, and regions
where circuits involved in intent formation had been localized (these are all
huge “ifs”), we still know nothing directly about how the brain was functioning
at the time the crime was committed. Each inferential leap raises considerable
issues of remoteness. 251 Concededly, many types of evidence require
inferences about the present based on the past. But with brain imaging, the time
travel aspect deserves special mention because it is not transparent, and the
brain states being “captured” are transient rather than fixed.
250. In addition to international and federal ethical regulations that prohibit research
resulting in significant risk of harm to the human subjects, there may be civil or criminal
charges brought for any research that involves the simulation of criminal acts. For a
summary of the IRB regulations, see 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(f) (2005). For information on
human subject research, see THE NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, THE BELMONT REPORT
(1979), available at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/belmont.html#goa.
251. Remoteness usually affects the weight of the evidence, rather than its
admissibility. See 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1021 (2009) (“It is held that the probative
remoteness of evidence is never alone a reason, or an absolute reason, for its exclusion, but
should always be accompanied by some other objection if it is to prevail, such as the
confusion which may result or the emotions which the evidence may arouse to disturb
impartial decision.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Matthews v. James, 362 S.E.2d 594, 599600 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (“Although the mental capacity of the decedent to change the
beneficiaries of his Blue Bell plans must be determined as of the date of the execution of the
forms effecting such change, evidence of the decedent’s mental capacity at other times is
admissible if it bears on the issue of the decedent’s mental capacity at the time he executed
the changes.”); In re Daniels, 313 S.E.2d 269, 271 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (“Evidence of
mental condition before and after the critical time is admissible, provided it is not too remote
to justify an inference that the same condition existed at the latter time.” (citing 1 BRANDIS,
N.C. EVIDENCE § 127 (1982))).
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In the case of an insanity defense, we may need to know whether the
defendant was capable of knowing whether his actions were wrong. This still
requires time travel, as a defendant may be legally sane at the time of the crime
and then rapidly decompensate in prison. Alternatively, a defendant may have
been legally insane at the time of the crime (perhaps due to a combination of
not taking psychiatric medicine and some triggering event) and legally sane at
the time of trial due to adherence to the use of prescribed psychiatric
medications and abatement of stress.
7. Multiple steps in the chain of inference severely limit the probative
value of fMRI
Of course, a lengthy chain of inferences is not itself fatal to relevance. 252
The significant inferential leaps that were described above indicate weaker
probative value, but they do not eliminate probative value altogether. Evidence
can have enough probative value to be admissible even if the proposition for
which it was offered still seems quite implausible once introduced. 253 This is
because evidence need only get you to first base, as it were, in order to be
relevant; it need not be a home run. The party offering the brain image as
evidence merely has to demonstrate that it tends to increase the likelihood that
the defendant lacked the requisite mens rea, not that it proves the defendant
more likely than not lacked such mens rea.
For all of the reasons articulated above, we argue that, at present,
functional neuroimaging has almost no probative value when introduced to
prove an individual’s past mental states. But because a brain image may be
correlated with a behavioral task that is itself correlated with some mental state,
it is at least marginally possible that the image brings the defendant one
infinitesimal step closer to making out a mens rea defense based on the lack of
intent or insanity. Because the bar is so low, evidence is almost never excluded
254
We do not suggest here that fMRI images
because it has no probative value.
should be excluded based on their lack of probative value alone, although an
argument along these lines could be made. Because the probative value is
paltry, FRE 403 and its state counterparts present a stronger threat to
admissibility.
G. Unfairly Prejudicial Effect and the Role of FRE 403
FRE 403 states that relevant evidence can be excluded if its probative value
252. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 733 (6th ed. 2006) (“[T]he common
objection that the inference for which the fact is offered ‘does not necessarily follow’ is
untenable. It poses a standard of conclusiveness that very few single items of circumstantial
evidence ever could meet. A brick is not a wall.” (footnote omitted)).
253. See id.
254. See id.
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is substantially outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial effect. 255 Some states do
not use the term “substantially outweighed” and require that the evidence be
excluded if the potential for unfair prejudice merely outweighs the probative
value. 256 Other states require the potential for unfair prejudice to substantially
outweigh the probative value, but will only exclude relevant evidence if there is
a finding by the judge that it inflames the jurors’ emotions or is simply too
unfair. 257 We will focus our analysis on FRE 403, as many states have modeled
their balancing tests on its language. Also, if evidence is excluded under FRE
403, it will most certainly be excluded under the lower preponderance standard
used by some states.
Though all relevant evidence prejudices one party over the other, Rule 403
only challenges evidence that is potentially unfairly prejudicial by thwarting the
jurors’ fact finding or influencing the outcome of the trial by improper
means. 258 Scientific evidence’s potential for unfair prejudice stems from its
objective appearance. The admissibility of many novel scientific tools has been
challenged on the grounds that the jury will place too much value in them. Such
was the case with the polygraph 259 and mitochondrial DNA. 260
Unfortunately, neither of these examples is an appropriate comparison for
fMRI. fMRI is potentially more unfairly prejudicial than the polygraph, as it
appears less vulnerable to subjective interpretation. 261 Unlike DNA evidence,
255. See Maxwell v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 693 P.2d 348, 356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)
(“Only where the prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value will relevant
evidence be excluded.”); see also Farr v. Wright, 833 S.W.2d 597, 602 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992)
(“We note that this rule generally comes into play when the probative value of the evidence
is low or the problems with the evidence are serious. Only if the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect is exclusion proper.”).
256. See, e.g., ALASKA R. EVID. 403; CONN. CODE EVID. § 4-3; PA. R. EVID. 403.
257. See WYO. R. EVID. 403; In re MLM, 682 P.2d 982, 986 (Wyo. 1984) (“The
showing of prejudice to exclude relevant evidence requires a demonstration that the
‘evidence had little or no probative value and that it was extremely inflammatory or
introduced for the purpose of inflaming the jury.’ Evidence must be deemed unfair to be
prejudicial.” (citation omitted)).
258. 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 292 (2009).
259. See, e.g., United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 314 (1998) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (plurality opinion) (“Such jurisdictions may legitimately determine that the aura
of infallibility attending polygraph evidence can lead jurors to abandon their duty to assess
credibility and guilt.”).
260. See, e.g., State v. Pappas, 776 A.2d 1091, 1113 (Conn. 2001) (“The concern is
that jurors will overvalue DNA evidence and ignore other types of evidence.”); cf. Sarah
Brashears-Macatee, Note, A Test Both Lawyers and Scientists Can Live With: The Rigorous
Five-Prong Test for the Admission of DNA Profiling Evidence Adopted in United States v.
Matthew Sylvester Two Bulls, 71 NEB. L. REV. 920, 934 (1992) (“Though the principle and
techniques behind DNA profiling can be difficult to grasp, examination of an autoradiograph
can be illuminating even to lay persons.”).
261. The polygraph, like fMRI, relies on an unproven chain of inference from a
measured biological function to a mental state. It also, again like fMRI, depends largely on
the skill and discretion of the polygrapher. However, the process for producing the
polygraph marks is more transparent and does not approach the level of complexity involved
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which has been generally adopted as reliable science for identification
purposes, fMRI does not yet have any standardized procedures for analysis or
replication. 262 Perhaps the best analogy for our analysis is the use of
computer-generated images. Hailed as a “silver bullet” in litigation, they
seemingly guarantee success by replacing a juror’s point of reference for what
actually happened. 263 Any evidence that relies on computers is particularly
prone to being overvalued, as jurors may view the evidence as “the ultimate
arbiter of truth and afford too much weight to [the computer-generated images]
while disregarding other crucial pieces of evidence.” 264 Similarly, there is great
potential for overestimating the objectivity of brain images.
1. fMRI images may be overvalued due to their glossy portrayal of “hard
science”
Neuroscientist Dean Mobbs has called the allure of fMRI images the
265
“Christmas tree phenomenon”;
the concern is that jurors may be so
impressed by the colorful depiction of the brain that they neglect the expert’s
interpretation of the image. Likewise, the complexity of the image’s meaning
may be lost on jurors who “perceptually convert differences of degree (of blood
oxygenation levels) into differences in kind: brain activity versus no brain
activity.” 266 The use of color also has the potential to reinforce the salience and
memory of the image (which, if the image is properly described to the jury, can
also be a positive effect). 267
in developing a brain image. But see Keckler, supra note 211, at 514-15 (“What current
research offers is what the polygraph fundamentally did not, a way to go beyond the external
correlates of deception and into the specific neural processes that underlie the different types
of deceptive behavior.”).
262. DNA is a much more reliable science, assuming proper specimen procurement
and lab practices are followed. It is still imperfect, however, as there is always a risk of
contamination. See, e.g., State v. Lyons, 863 P.2d 1303, 1311 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (“[W]e
find nothing about the [method of producing DNA] or the presentation of the results of the . .
. method that would undeniably cause jurors to misuse, misinterpret or overvalue the results.
. . . [T]he results of the . . . method are not expressed in terms of statistical probabilities
capable of creating the aura of absolute identification.”). A better example for comparison
comes from the use of behavioral genetics data, not to identify suspects, but as character,
aggravating, or mitigating evidence. See Farahany & Coleman, Jr., supra note 58, at 116.
263. Robert B. Bennett, Jr., Jordan H. Leibman & Richard E. Fetter, Seeing Is
Believing; Or Is It? An Empirical Study of Computer Simulations As Evidence, 34 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 257, 257-58 (1999).
264. Commonwealth v. Serge, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th 52, 79 (Com. Pl. 2001).
265. Dean Mobbs, Hakwan C. Lau, Owen D. Jones & Christopher D. Frith, Law,
Responsibility, and the Brain, 5 PLOS BIOLOGY 0693, 0699 (2007).
266. Neal Feigenson & Richard K. Sherwin, Thinking Beyond the Shown: Implicit
Inferences in Evidence and Argument, 6 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 295, 299-300 (2007)
(emphasis omitted).
267. See Cope C. Thomas, Computer Generated Animation: Identifying New and
Subtle Prejudicial Special Effects, FLA. B.J., Dec. 2000, at 52, 53 (“Scientific
experimentation has shown that the consistent use of color is a factor in recognition of an
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Scientists and lawyers alike have warned that, due in part to the allure of
the illuminated display of the brain, jurors will likewise succumb to the
seduction of fMRI. But not all jurors or judges have been swayed by
neuroimages. In fact, in some reported cases where images have been admitted
to negate mens rea, the jury has still found the defendant guilty of first-degree
murder. 268 Judges have also properly rejected images based on the existing
evidentiary rules. 269 This demonstrates that fMRI may be more unfairly
prejudicial in some cases than in others, depending on the make-up of the jury,
the competence of the attorneys to debunk sham claims, and the judge’s
application of the rules of evidence. Jurors may dismiss fMRI images when the
results appear to fly in the face of their instincts regarding the defendant’s
innocence or guilt, but if the image comports with their theory, they may be
more likely to give it exaggerated weight. In this way, fMRI may provide
scientific grounding for confirming deep-seated biases.
2. fMRI gives the unfairly prejudicial illusion that you are directly
observing the brain’s activity
Referring to fMRI as a “picture of someone’s brain” is as rampant as it is
inaccurate. 270 There is a good deal of well-intentioned but misguided

object. One experiment has shown that when test subjects were first shown items in color,
and then shown the same items in the same color, they were more likely to recall these items
than if they were in black and white.”); see also Aura Hanna & Roger Remington, The
Representation of Color and Form in Long-Term Memory, 24 MEMORY & COGNITION 322
(1996). But see State v. Syriani, 428 S.E.2d 118, 136 (N.C. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 948
(1993), reh’g denied, 510 U.S. 1066 (1993); Sonnier v. State, 913 S.W.2d 511, 518 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1995) (“Several factors may be considered in determining whether the danger of
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of photographs, including . . .
‘the number of exhibits offered, their gruesomeness, their detail, their size, [and] whether
they are black and white or color . . . .’” (quoting Emery v. State, 881 S.W.2d 702, 710 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1994))).
268. In People v. Musselwhite, 954 P.2d 475, 478 (Cal. 1998), the prosecution
derogatorily referred to neuroimaging analysis as a “marvel machine,” and the jury
ultimately found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder. Donald Horton, a juror on State
v. Stanko, 658 S.E.2d 94 (S.C. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 182 (2008), stated, “Well, I’ll
be honest with you when we went in deliberation with that PET scan and all that
computerized stuff they did, I said I felt like I’d been dazzled by brilliance and baffled with
b.s. That’s how I felt. I found the state’s witnesses much more credible than the defense.”
Daniel Schorn, Murder on His Mind: Can Scientific Images Show What’s in the Mind of a
Murderer?, 48 HOURS MYSTERY, Jan. 13, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2007/01/11/48hours/main2352668_page6.shtml. Recently, brain imaging and expert
testimony that convicted rapist and murder Brian Dugan was a psychopath did not save him
from the death penalty. See Barnum & Gregory, supra note 53; Art Barnum & Ted Gregory,
Tears of Joy as Brian Dugan Gets Death Penalty, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 12, 2009, at C1.
269. See United States v. Mezvinsky, 206 F. Supp. 2d 661, 677 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (“Upon
careful scrutiny, Mezvinsky’s proffered mental health defenses are founded upon a miasma
of ifs, hypotheses and conjectures that have no relevance to the mental state Mezvinsky
disclaims for the twelve years at issue here.”).
270. For a few examples of the “fMRI as picture” rhetoric, see June 2008 Mayo Clinic
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reductionism in the legal literature:
“New functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) technology can take
pictures of a person’s brain at the very moment the person is engaged in a
task.” 271
“fMRI can be used to take pictures in rapid succession, essentially allowing
scientists to create movies of the brain as it performs different tasks.” 272
“You may have seen it on the front cover of Newsweek a year or so ago. It
had a picture of the juvenile brain. It’s called brain imaging. It’s hard
science.” 273
“The result is that ‘areas [of the brain] with a higher concentration of
oxyhemoglobin give a higher signal (a brighter image) than areas with low
concentration.’ The areas that are more active have more blood and literally
‘light-up.’” 274

Of course, space constraints may not allow a thorough treatment of the
nuance underlying fMRI. Journalists and scholars could, however, note that the
images are not snapshots, but statistical data mapped onto a 3-D template of a
brain (which may not even be the subject’s own brain). The overly simplified
“picture of the brain” rhetoric reduces fMRI to a misleading sound bite that is
Health Letter Highlights New MRI Scanning Technology, Obesity-Related Cancer, and DoIt-Yourself Massage, OBESITY, FITNESS & WELLNESS WK., July 12, 2008, at 3612 (“A new
tool, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), gives a clearer picture of the brain in
action and what brain tissue is relevant to accomplishing a given task, such as raising a hand
or reading a sentence.”); see also Vickie Karp, Third Screen: An Interview with Dr. Oliver
Sacks, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 26, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/vickie-karp/thirdscreen-an-interview_b_129114.html (“We have pictures from Mars and Jupiter, and we will
eventually have a much more precise picture of the brain creating, remembering, and
imagining.”); Anne McIlroy, Meditating Through Mental Illness, GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 15,
2008, at L1 (“The patients watched and reflected on scenes from sad movies, such as Terms
of Endearment, while a functional magnetic resonance imager took a picture of their
brains.”); Milan Stojanovic, Brain Imaging: A Technological Breakthrough in the
Assessment of Pain, PYSCHCENTRAL, Nov. 4, 2006, http://psychcentral.com/lib/2006/
brain-imaging-a-technological-breakthough-in-the-assessment-of-pain/
(“The
fMRI
resembles the regular magnetic resonance imaging picture of the brain’s anatomy, except
that areas of the brain that are active during the experience of pain are seen as small red
islands on an otherwise gray, detailed picture of the brain.”); New Research Shows How
Aging Brain Brings a Healthy Dose of Perspective, BIOTECH WK., July 2, 2008, at 4376
(“[T]heir brain activity was monitored with a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
machine, a high-tech device that uses a large magnet to take pictures inside the brain.”).
271. Kittay, supra note 180, at 1351.
272. William Federspiel, 1984 Arrives: Thought(Crime), Technology, and the
Constitution, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 865, 867 n.7 (2008).
273. From the edited transcript of the closing argument by defense attorney Craig S.
Cooley in the December 2003 penalty phase of the capital murder trial of Lee Boyd Malvo.
See Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Malvo Closing Argument, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2004, at 73, 74.
274. Matthew Baptiste Holloway, Comment, One Image, One Thousand Incriminating
Words: Images of Brain Activity and the Privilege against Self-Incrimination, 27 TEMP. J.
SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 141, 146 (2008) (citations omitted).
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reminiscent of the “Gene for x” debacle that reinforced genetic determinism.
This oversimplification will need to be overcome in the courtroom.
3. fMRI is unfairly prejudicial as the probative content will be presumed
based on what the image can prove and what it appears to prove
For the reasons articulated supra in Part III.D.1 regarding the “silent
witness theory” of authenticating evidence, a major problem with admitting
functional brain images is that the observer may assume that the content of the
image speaks with its own probative value. In other words, a testifying expert
would only need to put the picture in context, and the content of the image will
appear self-evident. Many researchers have cautioned that fMRI “seem[s] to
offer direct access to the fact to be proven.” 275 Even with proper instructions,
judges and juries may subconsciously neglect the complex and idiosyncratic lab
methods that are relied upon to create the image, and instead assume that they
are “looking at ‘someone’s brain.’” 276
The representational strategy of photographs has been referred to as
“transparent immediacy,” meaning that the image (here, the colorful picture of
a statistical brain map) attempts to conceal the process of its construction by
making the medium itself invisible. 277 There is a gap between the signifier and
the signified—i.e., the visual representation of the brain activity is perceived to
be the brain activity itself. 278 When we see an fMRI image, it is not at all
obvious that we are looking at a statistically created map that relies on heavy
processing, comparisons to averaged data, and the superimposing of data onto a
separately obtained structural brain image. Instead, we think of the brain image
as an immediate translation. Even established scientists are not immune; as one
researcher explained, “‘many people express an interest in using PET . . .
because it is obviously so easy! They lack an understanding of what is entailed,
I think, because the data comes out as pretty pictures.’” 279 Instead of engaging
with the image as a correlative, statistical map, there is “a real danger that
pictures of blobs on brains seduce one into thinking that we can now directly
observe psychological constructs.” 280
275. Feigenson & Sherwin, supra note 266, at 299.
276. Id.
277. Jay David Bolter, Remediation and the Desire for Immediacy, 6 CONVERGENCE

62, 62 (2000); see also Robert P. Crease, Biomedicine in the Age of Imaging, 261 SCIENCE
554, 561 (1993) (“One obvious solution [to the floods of data] is to rely on images, whose
spatial dimensions, shadings, and color codings can easily express large amounts of data.”).
278. See JAY DAVID BOLTER & RICHARD GRUSIN, REMEDIATION: UNDERSTANDING NEW
MEDIA 61 (1999).
279. Dumit, supra note 63, at 57.
280. Feigenson & Sherwin, supra note 266, at 310 (quoting Richard Henson, What Can
Functional Neuroimaging Tell the Experimental Psychologist?, Q. J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 58A, 193 (2005)). This unfair prejudice is not limited to formal criminal
procedure; in the context of counterterrorism interrogation, too,
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fMRI as evidence thus subsumes the underlying data in a sea of colorful
images. 281 Many commentators on visual media have opined on its great
potential for unfair prejudice:
[U]nlike words on the page, visual images on the screen are far more likely to
directly stimulate heightened emotional responses. . . . Subject to our
unthinking gaze, which is mostly how we watch, the screen seems to present a
window onto reality. We tend to look through the medium rather than at it.
Moreover, once we comprehend what we see, that’s usually all we need to
believe it. In other words, the familiar commonplace that ‘seeing is believing’
is not just idle folk knowledge . . . .” 282

In this respect, it is possible that our beliefs about objects follow
immediately, perhaps automatically, from our perception provided that we
think we can grasp what it is we are viewing. 283 Such a belief would be
reinforced by a proponent referring to an fMRI image as a photograph of
someone’s brain. Put another way, testimony and judicial instructions
explaining an fMRI image, may be overshadowed by the apparent epistemic
power of the neuroimage to convey its own message. 284
While it may be harmless for television shows like “CSI” to fail to
discriminate between science and science fiction, it is dangerous when
government officials and trial counsel do not know the difference. 285 As
journalists and television writers continue to perpetuate the misconception that
the brain image is a picture of the defendant’s “abnormal” brain, this cultural
transmission increases the likelihood that a jury might give undue influence to

[t]here is a profound risk that intelligence personnel will be seduced by the glamour of fMRI
and its flashy images, and that they will overlook the limitations of the technology (including
lack of specificity), the subjectivity of interpretation, and the complexity of brain function
outside the realm of playing cards and controlled studies.

Jonathan H. Marks, Interrogational Neuroimaging in Counterterrorism: A “No-Brainer” or
a Human Rights Hazard?, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 483, 499 (2007).
281. Dumit, supra note 63, at 143 (“[T]he image overtakes the text, overturning the
authority of the text.”).
282. Richard K. Sherwin, A Manifesto for Visual Legal Realism, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
719, 725-26 (2007).
283. Roskies, supra note 21, at 22 (“Although seeing a photograph as a representation
of a scene involves an inference, the inference is generally automatic, and mediated by
implicit background knowledge and judgments of visual similarity.”).
284. See George J. Annas, Foreword, Imagining a New Era of Neuroimaging,
Neuroethics, and Neurolaw, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 163, 168 (2007); see also Dumit, supra
note 63, at 143 (“PET images . . . participate in this reversal of veridictory authority. They do
so especially when they leave the close community of researchers who daily deal with their
semiotic complexity and are aware of their illustrative rather than veridictory use in
scientific presentations. . . . PET images can sometimes become the central argument, with
the text as supplement.”).
285. See N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, The CSI Effect: Popular Fiction About
Forensic Science Affects Public Expectations About Real Forensic Science, 47 JURIMETRICS
357, 358 (2007) (explaining how the prosecution can be burdened by shows such as CSI,
which create a demand for forensic science and a respect for it that is not supported by its
actual validity).
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any functional neuroimaging evidence that may be admitted. 286
This phenomenon of thinking we are seeing a picture of someone’s brain
derives from what Adina Roskies has called the “inferential distance” of
neuroimaging. 287 Roskies uses the term to explain the nonobvious steps that
are necessary to go from the raw data to the ultimate conclusions and colorful,
glossy pictures. 288 Noting the cultural and epistemic value of pictures, Roskies
explains that fMRI images are belief dependent, meaning that the researcher
can influence the resulting image by using a certain task, agreeing on a certain
sample of controls, lowering the threshold lens through which the images are
viewed, or focusing on only a few brain regions.
This dependence on the discretion of the researcher makes functional brain
images more like paintings than photographs. Unlike photographs, the visual
properties of functional brain images are instantiated by the use of texture,
shading, perspective, and color. Thus, the brain image is not an instantiation of
the functioning brain, even if it appears so. The inferential distance may not
create unfair prejudice that is impossible to correct, but it may be quite difficult
to retrain jurors to see a statistical map when looking at a functional image of
the brain.
4. fMRI images may be unfairly prejudicial based on neuro-essentialism
The brain scan image—a silhouette of the skull, highlighted with bright
splotches of primary color—has also become a staple of popular culture . . . .
[T]he black box of the mind has been flung wide open, allowing researchers to
search for the cortical source for every flickering thought . . . . The machine,
in other words, knows more about you than you do: It’s like a high-tech
window into the soul. 289

Our current fascination with the brain may be part of what has been dubbed
“neuro-essentialism.” 290 This term describes the cultural phenomenon wherein
the brain is viewed as capturing the essence of what it means to be human. In
286. See David L. Faigman et al., The Limits of the Polygraph, 20 ISSUES SCI. & TECH.
40, 45 (2003) (noting, in reference to the polygraph, the potential for prejudice when the
media distorts a technology’s courtroom value).
287. Roskies, supra note 21, at 20-22.
288. Again, the problem of inferential distance was also true with PET. Joel S.
Perlmutter & Marcus E. Raichle, In Vitro or In Vivo Receptor Binding: Where Does the
Truth Lie?, 19 ANNALS NEUROLOGY 384, 384 (1986) (“Inferences drawn from qualitative in
vivo measurements . . . must be viewed with extreme caution despite their intuitive visual
appeal. Unfortunately, this sort of inference is the rule rather than the exception.”).
289. Jonah Lehrer, Of Course I Love You, and I Have the Brain Scan to Prove It:
We’re Looking for too Much in Brain Scans, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 17, 2008, at 1K,
available
at
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2008/08/17/
picturing_our_thoughts/.
290. “Although studies of the mind and brain are a cornerstone of cognitive
neuroscience, neuro-essentialism represents a hasty reduction of identity to the brain.” Eric
Racine et al., fMRI in the Public Eye, 6 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 159, 161 (2005).
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the last century, advancement of neuroscience has led to the development of
brain imaging and has been “said to lift mankind into a state of enlightenment
about its own intellectual foundations.” 291
Functional brain images in particular speak to our desire to understand
ourselves and to identify the location of the human essence as being inside the
body. Therefore, when we reveal images of the brain, viewers commonly
presume that these images expose not only an individual’s anatomical structure,
but also that individual’s essence or “self.” 292 This causes brain imaging to be
an incredibly powerful medium, both culturally and philosophically. Thus,
neuro-essentialism, as it applies in the context of functional brain imaging, may
underlie a risk of unfair prejudice within the meaning of Federal Rule of
Evidence 403.
5. fMRI has low probative value because alternative, better means of
proof exist
When engaging in a balancing test under FRE 403, the judge may consider
the existence of alternative means of proving the same point. 293 Where the
proposed evidence risks unfair prejudice to a party, the probative value of that
evidence must be discounted by the probative value of alternative means of
proof. There are alternatives to fMRI that, while afflicted with serious
limitations, may still be preferable to fMRI because those alternatives carry less
risk of unfair prejudice.

291. Michael Hagner & Cornelius Borck, Mindful Practices: On the Neurosciences in
the Twentieth Century, 14 SCI. CONTEXT 507, 508 (2001).
Colin Blakemore captured the sentiments of many by saying, “[T]he ‘me-ness’ of me is
undoubtedly situated about two inches behind my eyes, in the very middle of my head.”
COLIN BLAKEMORE, MECHANICS OF THE MIND 9 (1977); cf. MICHAEL R. TRIMBLE, THE SOUL
IN THE BRAIN 62 (2007) (“[I]n the eighteenth century, with the rise of the phrenology
movement . . . [v]arious parts of the cortex were deemed to be the seats of different
functions. . . . Such contentions, and the popularization of the discipline (phrenology),
opened the way to considerable misuse of the ideas and to exploitation of the vulnerable at
the hands of charlatans. This led to the eventual downfall of the phrenology movement, but
the ideas persisted, to permeate and influence thinking in neurology for the next two
centuries.”). Legal scholar Hank Greely made the same point in a different way:
If we could successfully transplant my brain into your body, would the resulting person be
me with a new body or you with a new brain? I believe almost all of us would say it was me
with a new body—that the “essence” of the person is the brain, not the body.

Henry T. Greely, Neuroethics and ELSI: Similarities and Differences, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. &
TECH. 599, 624 (2006).
292. Cf. Adina Roskies, Neuroethics for the New Millenium, 35 NEURON 21, 22 (2002)
(“[I]n investigating the brain, we investigate the self.”).
293. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 184 (1997); 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence §
342 (2009).
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a. The first alternative to fMRI evidence is the defendant’s behavior at the
time of the crime
A defendant’s mental state may be inferred from the defendant’s actions
and the circumstances at the time of the crime. For example, intent to kill may
be inferred from the manner in which the defendant approached the victim,
from the manner of attack, or from the use of a deadly weapon on the victim’s
person. Inferences about mental state may also be made from evidence of the
defendant’s flight, her attempts to conceal evidence, or from the defendant and
victim’s prior relationship. It requires far fewer logical leaps to infer intent
from evidence of what actually happened at the time of the crime than from
294
heavily processed and statistical brain-activation maps.
Recall the Saviñon case discussed supra in the Introduction. In that case,
the defendant treated his ex-girlfriend’s stab wounds and gave her a phone to
call for help. He also made her agree not to tell anyone that he had attacked her.
These attempts to conceal evidence seems to indicate the defendant’s
appreciation of the wrongfulness of his actions, which in turn indicates that he
had intended to kill his ex-girlfriend when he attacked her.
fMRI data correlate with behavior. Thus, even if we could model events
such as these using fMRI (which we presently cannot), the resulting data may
have no greater legally relevant explanatory power than the behavior itself.
b. Another alternative is behavioral psychology
At present, fMRI is most often used as a mere legitimizing illustrative
accompaniment for social and behavioral psychology data. 295 But in fact,
behavioral psychology is much better equipped to introduce the nuance and
subjectivity that, while some see them as weaknesses, are currently required for
this type of mens rea analysis. The user of fMRI can manipulate psychological
constructs and clinical assessment to evaluate an individual’s executive
functioning, capacity, and inhibition control, throw an incredibly isolated task
at a scanner, and then end up with a complementary blob in a brain-scan image
that appears to augment her psychological argument.
294. See supra Part III.F.7.
295. Matthew Hutson, The 7th Annual Year in Ideas: Neurorealism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.

9, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 34 (“The way conclusions from cognitive neuroscience studies
are reported in the popular press, ‘they don’t necessarily tell us anything we couldn’t have
found out without using a brain scanner. . . . It just looks more believable now that we have
the pretty pictures.’” (quoting neuroscientist Deena Weisberg)). Some scientists have dubbed
this phenomenon “neuro-realism”:
Our concept of ‘neuro-realism’ describes how coverage of fMRI investigations can make a
phenomenon uncritically real, objective or effective in the eyes of the public. This occurs
most notably when qualifications about results are not brought to the reader’s attention. For
example, commenting on an fMRI study of fear, one article states, “Now scientists say the
feeling is not only real, but they can show what happens in the brain to cause it.”

Racine et al. supra note , at 160 (citation omitted).
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If the blob only confirms what the psychological assessment gave the user
by offering an implicated area of the brain, then why use the blob at all? The
reason may be that jurors are suspicious of psychological explanations, and will
not accord this evidence much weight. 296 In this sense, brain images may be
seen as “saving” psychological explanations in the courtroom. The irony is that,
despite the jury’s skepticism of nuanced psychological evidence, fMRI data is
only as good as the psychological constructs relied upon to develop the
experimental task.
The fact that attorneys rely on fMRI, SPECT, EEG and PET, when their
experts should know that the functional data cannot make useful individual
inferences about past mental states, begs the question of whether the parties are
using the images specifically for their unfairly prejudicial effect. That is, are
attorneys using brain scans because they know they will unduly influence the
jury to accept psychological constructs that would otherwise be suspect as
“soft” science?
6. fMRI is unfairly prejudicial as it encourages the fundamental
psycholegal error
“Psycholegal error” is a term coined by Stephen Morse that refers to the
tendency to think that an actor is not responsible for behavior that is caused by
the actor’s brain function or genes. 297 This is improper reasoning because in
fact all human behavior is caused by the flow of neurotransmitter in the brain
and because the law cares about the effect of a cause on a legally relevant
excusing or mitigating condition rather than the cause itself.
Neuroscientific evidence could lead a factfinder properly to mitigation or
excuse of a defendant’s behavior, but only if that evidence does more than
point to an ordinary biological basis for the defendant’s criminal actions. For
example, neuroscientific evidence could be used to support a theory of reduced
296. Cf. Rick Brown, Note, Limitations on Expert Testimony on the Battered Woman
Syndrome in Homicide Cases: The Return of the Ultimate Issue Rule, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 665,
673 (1990) (“Jurors are not likely to give unquestioning acceptance to psychological expert
testimony.”). In addition, psychiatric testimony only needs to “assist the jury” as required by
FRE 702. Id. at 671. This low standard may be warranted for psychological testimony
because there is less risk that the jury will be overawed, as compared with the “hard”
sciences. Id. at 673.
297. According to Morse, this error “bedevils thinking about the relation between
scientific discoveries of causes of behavior and traditional conceptions of responsibility.
Discovering a cause for behavior, whether it is biological, psychological or sociological,
does not mean that the agent is not responsible for the behavior.” Stephen J. Morse, Criminal
Responsibility and the Disappearing Person, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2545, 2569 (2007).
Even if neuroscience develops airtight theories that illustrate biological causes that
predispose people to behave as they do, “the science typically supporting the more general
and radical claim that conscious will is an illusion—that we do not act and therefore cannot
be responsible—is either insufficient empirically or does not have the implications claimed.”
Id. at 2570.
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mental capacity, deficient executive function, or lack of inhibitory control that
produced a legally relevant excusing condition. 298 Brain images that indicate
structural or functional lesions are relevant to such findings. However, fMRI
does not by itself explain a behavioral deficit. Rather, it demonstrates which
areas of a person’s brain are engaged when that person performs particular
mental actions. Because it indicates nothing more than a correlation between
biological functions and behavior, it provides fodder for factfinders to fall prey
to psycholegal error and the mitigation or excuse of criminal behavior. As
discussed above, this is an improper basis for juror decision-making, and thus
risks unfair prejudice.
7. fMRI evidence is unfairly prejudicial as it impairs factfinders’ ability to
assess evidence
Converging evidence indicates that it may be very difficult for jurors to
properly evaluate fMRI-based evidence. For example, recent work
demonstrates the public’s extreme unfamiliarity with the complexity of
producing brain images. 299 Furthermore, researchers have long worried that
neuroimaging methodologies may increase the risk for misuse, given that
individuals may be lured by their high-tech profile. 300 This problem may be
simply one of a technology in transition. Over time, with the cooperation of
neuroscientists and journalists, the popular press may better communicate the
achievements and limitations of neuroimaging technology, which will
hopefully reduce its capacity for unfair prejudice. But we are not there yet, and
it is not just the lay public that is confused about the claims that can be made by

298. Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Genetics, and Criminal Responsibility, 69 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 174-75 (2006) (“Abnormal physical variables, such as
neurotransmitter deficiencies, may cause a genuine excusing condition, such as the lack of
rational capacity, but then the lack of rational capacity, not causation, is doing the excusing
work.”).
299. A Brazilian survey of “neuroscience literacy” showed that the public is quite
uninformed about imaging methods. Suzana Herculano-Houzel, Do You Know Your Brain?
A Survey on Public Neuroscience Literacy at the Closing of the Decade of the Brain, 8
NEUROSCIENTIST 98, 110 (2002).
300. See, e.g., Martha J. Farah & Paul Root Wolpe, Monitoring and Manipulating
Brain Function: New Neuroscience Technologies and Their Ethical Implications, 34
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 35, 40 (2004) (exploring the potential misuse of neuroimages, which
“possess an illusory accuracy and objectivity”); Trisha Gura, Big Plans for Little Brains, 435
NATURE 1156, 1158 (2005) (“‘You never can tell where research is going to lead . . . [b]ut
the danger to everyone . . . is expecting too much, too soon.’” (quoting John Bruer, president
of the James S. McDonnell Foundation)); Jennifer Kulynych, Brain, Mind and Criminal
Behavior: Neuroimages as Scientific Evidence, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 235, 237 (1996) (“[S]ome
researchers fear that the premature use of brain images to predict behavior has introduced a
new form of ‘junk science’ in the courtroom.”); Robert S. Stufflebeam & William Bechtel,
PET: Exploring the Myth and the Method, 64 PHIL. SCI. S95, S95-S96 (1997) (praising the
“dramatic character of these images,” but critically evaluating the limited ability of PET to
map onto psychological functions).
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fMRI. In fact, as one respected imaging expert pointed out, the “massively
multidimensional” aspect of producing neuroimages has led to methodological
mistakes by researchers themselves. 301
Two studies published in 2008 provide empirical support for our argument
that it may be extremely difficult for jurors properly to evaluate fMRI evidence.
The first study, from Yale University, 302 began with the hypothesis that
subjects would accord too much weight to the explanatory power of irrelevant
neuroscience data. The researchers split the eighty-one subjects into three
groups: those untrained in psychology and neuroscience, students in a
neuroscience course, and neuroscience experts. The subjects were given brief
descriptions of psychological phenomena. The researchers then gave the
subjects either a “good” explanation or a “bad” explanation (involving circular
reasoning) of the psychological phenomenon. The explanations also varied in
language. Some used plain English, while others used neuroscience lingo. The
varied language was logically irrelevant—it added zero explanatory power. 303
Subjects of all three groups were capable of judging good explanations
more persuasive than bad ones. But bad explanations accompanied by irrelevant
neuroscience lingo distorted the understanding of subjects from the two nonexpert groups. The researchers found that, for these two groups, the mere
presentation of phrases such as “brain scans indicate” turned a bad explanation
into a good one, “masking otherwise salient problems in these explanations”
and making the explanations appear to be more persuasive. 304 Thus, according
to the Yale study, the presentation of logically irrelevant neuroscience data can
give people the mistaken feeling that they have just read a good explanation of
psychological phenomena. 305 In the courtroom context, this should be
characterized as a risk of unfair prejudice. This is demonstrated below in Figure

301. Nonindependence bias results when there are correlations or relationships between
individual measures in research that render the subsequent outcomes nonrandom. This
occurs in fMRI studies when regions of interest are selected for follow-up and their selection
affects any comparison to other brain regions for a measure of relative activation. See
Edward Vul et al., Puzzlingly High Correlations in fMRI Studies of Emotion, Personality,
and Social Cognition, 4 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 274, 279 (2009), available at
http://www.edvul.com/pdf/VulHarrisWinkielmanPashler-PPS-2009.pdf; see also Edward
Vul & Nancy Kanwisher, Begging the Question: The Non-Independence Error in fMRI Data
Analysis, in FOUNDATIONAL ISSUES IN HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING (Stephen Jose Hanson &
Martin Bunzl eds.) (forthcoming 2010), available at http://www.edvul.com/pdf/
VulKanwisher-chapter-inpress.pdf (“[The non-independence error] is prevalent in cognitive
neuroscience . . . . [O]f the eight papers in a recent special issue of Neuroimage, five
contained variants of this error.”).
302. Deena Skolnick Weisberg et al., The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience
Explanations, 20 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 470, 470 (2008).
303. Id. at 471.
304. Id. at 470.
305. See J.D. Trout, Seduction Without Cause: Uncovering Explanatory Neurophilia,
12 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 281, 281-82 (2008) (discussing the implications of the Weisberg
et al. study).
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5.

Unsatisfying

Satisfying

Figure 5

In a separate study conducted at Colorado State University, researchers
examined “whether brain images actually do have a particularly powerful
persuasive influence on the perceived credibility of cognitive neuroscience
data.” 306 The researchers presented undergraduates aged eighteen to twentyfive with brief fictional articles that summarized cognitive neuroscience
research results. All of the articles contained serious logical errors regarding
psychological phenomena. Some of these articles contained neuroscientific
307
After reading the articles, subjects were asked
images; others did not.
whether “(1) [t]he article was well written, (2) [t]he title was a good description
of the results, and (3) [t]he scientific reasoning in the article made sense.” 308
The presentation of neuroscientific images did not substantially effect the
question about the title, but it substantially impacted the questions of whether
the article was well-written and whether the reasoning made sense. As the data
below demonstrate, subjects gave higher rankings to text that was accompanied
306. David P. McCabe & Alan D. Castel, Seeing Is Believing: The Effect of Brain
Images on Judgments of Scientific Reasoning, 107 COGNITION 343, 344 (2008).
307. One example of a stimulus was as follows: Subjects were given an article that
reported that watching TV and completing math problems both led to activation in the
temporal lobe. The article then concluded that because these two events activated the same
lobe of the brain, watching TV improved math skills. The similarity in brain activation was
depicted by plain text, bar graph, or brain image. Id. at 343.
308. Id. at 345 (emphasis omitted).

BROWNMURPHY - 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

1202

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

4/13/2010 11:40 AM

[Vol. 62:1119

by a brain image than to text that was accompanied by a bar graph or to text
with no image at all. 309
Figure 6: “Watching TV helps with math ability because both activate
the temporal lobe.”

These data lend support to the argument that brain images have unique
persuasive power, causing viewers to overlook serious logical errors and,
therefore, to make improper inferences. Improper bases for decisionmaking
such as these are a quintessential form of unfair prejudice, one that is clearly
risked by evidentiary use of fMRI. 310
H. Cross-Examination Is Not the Cure
An argument has been made that the answer to the problem of unfair
prejudice is to admit more, not fewer, images by allowing rigorous crossexamination and introduction of competing images. 311 Under this theory, more
information will lead to jurors assessing brain images more reliably.
Ostensibly, competing images would enable jurors to assess the relative
309. Id.
310. Id. at 343 (“These data lend support to the notion that part of the fascination, and

the credibility, of brain imaging research lies in the persuasive power of the actual brain
images themselves. We argue that brain images are influential because they provide a
physical basis for abstract cognitive processes.”). Unfortunately, as much of this type of
research is done on psychology undergraduate students, and we are dealing with constructs
such as the neurobiology of behavior, the data should be interpreted with a grain of salt. The
external validity remains to be tested on a broader pool of the population from which most
jurors will actually be selected.
311. See Neal Feigenson, Brain Imaging and Courtroom Evidence: On the
Admissibility and Persuasiveness of fMRI, 2 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 233, 250 (2006) (“The cure
for naïve realism is more, not fewer images.”).
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strength of the overall story. This argument would be more compelling if we
were confident in the robustness of the authentication process. This point aside,
cross-examination is a very imperfect process for getting at truth, especially in
the case of complex, high-impact technology as fMRI. 312
Cross-examination might reveal that an expert’s statistical thresholds are
poor or inconsistent. It might also uncover poor study design or conflicting
potential interpretations. But the weaknesses of using fMRI in the courtroom
extend far beyond deviation from best research practices. Truth cannot be
exposed through the adversarial process when there is no agreed-upon “truth.”
The current state of the science is up in the air, as the relationship between
brain states and mental states is still being worked out. Furthermore, even when
the science is done well, there will be serious disagreement about how to
interpret the results. Therefore, cross-examination can do little to get us closer
to the truth, and it cannot be relied upon to completely purge unfair
prejudice. 313
Unfortunately, neither rehabilitative testimony nor further crossexamination can currently fix this attack. Even after considerable waste of court
and party resources, we would be left with jurors’ shrugged shoulders and an
acknowledgment that the brain images are only a prop developed to bolster the
psychological testing or observed behavior. This is precisely what happened in
the Saviñon case, where the defense counsel ultimately admitted that the brain
images were just superfluous, but only after wasting much of the prosecution’s
and judge’s time. Prosecution and public defender offices are already trying to
do too much with too little, and ordering expensive fMRI analyses and experts
is a waste of precious resources. Because the interpretive standards of
producing a functional brain image are subjective, and because the relationship
between brain states and mental states is still being worked out, crossexamination is a poor tool for getting at the “true” mental state. Therefore,
being presented with more or conflicting images from either side will likely
only confuse jurors and waste the court’s time. In fact, increasing the jury’s
cognitive load, or decision-making burden, may lead to less thoughtful
decisions. 314 This alone is an acceptable reason to exclude the brain images, as

312. See Jeffrey Bellin, The Significance (if Any) for the Federal Criminal Justice
System of Advances in Lie Detector Technology, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 711, 711 (2007) (“[F]ew
would deny that [cross-examination] has achieved . . . exalted status largely by default.
Science has simply failed to produce any valid alternative.”); Laura Stephens Khoshbin &
Shahram Khoshbin, Imaging the Mind, Minding the Image: An Historical Introduction to
Neuroimaging and the Law, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 171, 192 (2007) (“[T]he adversarial system
is an inadequate forum for determining the evidentiary validity of such evidence.”).
313. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note , § 13-11, at 431.
314. See, e.g., Joshua D. Greene et al., Cognitive Load Selectively Interferes with
Utilitarian Moral Judgment, 107 COGNITION 1144, 1144 (2008) (finding that “a cognitive
load manipulation selectively interferes with utilitarian judgment”); cf. Nadine Marcus et al.,
Understanding Instructions, 88 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 49, 49 (1996) (“Instructional material
may be difficult to understand if it consists of many elements that must be held in working
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the judge has “‘wide latitude to impose reasonable limits’ on cross-examination
in order to avoid confusion of the issues or extended discussion of marginally
relevant material.” 315 If fMRI adds almost no probative value, while
introducing much interpretive ambiguity, unfair prejudice, or confusion, the
images should be excluded based on FRE 403.
CONCLUSION
A. FRE 403 Provides Adequate Grounds for Exclusion Based on the Potential
for Unfair Prejudice and Nearly Bankrupt Probative Value
Relevant evidence can be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and
misleading the jury. A great deal of evidence is excluded on these grounds, and
trial judges have considerable discretion in making this determination.
We have demonstrated here that the probative value of fMRI addressed to a
defendant’s mens rea is extraordinarily low, such that a modest amount of
unfair prejudice should render these images inadmissible.
Functional neuroimaging promotes unfair prejudice and confusion of the
issues because it causes jurors to ground their decisionmaking in emotional
responses to images and distracts jurors from logical errors, thus causing them
to make decisions founded on improper bases. Additionally, it wastes the
court’s time and resources. 316 While more research on mock jurors needs to be
done to bolster or refute our claims, the preliminary data suggest that fMRI
could be excluded based on its potential to bias jurors and make them find
otherwise bad arguments more compelling. 317
B. Closing Thoughts on the Critical Legal View of the Allure of fMRI
The familiar story is one of weak circumstantial evidence and impressive
scientific findings. The combination of these elements may be a powerful
memory simultaneously.”); John Sweller, Cognitive Load Theory, Learning Difficulty, and
Instructional Design, 4 LEARNING & INSTRUCTION 295, 303 (1994).
315. United States v. Gonzalez-Vazquez, 219 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting
United States v. Twomey, 806 F.2d 1136, 1139 (1st Cir. 1986)); see also United States v.
Ambers, 85 F.3d 173, 177 (4th Cir. 1996) (“To entitle defense counsel to explore the
intricacies of the [evidence] on cross-examination might do much to confuse lay jurors and
little to enlighten them.”).
316. See Michael Avery, Prejudice vs. Probative Value, Philadelphia Style, 50 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1147, 1147 & n.5 (2006) (“[I]f the defense lawyer cannot convince the trial
judge to exclude such photographs, the chances of winning the issue on appeal are remote.”).
317. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and
Prejudice in Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common
Law of Evidence?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 879, 905 (1988) (discussing when Rule 403 should be
used to “shield the jury from evidence”).
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prescription for injustice: scientific evidence seems so compelling that it could
sway even the most skeptical juror and convince him that the elements of a
weak case are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 318 If, on the other hand, the
defendant catches the court’s sympathies, then the junk science may swing in
the opposite direction and make a weak defense appear stronger. 319 This story
has played out before with phrenology, 320 the polygraph, 321 and countless
other forensic technologies that have since been discredited. Improper reliance
on each of these untested and unreliable technologies has led to unjust
outcomes. 322
These older forensic technologies all have the window dressings of
science. 323 Each supplies the court with lab coat-wearing experts who will
speak to analyses of “matching” criteria with confidence that their methods are

318. Perhaps this is what happened in a recent case in Pune, India, where Aditi Sharma
was convicted of murdering her ex-fiance, Udit Bharati. The court repeatedly mentioned the
fact that the marriage between Aditi and Udit was approved by their parents, and it is
difficult not to consider the possibility that Aditi’s acts were considered particularly heinous
in light of her breaking off her engagement to Udit. The court’s opinion contained many
logical errors, and the shaky evidence was all drawn in the light most negative to the
defendant. With no clear proof of intent or action, an untested brain-based technology was
used to prove that Aditi had “guilty knowledge” of the details of the crime. The opinion does
not say how the technology is capable of discerning whether Aditi’s brain appeared to
recognize facts of the case because she experienced them, versus her awareness because
these statements were present in her charge sheet. The full opinion is available at
http://lawandbiosciences.files.wordpress.com/2008/12/beosruling2.pdf.
319. Dan White, the former San Francisco supervisor who assassinated Harvey Milk
and Mayor George Moscone, famously entered a diminished capacity defense based largely
on his depression, and minimally upon his diet of junk food. The junk food was introduced
as a symptom of his depression rather than the cause, but the press exploited the latter, even
thought it was only briefly mentioned by defense attorney Douglas Schmidt in his closing
argument. See Kelly Snider, The Infamous Twinkie Defense—Fact or Fiction?, 9 ANNALS
AM. PSYCHOTHERAPY ASS’N. 42, 43 (2006). In any event, the defense worked to reduce
White’s conviction from first-degree murder to manslaughter. See People v. White, 172 Cal.
Rptr. 612, 612 (Ct. App. 1981). The people of San Francisco rioted in response, and the
diminished capacity defense was later abolished in California. See In re Christian S., 872
P.2d 574, 575 (Cal. 1994).
320. See supra note 3.
321. See supra note 35; see generally Wygant, supra note 4, at 330-31.
322. Comparative bullet lead analysis (CBLA) is just one example. CBLA has
“recently been abandoned after decades of use because an exhaustive analysis by the
National Research Council concluded that there was no scientific basis for the claim that it
could ‘match’ crime scene bullets to particular boxes of bullets.” Keith A. Findley, Innocents
at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, and the Search for Truth, 38 SETON HALL
L. REV. 893, 935 (2008); see also, e.g., Bowling v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-SC-000034MR, 2008 WL 4291670, at *2 (Ky. Sept. 18, 2008) (denying defendant’s motion for a new
trial, despite the introduction of now-discredited CBLA evidence, on grounds of harmless
error).
323. Cf. David Faigman, Anecdotal Forensics, Phrenology, and Other Abject Lessons
from the History of Science, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 979 (2008) (describing the “varying
merit” of various “claims to the mantle of science”).
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sound. But despite popular appeal, phrenology, polygraphy, and fingerprint and
handwriting analysis have never had the ringing endorsement of mainstream
physical or biological sciences. In addition, empirical studies have confirmed
that there is little reliability or validity in many of these methodologies. 324
However, unlike these sensationalized forensic sciences, functional
neuroimaging has the imprimatur of the scientific research community. Indeed,
it is difficult to open a copy of Nature or Science without eyeing several
colorful functional brain images.
Perhaps, then, the once fledgling field of genetics can provide a more
appropriate analogy. So long as genetic samples are not contaminated, the
ability to exclude someone from a suspect list based on modern DNA testing is
fairly robust. Even so, recall that it took many years for DNA evidence to arrive
at the presently-understood state of fallible yet scientifically-valid evidence.
However, before the lab standards and analytical models were fully vetted,
suspects were unfortunately charged based on DNA samples that were later
found to have been carelessly analyzed. 325
Science can appear to be beyond the reach of human distortion. As a result,
the more the scientific evidence relies on complex technologies like computers
or imaging devices, the greater the risk that it may be endowed with powers to
solve difficult legal questions. Litigants have long used this fact to their
advantage, stretching scientific findings in order to retrofit them to legal
conclusions. This may be what is happening with fMRI. The device is not yet
capable of capturing past mental states, but because the criminal law is
sometimes desperate to prove the unprovable, there will almost surely be an
increase in proffered evidence and testimony based on this new technology.
However, until fMRI is able to reliably capture past mental states, this evidence
should not be admissible for such purposes either under FRE 403 or under local
standards for admissibility of scientific evidence.

324. See Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in
Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892, 892 (2005) (“The assumption of
discernible uniqueness that resides at the core of these fields is weakened by evidence of
errors in proficiency testing and in actual cases.”); see also Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded by
Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific Evidence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 56
(1998) (“[H]air identification, bitemark analysis, voice spectography, handwriting analysis . .
. and . . . fingerprinting[] have crept into court with virtually no demonstration of their
scientific bases.”); Craig M. Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community to Avert
the Ultimate Injustice, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 381-82 (2004) (providing examples of
many forensic science errors that have carried great weight in trials).
325. In one instance of carelessly analyzed DNA, the defense thankfully was able to
challenge the genetic testing procedure, and teased out the lack of testing on the criteria used
to determine a DNA “match.” See People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 997 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1989). For an example of how Australian courts have treated errors in DNA analysis, see R.
v. Lucas, (1991) 55 A. Crim. R. 361.
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APPENDIX: CHECKLIST FOR JUDGES CONFRONTED WITH FUNCTIONAL
NEUROIMAGING EVIDENCE
It is possible that the validity and probative value of fMRI in assessing
mental states will improve in the future. It is also possible that the public
understanding of the inferential leaps required by functional imaging
techniques will progress such that the technology carries less risk of unfair
prejudice. In the event that these twin events occur, judges and opposing
counsel may appreciate having access to a simple checklist of questions that
they can pose when deciding whether to admit fMRI evidence. Although our
thesis is addressed to functional brain images used to prove mens rea, this
checklist could also be applied to fMRI used as evidence of lie detection and
other mental states.
General questions to ask counsel seeking to introduce functional
neuroimaging evidence:
(a) Behavioral task. What is the particular behavior assessed during the
scan? Why was the particular behavioral task chosen? Is it well
supported in the psychological literature as best capturing this type of
mental state? Did the subject perform the behavioral task adequately?
Is the task vulnerable to manipulation, countermeasures, or
malingering? Are the subject’s behavioral data within or significantly
outside the normal distribution of performance on the task?
(b) Controls. How were the controls selected to be in the control group?
Are they the correct reference class? What sort of testing was done on
the controls to make sure that they were in fact, “normal”? Is the
sample size large enough to capture normal variance between subjects?
(c) Variance. Can you show us the brain scans of the control group, and
are there significant differences among the individuals in this group?
How much difference between individuals do we see?
(d) Image construction. Please walk us through the process for developing
the image. How did you go from the raw data in the scanner to the
color picture of the brain? Can you provide the raw data and exact
methodology to an independent party for verification of the image
creation process?
(e) Alternative explanations. What are possible alternate explanations for
this behavior and corresponding neural activation correlates (i.e.,
expertise in the task, medication status, drug abuse history, hormonal
fluctuations, language or motor limitation, etc.)?
(f) Purpose of fMRI evidence. What justifies the introduction of this brain
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image over evidence of the accused’s behavior at the time of the
crime?
(g) Statistical threshold. What statistical threshold was used to create the
image? Why was it used?
(h) Causal connection. Is there a known or hypothesized mechanism
causally connecting any perceived brain abnormality to a functional
deficit? Do we have any data on the incidence of reduced metabolic or
hemodynamic activity of this kind resulting in this type of cognitive
deficit?

